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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of authentication is to ensure that only authorized individuals have access to 
a particular resource or physical area. To authenticate and prove their “right to access,” a 
person must essentially prove that they are who they claim to be (i.e., an authorized 
individual) by presenting elements such as ID badges, fingerprints, personal identification 
numbers (PINs) or – very often – a username and password. For users of information 
technology, authentication is an inescapable fact of daily life – and it affects them in 
ways that are still poorly understood. 
In order to better understand users’ authentication-related perceptions and behaviors, we 
conducted a two-part study with 25 NIST employees. In the first part of the study, we 
instructed our participants to record all the authentication events they encountered over a 
24-hour period (in the workplace and, if they so chose, at home) using forms we 
provided. The second part of the study consisted of individual follow-up interviews 
regarding participants’ experiences with authentication. 
Our study was designed to answer the following questions: 
• Where does authentication fit into the daily activities people carry out? 
• What characteristics of authentication may interfere with the primary activity that 
authentication is supposed to enable? What are the friction points? 
• How do people add up the cumulative costs of authenticating multiple times each day, 
and how do they balance them against their own perceived security needs? 
• How do people perceive the costs of performing security tasks (particularly 
authentication tasks) in comparison with the benefits of performing those tasks? 
We found that our participants were confused about what “authentication” actually 
meant. For example, one participant erroneously recorded unlocking his car with his 
remote key fob as an authentication event. Conversely, some participants did not record 
showing their ID badge to a guard before entering the NIST campus (although most did). 
Our participants recorded an average of 23 authentication events each during the study 
period. Since many participants did not record authentication events outside of work, we 
suspect that the actual number is higher. In interviews, participants indicated that they 
were frustrated by the sheer number of authentication tasks they had to perform every day 
– especially those they had to perform repeatedly, such as unlocking work computers that 
auto-locked after 15 minutes. In addition, while participants were understandably 
frustrated by problems that interfered with the successful completion of authentication 
tasks, they were also frustrated by tasks that were particularly complex and/or time-
consuming, even when they did not encounter problems. Participants also found it 
particularly effortful  to manage a variety of passwords for multiple resources, especially 
since those passwords were often governed by different policies. 
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Although our participants valued organizational security and understood the benefits of 
authentication with regard to security, these benefits were often overshadowed by the 
day-to-day costs of using and managing multiple authentication elements. For that 
reason, many of our participants adopted behaviors to help them cope with or avoid 
authentication, without (from their perspective) compromising organizational security. 
Coping strategies included synchronizing passwords across multiple IT resources; 
employing password creation schemas; keeping password notes in a secure place; and 
employing password vaults or managers. Avoidance usually meant giving up on 
performing certain “extra” activities (e.g., doing additional work from home) because the 
cost of authenticating to do so seemed greater than the potential benefit of the activity. 
Our participants are not unique in being impacted by authentication. “Password fatigue” 
is, in fact, a very common problem [1][13]. Expecting users to simply adapt to an 
excessive authentication workload is not realistic. But from the user’s perspective, what 
is excessive? In any case, if our participants’ coping and avoidance strategies are any 
indication, the ways in which users adapt may not be desirable from an organizational 
perspective. Rather than trying to force users to adapt to authentication, organizations, 
security experts, developers, and engineers must find ways to make authentication adapt 
to users – in other words, to make it more usable. 
Ultimately, making authentication more usable will take time. Further research is needed 
on how authentication affects users and the habits they develop to cope with those 
effects. This kind of research is essential for developing more usable, context-sensitive 
authentication solutions that will keep interference with users’ primary tasks to an 
absolute minimum. Finally, there is a need for best practices aimed at designing and 
implementing more usable authentication. 
Until then, organizations can take steps to reduce the burden of authentication on their 
employees, and other users of these systems, which will improve both security and 
productivity. This study indicates that users prefer  single sign-on (SSO) authentication; 
another option is standardizing password policies throughout the organization, which will 
make authentication elements easier for users to manage. Finally, organizations can 
encourage and support authentication coping mechanisms such as the use of password 
manager or vault applications on computers and mobile electronic devices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Users must interact with a variety of applications and systems over the course of a day, in 
both their professional and personal lives. Each application and system has its own set of 
security policies and measures. Even different systems within the same organization – 
say, a single company or governmental agency – tend to have separate (and sometimes 
conflicting) security policies that are effectively “unaware” of each other. Each policy is 
narrowly focused on the system or application to which it directly applies, rather than the 
broader technological and policy environment in which the system exists. 
Fragmented security policies are one reason why workers have to manage multiple 
passwords – between 5 and 15, according to some researchers in the usability field 
[1][5][9][10]. In addition, those passwords may be governed by different and even 
mutually exclusive password policies. One requires a password 8 characters long, while 
another requires a password at least 12 characters long; one mandates that the password 
include special characters, while another forbids them; and one expires every six weeks 
while another expires every ninety days. In addition to the challenges of password 
management, users must handle the cumulative impact imposed by the need to 
authenticate multiple times per day [5]. 
In theory, authentication is supposed to enable users to perform their primary tasks (e.g., 
research, financial management) in a secure way. But from a user’s perspective, 
authentication often interferes with the performance of primary tasks. Beautement et al. 
refer to this kind of interference as “friction,” a term we use in this report [5].1  
Users have developed various coping strategies for minimizing or avoiding the friction 
and burden associated with managing and using their portfolios of user IDs and 
passwords or personal identification numbers (PINs). Many try to use the same password 
(or different versions of the same password) across different systems [10]. Others use 
memory aids or technological assistants such as password management software for 
computers and mobile electronic devices.  
The research team was interested in these coping strategies and the “friction points” that 
prompt people to use them. More broadly, we wanted to address a pressing research need 
by gathering data for user-centered models of how people interact with security as part of 
their daily life, as empirical research in that area is currently lacking. 
Specifically, this study was designed to answer the following research questions:  
• Where does authentication fit into the daily activities people carry out?  
                                                 
1 Sec. 2.3 and Sec. 2.4 contain more detailed explanations of enabling tasks, primary tasks, and friction. 
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• What characteristics of authentication cause friction with the primary activity that 
authentication is supposed to enable? What are the friction points? 
• How do people perceive the cumulative costs of performing authentication tasks for  
the systems and applications they use, and how do they balance them against their 
own perceived security needs? 
• How do people perceive the costs of performing security tasks (particularly 
authentication tasks) in comparison with the benefits of performing those tasks? 
The research team considered a few different factors in this study. A first objective was to  
develop an estimate of how many times in a typical day federal government knowledge 
workers2 authenticate – in other words, prove who they are to persons or systems. To do 
this, participants were asked to record the “authentication events” they encountered 
during a typical workday in a diary form provided by the team (shown in Appendix A). 
It was anticipated that by examining users’ security compliance from this angle, rather 
than focusing on the number of user IDs and passwords individuals maintain, some 
insights about usable security that have not been revealed by prior research could be 
obtained. 
Second, the study examined instances in which participants reported situations that 
delayed or prevented successful completion of the authentication process, in order to 
identify circumstances attributed to delays and problems, e.g., friction. Finally, we 
investigated the factors that contributed to frustration, friction, and the use of coping 
strategies associated with daily use of authentication. Following the recording of 
authentication events, we conducted an interview with each the participant to examine 
these issues.  
This report presents when, where, and how participants authenticated during the study 
period, as well the issues they encountered. Based on the findings, we quantified and 
developed a preliminary visual model of task disruption, success (or failure), and 
frustration – factors contributing to impact on the user. These factors include the mental 
and physical workload associated with recalling authentication elements such as 
passwords and PINs and the disruption that failure to recall those elements causes to the 
user’s activity. 
Additionally, we identify and discuss the friction points of authentication that participants 
reported. We also relate and discuss participants’ observations about organizational 
security from their perspective as it relates to authentication, as well their coping 
mechanisms to manage the impact of authentication requirements. Insights and 
recommendations related to usable security were also derived from the findings. 
                                                 
2 Knowledge workers include those who work in information technology fields. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
This section presents key terms used in this study: 
• Authentication (including authentication factors) 
• Usability 
• Enabling tasks and primary tasks 
• Friction 
• Compliance budget 
• Password fatigue 
The definitions of these terms are given below, as well as, a description of the general IT 
and authentication environment within NIST and how that environment affects the way 
authentication mechanisms are implemented and used there – important considerations 
for this study, since all of the participants were NIST employees.  
2.1 AUTHENTICATION 
The purpose of authentication is to ensure that only authorized individuals have access to 
a particular resource: that resource can be a system, application, database, or even a 
physical area. In essence, authentication requires that a person prove that they are who 
they claim to be, i.e., an authorized individual, using a set of authentication elements that 
employ some combination of the following three factors: 
• Something you have – a physical token such as a smart card or ID 
• Something you are – biometrics such as fingerprints or a facial image 
• Something you know – a password, code, or PIN 
While there are a variety of authentication mechanisms currently in use, the one that will 
perhaps be most familiar to people is the combination of a user ID and password 
(something you know). Displaying a picture ID to a guard or holding a passcard to a 
reader in order to unlock a door are also common forms of authentication (something you 
have). One form that is becoming more and more common is a multi-factor 
authentication (MFA) mechanism involving a smartcard and PIN (something you have, 
something you know). 
2.2 USABILITY 
Mary Ellen Zurko and Richard T. Simon coined the term “user-centered security” in a 
research paper in 1996. In their paper, they described the usability lessons they had 
learned from their work on a user-centered rules-based authorization engine. One of their 
key observations was that because “security mechanisms need to be appropriately used to 
maintain their effectiveness…. Mechanisms and models that are confusing to the user 
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will be misused.” Not misused maliciously, in the classic sense, but unintentionally. 
Zurko and Simon strongly recommended that secure systems should be designed and 
tested for usability in order to reduce the potential for confusion and, by extension, 
inadvertent misuse [29]. 
A few years later, in 1999, Alma Whitten and Doug Tygar published the results of a 
usability study on Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 5.0, a program that provides cryptographic 
privacy and authentication for e-mail and other online communication. In their paper, 
they presented the following criteria for usability: 
“Security software is usable if the people who are expected to use it:  
(1) Are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform.  
(2) Are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks.  
(3) Don’t make dangerous errors.  
(4) Are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.” [27]. 
2.3 ENABLING TASKS AND PRIMARY TASKS 
Authentication is something that users do on the way to some other activity – for 
example, logging into an e-mail application in order to send a message to a co-worker. 
Sending the e-mail is the primary task, while logging into the application in order to do 
so is the secondary task that enables it. Or, as usability researchers Dirk Weirich and 
Martina Angela Sasse put it: 
“In most cases, authentication to a system is an enabling task, which means it 
creates an overhead for the user, who is using that system as a tool to achieve a 
primary, real-world task.” [26] 
In some cases the enabling task of authentication can be transparent: it fits into the flow 
of the user’s primary task or happens automatically, so the user does not notice it. But in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, authentication is explicit – a specific set of actions 
that the user must take before proceeding. It is something the user must do before 
engaging in something he or she wants to do. 
2.4 FRICTION 
In a report on a study examining the factors that influence users’ compliance (or non-
compliance) with organizational security requirements, Beautement et al. explained that: 
“Employees focus on completing their primary (production) tasks, and the 
behaviour required by the security (enabling) tasks often presents an obstacle on 
the shortest path to the primary goal. This misalignment introduces friction 
between security and business processes into the organizational system, and it is 
this friction that is at the heart of individual compliance issues.” [5] 
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In other words, friction occurs when security tasks interrupt the user on his or her way to 
completing a primary task. Because of this friction, users must spend additional time and 
effort to accomplish their primary goals.  
2.5 THE COMPLIANCE BUDGET 
Because of the friction inherent in security tasks, as described in Sec. 2.4, users often 
perceive these tasks as an obstacle to engaging in and completing their primary tasks. 
More than that, they see little if any return on the investment of time and effort that they 
put into security tasks. As Beautement et al. explain, users have a limited tolerance for 
the disruption related to security tasks: 
“There is a limit to the amount of effort individuals are prepared to expend on 
security measures that do not obviously contribute to their key production tasks, 
and this extra non-productive effort required accumulates until a limit is reached. 
We have named this limit the Compliance Budget… The limit of the Compliance 
Budget is referred to as the compliance threshold; this being the point at which 
the individual no longer has the will to comply with official requirements.” [5] 
For users, cost/benefit calculations related to the compliance budget are largely non-
quantified, just like most of the cost/benefit calculations humans perform as they make 
decisions on a daily basis – for example, determining the importance and urgency of 
individual tasks when prioritizing the tasks that might be accomplished in a given 
timeframe. Users cannot quantify their compliance budget. But they are aware that 
security requirements and security tasks cause accumulated fatigue over time.  
2.6 PASSWORD FATIGUE 
Password fatigue, also referred to as authentication fatigue, is conceptually related to the 
compliance budget and compliance threshold: it is a nearly perpetual state of stress and 
exhaustion experienced by technology users who are overwhelmed by authentication-
related demands on their time, energy, and memory [13]. Martina Angela Sasse and 
Angela Adams point out that this situation is exacerbated by organizational IT 
departments that try to address what they see as the problem of “inherently insecure” 
users by escalating the number and stringency of security mechanisms and policies those 
users must deal with [1]. 
“Password fatigue” is a common term in the security and IT industries, often cited as the 
reason why many users – even if they are relatively security-conscious – engage in 
behaviors that compromise the security of the systems they use, e.g., creating passwords 
that are easy to guess or to compromise with password-cracking software. Another 
possible effect of password fatigue is changing one’s work habits to reduce or avoid 
authentication in a way that does not compromise security, but does have adverse effects 
on one’s productivity. 
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2.7 IT AND AUTHENTICATION AT NIST 
At NIST, many and varied applications and software systems3 are required to perform the 
business of the organization. These applications and systems may be administered by 
agencies and organizations outside of NIST, e.g., other government agencies or standards 
bodies; and as a consequence NIST does not have control over their authentication 
configuration. Other systems are administered by the NIST IT system support staff, while 
still other (often more specialized) systems and applications may be managed by staff 
associated with the individual projects that make use of those applications. Users at NIST 
interact with multiple applications each day to do their work, each of which requires 
authentication. The authentication methods associated with these applications include: 
user ID and password, smartcard and PIN, remote token combined with smartcard and 
PIN, and picture ID. 
As in many other organizations, the most common authentication mechanism used for 
logical access (i.e., access to a system or application) employs a user ID and password. 
Logins for a number of mission-critical applications and systems within the NIST domain 
are consolidated using a single sign-on (SSO) solution – for example, NIST’s domain 
services automatically log users into e-mail and calendar clients as well as other 
applications. However, Windows and OSX user profile passwords are not part of the SSO 
solution, nor are the passwords used for hard disk encryption on laptops. Fortunately 
these are all governed by the same password policy. Additionally, authentication 
elements for a number of other applications used at NIST – such as applications managed 
by the Department of Commerce – are not managed through SSO, and their password 
policies vary.  
Some applications and systems also support smartcard-based authentication. All NIST 
employees have a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) smartcard with an associated 6-8 
digit PIN. At the time of this writing, a relatively small number of employees use this 
method on a regular basis, in part because not all employees are “PIV-enabled,” i.e., they 
do not have the requisite card reader and middleware or operating system. Even 
employees who use smartcard authentication almost exclusively must still manage their 
NIST domain password, which expires every ninety days. 
Logging into the NIST virtual private network (VPN) from off campus requires not only 
a user ID and password (or PIV card and PIN), but also a six-digit code from a NIST-
issued RSA token, which changes every sixty seconds. To authenticate, users must enter 
their user ID, PIN and the RSA code, then their user ID and password. It takes a few 
seconds for the system to process each set of authentication elements once they are 
                                                 
3 The reference to any commercial products in this document is not intended to imply recommendation or 
endorsement by National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the 
products are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 
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submitted, and if the RSA code expires before the authentication process is completed, 
the user will have to authenticate again.  
All NIST computers, whether they are desktops or laptops, are set to lock after fifteen 
minutes of inactivity, i.e., no input from the keyboard or mouse. Once the computer is 
locked, the user must enter his/her password – or insert a PIV card (if it had been 
removed) and enter the corresponding PIN – to unlock it.4 
NIST requires authentication for physical access to the grounds and buildings as well as 
logical access to information systems. All NIST employees, contractors, and associates 
have a picture ID/keycard that they use as a credential for this purpose. This ID must be 
shown to the guards posted at NIST gates for campus access. Further, this card is also 
required for access, via an electronic reader, to the majority of NIST facilities.  
3 METHOD 
 
This study used a combined methods approach, drawing quantitative data from self-
reports from participants about the number and types of authentication they encountered 
(called a diary study), and qualitative data from ethnographic interviews to probe 
participants’ experiences and specific authentication incidents reported in their diaries. 
Ethnographic methods such as the in-depth follow-up interviews conducted, provided an 
excellent opportunity to understand the contexts in which participants encountered 
authentication, and in particular, situations in which they experienced problems,  
frustration, or authentication-related  disruption. The interviews provided a counterpoint 
to the participant diaries. 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
NIST’s Visualization and Usability Group (VUG) put out a call for volunteers throughout 
the organization via e-mail. Twenty-five NIST employees responded to that call. Of 
those, 22 attended briefings before the data collection started. We were able to use data 
from 23 participants to model the day-long snapshot of authentication that formed the 
critical component of our study. The remaining two participants were unable to provide 
authentication diary data within the requested time frame. We were able to conduct 
follow-up interviews with 22 of those 23 participants who provided diary information. 
There were 9 women and 14 men. 11 of the participants ranged in age from 50-59; 3 were 
in their 40s, 5 were in their 30s, and the remaining 3 were in their 20s. 
                                                 
4 Mac users were not required to use these measures until a few months prior to the study, when NIST 
started centrally managing security on Macs in the same manner it had been managing Windows machines. 
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All the participants in this study were knowledge workers. Thirteen of the participants 
were researchers with computer science explicitly in their title or background. Three 
participants were researchers with non-computer science backgrounds (e.g., physics, 
cognitive science). Two were information technology systems administrators. Three 
participants held technical supervisory positions. The remaining two participants were 
administrative support staff. 
3.2 MATERIALS 
The research team worked with NIST scientists to develop the following materials for use 
in this study: 
• A script for briefing participants prior to the study. The script contained an 
explanation of the study and the definition of “authentication events” participants 
were supposed to record. 
• A list of open-ended questions to ask in follow-up interviews conducted with 
participants (see Appendix A). 
• The diary form that participants could use to capture authentication events during the 
course of a work day. 
Since the form participants use to collect data is a key success factor in every diary study 
– and the research team did not want to create an additional burden for participants – 
every effort was made to create one that was compact, clear, and easy to complete. 
Several members of the NIST staff contributed to the design of the form, working from 
design principles and lessons learned by others at University College London’s Human-
Centred Security, Privacy, Identity, and Trust department who had previously conducted 
diary studies about usable security [10]. At the participant briefing, described more fully 
in Sec. 3.4.1, study participants received printed copies of the diary form. Each 21.59 cm 
by 27.94 cm (8.5 in x 11 in) page contained two entry forms. Each participant received a 
packet of 20 sheets, containing a total of 40 event entry form instances. Softcopy, 
editable versions of the form were also e-mailed to participants in Word and PDF 
formats. The form can be seen in Appendix A. 
3.3 SETTING 
Data collection centered on authentication events participants encountered during a 
normal workday at NIST. Most of the data was from authentication events on the NIST 
campus, but some participants were on travel or worked from home for at least part of the 
day. A few participants reported authentication events in their personal lives as well as in 
their workday; these are delineated in the presentation of the data. 
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3.4 PROCEDURE 
3.4.1 Briefing 
Participants were invited to group meetings to be briefed about the study and to receive 
specific instructions about how to record “authentication events”. Because this diary 
study was about security, it was anticipated that some participants might not want to join 
a group briefing meeting. The option for individual briefings was available to 
participants. However, a majority of participants attended the group meetings. A few 
were briefed individually, as they were not located on the NIST Gaithersburg campus at 
the time of the briefing meetings rather than because of other concerns. Of the 
participants who were briefed individually, one was based on the NIST campus in 
Boulder, Colorado, while others were traveling or working from home at the time – 
remote briefings took place via teleconference.  
In the briefing, the study was described to participants as a “day in the life of 
authentication” and participants were invited to be “co-researchers,” helping the research 
team to understand the depth and breadth of the effects of authenticating. Participants 
were given the diary form created for the study (described in Sec. 3.2) and were asked to 
use it to record every authentication event, every time they had to prove their identity to a 
person or a system, during a 24-hour period.  
Participants were asked to record the following information: 
• The beginning and ending times of each authentication event, i.e., when it happened 
and how long it took 
• The purpose of the authentication, e.g., first log-in of the day, re-trying authentication 
after a problem 
• What device they were logging into 
• Where they were during each authentication event (on NIST’s campus or off) 
• What type of application or system they were authenticating 
• Whether they used any memory aids for an authentication and if so, what type 
• Any problems encountered during the authentication event 
• Actions taken in the event of an authentication problem 
• Frustration level (on a 5-point scale, with 1 being “Not Frustrated” and 5 being “Very 
Frustrated"  
In addition, participants were provided with examples of authentication events, e.g., 
VPN, NIST domain, and NIST e-mail logins. It was specified that they should focus on 
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authentications that were work-related; authentications outside of work were optional. 
Although the data was protected and anonymous, because the participants and some of 
the researchers worked for the same agency, we wanted to allow for as much privacy as 
possible. 
Therefore participants were provided with blank envelopes with which to deliver their 
paper diaries to Mary Theofanos at NIST and instructed not to mark or label the 
envelopes. Alternatively, participants had the option to e-mail softcopy versions of their 
diaries to Dana Chisnell, a contractor employed by NIST. Finally, participants were 
advised that they would be contacted shortly after the diary recording portion of the study 
to a schedule a follow-up interview. 
3.4.2 Data Collection Period 
Since the briefings were held a few days before the “diary day” when participants were 
supposed to record their authentication events, participants were e-mailed the day before 
to remind them of their recording task. At that time, participants were also given 
instructions on how to obtain more diary forms and how to contact a researcher with any 
questions.  
To minimize the disruption caused by the self-observation, participants were given a 
choice of how to document their authentication events, and were encouraged to use the 
tools they found most comfortable. Most participants recorded the events on the paper 
forms provided to them, but some participants constructed their own spreadsheets or used 
Portable Document Format (PDF) versions of the paper diaries. Although we offered 
participants the option of recording their diaries on video or audio, none of them opted 
for this alternative.   
3.4.3 Follow-Up Interviews 
Within one month after the “diary day,” we met with each participant to interview them 
about their experiences with authentication. During this time, basic demographic 
information, including profession, gender, and age range, was collected from each 
participant. 
The interview focused on retrospectively reviewing diary events to ensure the researchers 
understood the data collected, as well as the context for problem events. Because of the 
retrospective nature of the interview, participant diaries were used in combination with a 
list of open-ended questions (see Sec. 3.2), to set the framework for the exchange. 
Initially, participants were asked what they thought the big insights were from their 
“diary day,” what surprises they encountered, and what questions they had. The rest of 
the interview investigated:  
• The number and frequency of authentications throughout the day, and how 
participants felt about these measures. 
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• How much control and autonomy participants felt they had in authentication and 
where they exercised it, e.g., whether they could do certain things to control how 
often they authenticated.  
• Where participants encountered frustration, and what were the factors contributing to 
that frustration, i.e., what participants found frustrating and why. 
• When participants authenticated during the day and why. 
• How participants felt about the effectiveness of authentication, including perceived 
tradeoffs of security versus usability and convenience.  
• How participants decided on their coping strategies, if used. 
• How typical the timing of recorded authentication events was. 
• What participants considered the major impediments related to authentication. 
Participants’ responses to these inquiries are related in Sec. 4 and Sec. 6. Appendix C 
provides a catalog of participants’ direct quotes. 
4 RESULTS 
Although we defined the term “authentication event” to participants during briefings and 
provided participants with examples of what we were seeking, the data participants 
provided on their diary forms was somewhat  inconsistent across the sample. For 
example, one participant included unlocking his car with a remote key fob; key entries 
were not considered to be authentication events because a key is not usually unique to a 
person, nor does it serve as proof of one’s identity. Events such as the key entry example 
that did not qualify as authentication events in this study and were excluded from the data 
that was analyzed. Conversely, many participants  included checking with the guard as 
they came through the gate at the entrance to the NIST campus – which was considered 
to be authentication because the participant had to prove who they were with approved 
identification to gain entry – but seven participants did not record this type of event even 
though they logged on-campus events. This example illustrates that some underreporting 
existed; however, only the qualifying data that participants reported was included in the 
analysis. 
Overall, participants reported a total of 528 authentication events during the diary data 
collection period – one 24-hour day (all reporting will reflect that period, unless 
otherwise noted). On average, participants authenticated 23 times during this period, with 
the lowest number of authentication events being 4 and the highest 40. The majority of  
authentication events delayed participants in the performance of their primary tasks, but 
usually did not prevent them from reaching their goals.  
14 
 
To inform a primary research objective, Where does authentication fit into the daily 
activities people carry out?, the diary data collected and reported by participants was 
summarized into the following groupings: 
• When did participants authenticate? 
o Distribution of events over the study period 
• What were the types of applications requiring authentication that were reported? 
o Personal and work-related authentication events 
o Types of applications requiring authentication 
o Application subtypes 
• Where were these events taking place? 
o Authentication event locations 
• Information surrounding how authentication events occurred: 
o Devices used to authenticate 
o Types of authentication factors and information required for authentication 
o Authentication memory aids 
o Authentication problems 
o Actions taken after encountering authentication problems 
o Participant frustration ratings 
Several of the latter categories just given, i.e., “Authentication memory aids”, 
“Authentication problems”, and “Actions taken after encountering authentication 
problems”, were diary reporting categories that were anticipated to give researchers 
insights into the research question, What characteristics of authentication cause friction 
with the primary activity that authentication is supposed to enable?  
The remainder of Sec. 4 relates aggregated diary data to inform these research questions. 
4.1 WHEN DID PARTICIPANTS AUTHENTICATE? 
The largest cluster of authentication events reported by participants occurred near the 
start of the workday – around 9:00 AM – as is evident in Fig. 1.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of authentication events over the study period 
Other peak periods of authentication activity occurred later in the morning and in the 
early afternoon. 
4.2 WHAT TYPES OF APPLICATIONS WERE USED? 
In this paper we use the term “application” broadly: it can mean an actual computer 
application, a device, a system, a network, a website, a door that must be opened with a 
keycard, or even a checkpoint staffed by a human who ensures that only persons with  
legitimate identification are allowed onto the NIST campus. In this section, we present 
the types of applications participants reported encountering and authenticating to 
throughout the study period. Two different perspectives are given: the first differentiates 
between events enabling a primary task for personal use or one which is work-related. 
The second view presents the researcher-assigned categorization of each event by 
application type and subtype.   
4.2.1 Personal and work-related authentication events  
Although participants were invited to log events for a 24-hour period, logging events 
outside of work hours was optional. 18 of 23 participants logged authentication events 
when they were not working; however these participants typically logged fewer personal 
events than work-related events. It is therefore unsurprising that 81.21% of the 
authentication events captured in the study were work-related, while the remaining 
18.79% were personal authentications. Figure 2 shows a summary of each participant’s 
events requiring authentication categorized as work-related and personal applications. 
Note that while participants were not asked to distinguish between personal or work-
related events, the nature of each event was evident from the recorded data (combined 
with supplemental information from the interview as needed). 
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Figure 2: Work-related and personal authentication events by participant5 
4.2.2 Types of applications requiring authentication 
Figure 3 shows the categories of applications that users reported authenticating to and 
the percentage of each type’s reported use during the data collection period. 
                                                 
5 Participants “8” and “24” are absent from this figure as well as other numbers and tables that display 
participant labels, because their data were not included in the final study (see Sec. 3.1). 
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Figure 3: Application types requiring authentication 
As the chart shows, the largest portion of the recorded authentications were for access to 
IT systems (42.91%), e.g., computer account access. The second-largest category, 
Application software, contained authentication events related to access for a plethora of 
packages and internet-based functionality and services (25.14%). Some examples include 
backup software, online banking, online shopping, e-conferencing, NIST time and 
attendance, applications supporting other NIST administrative functions, and Web 
applications. Authentication events related to e-mail access were contained in the next 
largest category (9.86%). Events related to physical access, such as admittance to the 
NIST campus6 and buildings, were categorized as Physical access (9.26%). Events 
related to mobile phone device access was the next largest category, comprising 5.29% of 
all events. The Computer security category (3.59%) contained events that were 
considered specialized computer security access above and beyond those contained in the 
IT system category, such as computer encryption software, password vaults, and 
privileged account access. The Network access category, having 2.46% of the total 
events, contained events related to authentication for network access that were not 
abstracted from the user. The Voicemail category contained all events related to accessing 
                                                 
6 As described at the beginning of this section, all participants who worked on the NIST Gaithersburg 
campus during the study period had to authenticate to a guard to gain access to the NIST campus. However, 
7 of the 20 participants who recorded events as originating on the NIST campus did not record their 
authentication at the gate. If they had, the events in the Physical access category would represent a 
modestly larger percentage of the applications to which participants authenticated. 
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voicemail systems (0.95%). Finally, the Service category contained two events (0.38%), 
use of a library card and use of a debit card. 
The chart in Fig. 4 displays the relative number of work-related and personal events in 
each application category. 
 
Figure 4: Personal and work-related events for each category 
4.2.3 Application subtypes 
There were often a variety of applications reported within each application category: 
these are referred to in this report as the application subtypes. For example, within the 
category IT system access, three specific types of system access were reported: NIST 
domain, local computer, and remote computer. The list of application types, subtypes, 
and number of participant-reported logins associated with each is provided in Table 1.  
Table 1: Number of participant-recorded logins by application 
Application type Application Subtype Work-related Personal Totals 
IT system access 
 
208 19 227 
 Local computer 23 19 42 
 NIST domain 144 0 144 
 Remote computer 41 0 41 
Application 
software 
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Application type Application Subtype Work-related Personal Totals 
 Backup 4 0 4 
 E-conferencing 15 2 17 
 NIST application 32 0 32 
 NIST time & attendance 21 0 21 
 Not specified 0 1 1 
 Online banking 0 5 5 
 Online shopping 0 3 3 
 
IT support incident 
mgmt sys 3 0 3 
 Web application 33 14 47 
Email  33 19 52 
 NIST e-mail 33 0 33 
 Personal e-mail 0 19 19 
Physical access  48 1 49 
 Building/door entry 31 1 32 
 Gated location 17 0 17 
Mobile phone  10 18 28 
 Cellular/phone account 10 18 28 
Computer security  16 3 19 
 Computer encryption 8 0 8 
 OS privileged access 2 1 3 
 Password manager 6 1 7 
 PC security package 0 1 1 
Network access  12 1 13 
 NIST wireless network 5 0 5 
 Virtual Private Network 7 0 7 
 Wireless network 0 1 1 
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Application type Application Subtype Work-related Personal Totals 
Voicemail  4 1 5 
 Home voicemail 0 1 1 
 NIST voicemail 4 0 4 
Service  0 2 2 
 Library card 0 1 1 
 Purchase (debit) 0 1 1 
Grand Total 
 
439 89 528 
 
As described in Sec. 2.7, logins for a number of applications and systems within portions 
of the NIST domain are consolidated using an SSO solution; for example, NIST’s domain 
services automatically log users into the e-mail and calendar application when the client 
is started. This is true for other applications as well, when it is implemented. Because of 
this, we suspect that there were a large number of authentication events that users did not 
notice or report, as the actual authentication was abstracted from the user. Users would 
only notice these authentications if SSO either failed to work or was not available (e.g., 
when the user logged in remotely or from a segment of the domain where SSO was not 
implemented). Since users did not notice these automatic SSO-enabled authentications, 
they did not report them. It is likely that if SSO-enabled authentication had not been in 
place, participants in this study would have encountered and recorded more work-related 
authentication events in the Application software, NIST e-mail, and Network access 
categories. 
In addition, since all NIST computers are set to lock after a certain period of inactivity 
and must be unlocked with a password (as described in Sec. 2.7) or a PIV card, it is likely 
that many of the work-related IT system access authentication events recorded by users 
represented unlocking their computers multiple times during the day. 
4.3 WHERE WERE THESE EVENTS TAKING PLACE? 
For each authentication event recorded, participants were asked to record whether they 
were on or off the NIST campus at the time of the event. Figure 5 shows the number of 
events recorded by each participant, while distinguishing the location (i.e., whether they 
were on- or off-campus).  
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Figure 5: Participants' authentication events by location 
Table 2 provides a delineation of all participants’ authentication events by location (on-
campus or off-campus) and type (work-related or personal). It should be noted that 
authentication events recorded on the NIST campus were not always work-related; 
likewise, not all events that were recorded off-campus were personal. 
Table 2: Authentication events by location and type 
Event Location 
Event Type 
All Types 
Personal Work-related 
NIST 26 359 385 
Off-campus 63 80 143 
All Locations 89 439 528 
 
Additionally, the data show that 72.92% of the recorded authentication events took place 
on-campus, while 27.08% took place off-campus. This is to be expected, given that most 
of our participants worked on-campus during the diary day. Two participants were 
telecommuting at the time of the study, and one was on work-related travel. 
4.4 INFORMATION SURROUNDING HOW THESE EVENTS OCCURRED 
4.4.1 Devices used to authenticate 
Diary data show that participants used a number of different mechanisms, usually 
electronic devices, to gain access to various resources through authentication. These 
mechanisms included desktop computers, laptop computers, tablet computers, mobile 
phones, landline phones, biometric scanners (e.g., fingerprint readers), and various 
electronic card readers for PIV smartcards, NIST badges, debit cards, and so on. There 
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was also a human authentication mechanism – specifically, a guard at each gate to the 
NIST campus to whom participants had to display their ID badges for admittance. 
As one might expect, the devices used in the vast majority of authentications were 
desktop and laptop computers (42.52% and 32.12% respectively). The next most 
commonly used authentication device types were mobile phones (10.04%) and NIST 
badge readers located at most building entrances (5.66%). Events using a human 
authenticator, i.e., authenticating to a guard at a NIST property gate, accounted for the 
next highest number of events, 3.10%.  Note that while some building-entry badge reader 
devices could read NIST PIV cards at the time of this study, use of the non-PIV and PIV 
NIST identification cards7 were not distinguished at gate and building entry. Biometric 
scanners built into computing systems or keyboards constituted 2.92% of the reported 
use. Tablet use accounted for 1.46% of the reported authentications.  
The “Other” category contained three different electronic card reader types, i.e., 
credit/debit card reader, library card reader, and a membership card reader, as well as a 
hardware-based encrypted password vault device. This category constituted 0.91% of the 
reported device type use. Landline phone use accounted for another 0.91% of the total 
use. 
PIV card readers may be attached to or integrated into a desktop or laptop computer, but 
for purposes of this study we asked participants to count readers as a device. PIV card 
readers accounted for 0.36% of the total number of reported device types used. For the 
two events in which participants reported using a PIV card reader, the associated device 
was a desktop computer, which was also counted as a device on which authentication 
occurred during those events. Figure 6 shows a circle graph in which the relative sizes of 
the areas shown correspond to the percentages of reported device use for authentication 
during the study period. 
                                                 
7 At the time of the study, NIST was transitioning to PIV identification cards (also referred to as badges) 
and many NIST employees carried both PIV and non-PIV NIST identification cards. 
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Figure 6: Device use during authentication  
Figure 7 shows the relative number and device types used by each participant during 
authentication events. 
 
Figure 7: Devices used by each participant while authenticating 
On average, participants in this study reported using 3.74 + 1.57 SD different device 
types when authentication occurred during the study period. At the ends of the spectrum 
of device use, one participant reported authenticating via only one device type, a laptop, 
while another participant reported authenticating via seven different device types over the 
course of the day. 
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4.4.2 What was required for authentication? 
Participants also reported the types of information and objects they were required to 
provide during authentication events. Figure 8 shows the relative use of the different 
types of items used in the 528 application events recorded during the data collection 
period. The “Other” category contains information elements such as: personally 
identifying information (e.g., birthdate, Social Security number), challenge question 
responses, Google credentials, Completely Automated Public Turing Test To Tell 
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA), a user-selected verification image 
associated with an account, encoding contained on a hardware-based password vault, and 
encoding on electronically read cards (e.g., debit card, library card). 
 
Figure 8: Types of elements required for authentication 
As the chart shows, the most commonly used authentication elements  were passwords 
(46.87%) and user IDs or user names (32.53%). This is unsurprising, given that the most 
common authentication mechanism used on information systems requires a user ID and 
password. Since the two items are almost always used together, one might expect the 
percentages of both elements to be equal; however, in many cases a user ID may be filled 
in automatically based on the previous login, so the only element a user must enter 
manually is a password. In such cases, it is understandable that a participant would not 
count the user ID as an authentication element.  
The next most common were a PIN (7.83%) and a NIST badge/PIV card (6.02%). 
Although a PIV card and a PIN can be used together to authenticate in the same way that 
a user ID and password are, there were only two reported uses of a PIV card during the 
diary period.  So even though the PIN and badge/PIV card had roughly similar reported 
use, in this study PINs were generally used in events that did not involve use of a PIV 
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card. The majority of reported badge/PIV card use was for physical access to the NIST 
site and buildings.  
The “Other” category (2.41%) had a relatively small proportion of the elements 
participants reported using during the study period. The fact that VPN tokens were only 
used in 2.29% of authentication is to be expected: one would only need to use the token 
to connect remotely to the NIST network, and the fact that the vast majority of work-
related authentication events took place on the NIST campus (illustrated in Table 2) 
indicates that most of the study participants did not connect remotely during the study 
period. Finally, biometrics accounted for 2.05% of the reported elements used for 
authentication.
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Table 3 shows how many and which authentication elements (e.g., user IDs, VPN tokens, PIV cards) participants used to authenticate 
to the applications reported via diaries.  
Table 3: Authentication elements used for each application type 
Application Type # Of events 
Pass- 
Word 
User ID 
or Name PIN 
Badge or 
PIV Card 
Other 
Info Token 
Bio-
metrics 
Avg # of 
items 
needed 
IT system access 227 184 92 22 2 1 0 16 1.40 
Local computer 42 35 13 1 0 0 0 6 1.31 
NIST domain 144 109 42 21 2 0 0 10 1.28 
Remote computer 41 40 37 0 0 1 0 0 1.90 
Application software 133 119 103 3 0 15 0 0 1.80 
Backup 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 2.00 
E-conferencing 17 12 12 0 0 6 0 0 1.76 
IT support incident 
management sys 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1.67 
NIST application 32 29 16 1 0 3 0 0 1.53 
NIST time & attendance 19 19 17 0 0 0 0 0 1.81 
Not specified 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2.00 
Online banking 5 4 5 2 0 2 0 0 2.60 
Online shopping 3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1.67 
Web application 47 43 43 0 0 4 0 0 1.91 
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Application Type # Of events 
Pass- 
Word 
User ID 
or Name PIN 
Badge or 
PIV Card 
Other 
Info Token 
Bio-
metrics 
Avg # of 
items 
needed 
Email 52 52 48 11 0 1 12 0 2.38 
NIST e-mail 33 33 33 11 0 1 12 0 2.73 
Personal e-mail 19 19 15 0 0 0 0 0 1.79 
Physical access 49 0 0 0 48 1 0 0 1.00 
Building/door entry 32 0 0 0 31 1 0 0 1.00 
Gated location 17 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 1.00 
Mobile phone 28 11 0 17 0 0 0 0 1.00 
Cellular/phone account 28 11 0 17 0 0 0 0 1.00 
Computer security 19 19 14 0 0 0 0 0 1.74 
Computer encryption 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 2.00 
OS privileged access 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.33 
Password manager 7 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 1.57 
PC security package 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2.00 
Network access 13 5 11 7 0 0 7 0 2.31 
NIST wireless network 5 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 1.60 
Virtual Private Network 7 0 7 7 0 0 7 0 3.00 
Wireless network 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 
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Application Type # Of events 
Pass- 
Word 
User ID 
or Name PIN 
Badge or 
PIV Card 
Other 
Info Token 
Bio-
metrics 
Avg # of 
items 
needed 
Voicemail 5 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 1.40 
Home voicemail 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 
NIST voicemail 4 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 1.50 
Service 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1.50 
Library card 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1.00 
Purchase (debit) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2.00 
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Figure 9 below displays the information from Table 3 in bar chart form. Specifically, it 
charts the number and types of authentication elements reported being used for each 
application category, e.g., IT system access, e-mail, Network access, and so on. 
 
Figure 9: Authentication elements used for authentication by application category 
The application categories that demanded the largest average number of elements for 
authentication were IT system access and Application software. Reported password use 
was higher than username/ID use in several categories; in these cases it is expected that 
the username portion of the authentication event had already been supplied by the 
application. For example, a locked computer session inherently has a user ID associated 
with it. Also of note is the fact that mobile phone users reported using both PINs and 
passwords to access their devices, when in fact it is possible some of these elements were 
mis-reported, i.e., that elements labeled as passwords were actually PINs.  
4.4.3 Authentication information memorization and memory aids 
Participants in this study reported using a variety of memory aids to help them avoid 
mistakes while performing their authentication tasks during the study period. In this case, 
we define a “memory aid” as anything that helped relieve some of the authentication-
related pressures on participants’ memories. By this definition, a memory aid could be a 
record of passwords and PINs, or a non-password authentication mechanism (such as a 
fingerprint reader) that helps minimize the need to use passwords at all. Note that 
authentication tasks that did not involve memory use by design, e.g., physical access 
using a badge and badge reader, are delineated as such. However, there were some events 
where the participant could provide something they are, such as a fingerprint, as opposed 
to something they know, like a password. In this type of event where participants chose to 
use fingerprint scanners rather than provide one or more other elements, the use of 
biometric information was considered a memory aid.  
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While all participants reported having at least some passwords and PINs memorized, all 
but two participants reported using some type of memory aid. Some stored their 
passwords in a client such as a Web browser, or wrote them down in an electronic file or 
on paper. Others used password manager programs or secure USB drives.8 Participants 
also used strategies such as keeping a designated “root” segment of a password the same 
and changing a predefined part of it every time that password was about to expire. 
4.4.3.1 Memorization reported 
All participants recorded at least one event where they reported having used a memorized 
authentication element for authentication during the study period. Indeed, of the total 528 
events, 353 events (66.86%) were reported as having at least one element that was 
described as memorized. Note that it was often the case where multiple elements were 
required for an event, the diary form did not prompt participants to note which elements 
were memorized, only to indicate if at least one was memorized. 
For these 353 events, where one or more elements used in the event’s authentication task 
were reported to be memorized, Table 4 shows how many events were reported being 
used for the types of memory aids reported. The data reported in Table 4 were collected 
from both diaries and follow-up interviews. 
Table 4: Memory aid use where one or more elements were memorized 
Memory Aid Number of events 
Paper note 34 
Maintaining the same root or stem for passwords while varying 
one or more parts 8 
Biometric (fingerprint) 5 
Client application storage (e.g., Web browser) 5 
Configuring the computer or application to use local user ID 
information 3 
Electronic file 2 
Memorable phrase 2 
                                                 
8 These store passwords and/or other confidential information in encrypted form: the user must enter a 
“master” password to access the stored information, but the user does not have to follow any policies 
regarding password composition when creating this master password, nor is he/she required to change it 
regularly. 
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Memory Aid Number of events 
Total number of events in which memory aids were employed 
when elements were reported being memorized 59 
 
As shown in Table 4, of these 353 events, participants reported 59 events where a 
memory aid was used. Put another way, participants reported a total of 294 events where 
the authentication task was completed by use of memory without additional aid. In the 
context of all events reported for the study period, this is 294 of 528 total events, or 
55.5%. 
4.4.3.2 Memorization not reported 
For the 175 events where authentication information was not reported as being 
memorized, 50 events were of the type that required the participant to provide a sole 
physical authentication element (something you have), e.g., an identification or library 
card; therefore information recall was not a part of the authentication task. Additionally, 
five events were for authentication prompts that the participant aborted without entering 
information (the participant did not know why the prompt appeared). And finally, eleven 
events were reported without indication that one or more elements were memorized or 
that memory aids were used. The omission of the memory aid information appeared to be 
an oversight by these participants, as each participant who omitted the memory aid 
information for these eleven events recorded the memory aid information for other events 
reported in their diaries.  
For the remaining 109 events, participants did not report memorizing the elements 
required for authentication and relying on other aids to help them complete the 
authentication task.  
Table 5 shows how often the different types of memory aids were noted as being used for 
events where participants did not report elements being memorized. Again, the data were 
extracted from both participant diaries and follow-up interviews. 
 
Table 5: Memory aids used when memorization not reported 
Memory Aid Number of events 
Client application storage (e.g., Web browser) 59 
Paper note 14 
Vaults and managers (e.g., IronKey, KeePass) 13 
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Memory Aid Number of events 
Biometric (fingerprint) 11 
Electronic file 8 
OAuth9 used to attempt recovery of forgotten information 4 
E-mail used to attempt recovery of forgotten information 3 
Total number of memory aids employed when elements were 
reported not being memorized 112* 
 
* Note that one participant reported using two memory aids for the authentication 
information used in three events, relating where a password was written on paper as well 
as stored in an application, which resulted in three reported uses of memory aids beyond 
the 109 events for this category. These data show that only one participant reported using 
a “back-up” method for authentication retrieval for elements that were not memorized, 
while other participants relied on one chosen method, without reporting the use of 
additional methods for authentication element retrieval in the event that their primary 
method failed in some way. 
The previous two tables show how many times, i.e., the frequency expressed in number 
of events, each memory aid was used in the context of authentication information 
memorization. The next subsection presents how many memory aids participants reported 
using overall and the context of authentication information memorization when it was 
available.  
4.4.3.3 Number of memory aids used 
Through their diary entries and interviews, each participant reported on the types and 
number of memory aids employed. Figure 10 shows the distribution of how many 
memory aids participants reported using. This data were extracted from both the diary 
and interview data. The use of two different memory aids was the most commonly 
reported situation (nine participants); however two participants reported not using any 
memory aids, while one participant reported using five different memory aids for the 
various authentication elements required over the course of the study period. 
                                                 
9 OAuth is an open protocol to allow secure authorization using a standard method for multiple platforms. 
More information is available at http://oauth.net/  
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Figure 10: Number of authentication memory aids used by participants 
As noted earlier, participants also reported whether one or more authentication elements 
for each event were memorized; this was usually associated with a password or PIN. The 
diary data can be viewed by which types of memory aids were noted when participants 
reported that one or more authentications elements were memorized or not. The next 
segment explores this perspective. 
Table 6 shows how many participants used each memory aid that was reported being 
used in both the diaries and interviews. The two middle columns in the table provide 
insights from the diary data to distinguish which memory aids were used when one or 
more authentication elements were reported as being memorized. The right-most column 
(heavy shading) in the table provides data on memory aid use from the follow-up 
interviews. In particular, this data comes from the interview question, “What kinds of 
tricks do you use to make authentication easier or more efficient for yourself?” Often the 
number of participants detailing use of a particular memory aid in their diary did not 
match with their reported memory aid use during the later interview.   
Again, events where an authentication element of the type “something you have”, e.g., a 
identification or library card was required and no other authentication information was 
used, and where the element was not substituted for “something you know”, e.g., a 
fingerprint instead of a password, were excluded from the table below.  
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Table 6: Authentication memory aids used by participants 
Memory Aid 
… when 
elements(s) 
memorized 
… when 
elements(s)  NOT 
memorized 
Use reported 
during 
interview10 
Client application storage (e.g., Web 
browser)  1 12 3 
Paper note 5 6 5 
Electronic file  1 3 3 
Biometric (fingerprint) 1 3 3 
Vaults and managers (e.g., IronKey, 
KeePass) 0 2 4 
E-mail hints, reminders, or 
passwords 0 2 0 
OAuth 0 1 0 
Configuring the computer or 
application to use local user ID 
information 
1 0 0 
Maintaining the same root or stem 
for passwords while varying one or 
more parts 
1 0 5 
Memorable phrase 1 0 1 
Using the same password across all 
applications (where possible) 0 0 2 
 
From the perspective of which memory aids were reported being used by the most 
participants, use of client authentication information storage, e.g., Web browser storage, 
was the most prevalent. Use of the paper note was the next most commonly employed 
memory aid. Use of electronic files and biometric (fingerprint) data was next highest in 
reported use. In addition to the first four listed aids, password vaults, managers, e-mail, 
and OAuth were the types of memory aids used when authentication information was not 
reported being memorized – note conversely these aids were not used when information 
was reported being memorized (table entries are lightly shaded). Likewise, there were 
three memory aids used exclusively when elements were reported being memorized: 
                                                 
10 The interview data did not contain detail regarding whether memorization was associated with memory 
aids. It is reported here to give insights into the types of memory aids and strategies participants use. 
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configuring the computer to use the local user ID, maintaining the same root or stem, and 
use of a memorable phrase (medium shading), in addition to the top four listed memory 
aids. Finally, two participants reported in the follow-up interviews, use of the strategy of 
attempting to use the same password across all applications. 
The memory aids discussed in this section are part of a larger collection of coping 
mechanisms our participants reported using to deal with authentication. We explore these 
coping mechanisms – memory aids included – in more detail in Sec. 6.4. 
4.4.4 Authentication problems 
15 of the 23 participants who logged authentication event data for the study reported 
having one or more authentication problems during the study period. Of the 528 total 
events recorded, 48 (or 9.09%) were “problematic” (meaning that participants 
experienced some problem during those events). Figure 11 shows the number of 
problems in relation to all events reported by each participant during the study period. 
 
Figure 11: Number of authentication problems reported by each participant 
The average number of authentication problems per participant was 2.09 + 2.66 SD.55; 
three participants reported eight problems each, while eight participants did not report 
encountering any authentication problems during the study period.   
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Table 7 shows the types of problems reported by each participant, along with the number 
of occurrences of each type of problem (for a total of 48 authentication events with a 
reported problem). The most common authentication problem was mistyping one’s 
password (50.00%), followed by using the wrong password and problems due to an 
unknown cause (14.58% each). As stated earlier, there were five events where the 
unknown cause reported by one participant was a case where an application was 
requesting authentication information, seemingly without cause; the participants 
reporting the remaining two events of unknown cause simply could not detect the cause 
of a failed authentication attempt. 
Table 7: Authentication problems reported 
Problem or issue Number of occurrences 
Percentage 
Of problems 
Percentage 
of all events 
Mistyped password 24 50.00% 4.55% 
Unknown cause 7 14.58% 1.33% 
Used wrong password 7 14.58% 1.33% 
Account/password not recovered 2 4.17% 0.38% 
Forgot password 2 4.17% 0.38% 
Caps lock on 1 2.08% 0.19% 
Could not find where to enter password 1 2.08% 0.19% 
Forced to strengthen weak password 1 2.08% 0.19% 
Forgot user ID 1 4.08% 0.19% 
Password change required re-authentication11 1 2.08% 0.19% 
Trouble finding (written) memory aid 1 2.08% 0.19% 
 
                                                 
11 This often occurred when participants changed the general realm password they used for applications 
such as the corporate e-mail client, and then had to enter the new password on applications they had opened 
using the previous password. 
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4.4.5 Actions taken after encountering authentication problems 
Participants were asked to report what actions they took after encountering a problem 
during authentication. 13 participants reported a total of 43 actions taken after 
encountering authentication problems. “Try again immediately” was the most commonly 
employed action by a large margin. This is not surprising given that the most common 
problems reported were mistyped passwords or using the wrong password. The next most 
common action was “dismiss pop-up,” which requires some explanation. This was the 
user’s solution to a problem stemming from a glitch in the PIV card middleware used by 
participants with the Windows XP operating system. The problem occurred when a user 
logged into the computer and by extension the e-mail client using his/her PIV card, 
removed the card to lock the computer, and later unlocked the computer with a user ID 
and password. The e-mail client would detect that the user ID and password, while valid, 
did not match the authentication information originally used to log in, and would generate 
a pop-up. It did not, however, require re-authentication, so dismissing the pop-up was the 
only action the user needed to perform. 
Each action category is given in Table 8, along with the number of times used and the 
percentage of the 43 total actions. 
Table 8: Actions taken after authentication problems 
Strategy # of times used % of times used 
Try again immediately 30 69.77% 
Dismiss pop-up 5 11.63% 
Contact NIST support 2 4.65% 
Correct and resubmit 2 4.65% 
Ask a colleague 1 2.33% 
Give up 1 2.33% 
Log out and back in 1 2.33% 
Review memory aid 1 2.33% 
 
4.4.6 Participant frustration ratings 
Participants were asked to rate their level of frustration for any problems they 
encountered on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “Not Frustrated” and 5 being “Very 
Frustrated.” Some participants gave a frustration rating even when they did not record 
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having any problems, and some did not record a frustration rating even when they did 
record problems. 
Unfortunately the middle position (3) of the frustration rating scale was labeled “Neutral” 
on the diary form: this potentially complicates the interpretation of these results, as the 
qualitative interview data indicates that some participants used the numbers as a rating of 
the strength of the frustration they experienced. In that case, 3 would not be “Neutral” but 
instead would designate a level of frustration higher than 2 and lower than 4. 
Table 9 shows the total number of reported authentication events for each application, as 
well as how many (and relative percentage) of those events were “problematic.” The 
table also shows participants’ average frustration ratings with each type of application. 
 
Table 9: Authentication problems and frustration ratings by application 
Application # of problems # of events 
Average 
number of 
problems 
Average 
frustration 
(1-5 scale) 
IT system access 21 227 9.25% 1.73 
Local computer 4 42 9.52% 1.69 
NIST domain 16 144 11.11% 1.89 
Remote computer 1 41 2.44% 1.24 
Application software 18 133 13.53% 1.52 
Backup 1 4 25.00% 1.50 
E-conferencing 6 17 35.29% 1.71 
IT support incident mgmt sys 0 3 0.00% 1.00 
NIST application 2 32 6.25% 1.19 
NIST time & attendance 6 21 28.57% 2.46 
Not specified 0 1 0.00% 0.00 
Online banking 0 5 0.00% 3.50 
Online shopping 0 3 0.00% 1.00 
Web application 3 47 6.38% 1.26 
E-mail 6 52 11.54% 1.59 
NIST e-mail 5 33 15.15% 1.96 
Personal e-mail 1 19 5.26% 0.85 
Physical access 1 49 2.04% 1.55 
Building/door entry 1 32 3.13% 1.52 
Gated location 0 17 0.00% 1.60 
Mobile phone 0 28 0.00% 1.08 
Cellular/phone account 0 28 0.00% 1.08 
Computer security 1 19 5.26% 2.00 
Computer encryption 0 8 0.00% 2.80 
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OS privileged access 1 3 33.33% 3.00 
Password manager 0 7 0.00% 0.80 
PC security package 0 1 0.00% 0.00 
Network access 2 13 15.38% 2.44 
NIST wireless network 2 5 40.00% 3.00 
Virtual Private Network 0 7 0.00% 1.75 
Wireless network 0 1 0.00% 0.00 
Voicemail 0 5 0.00% 1.20 
Home voicemail 0 1 0.00% 1.00 
NIST voicemail 0 4 0.00% 1.25 
Service 0 2 0.00% 1.00 
Library card 0 1 0.00% 0.00 
Purchase (debit) 0 1 0.00% 1.00 
     
While we expected participants to assign relatively high frustration ratings to applications 
that frequently had authentication problems, we were surprised to note that participants 
indicated (sometimes considerable) frustration with certain applications even when they 
experienced few or no problems with those applications. For example, no participants 
reported experiencing authentication problems with online banking or computer 
encryption, but the average frustration ratings associated with these applications were 
among the highest on the list. Other applications that participants reported as problem-
free but somewhat frustrating were the NIST VPN (1.75) and entering a gated location on 
the NIST campus (1.6). This data suggests that additional factors beyond an actual 
“problem” experienced by a participant during a specific authentication event (or not), 
influence the frustration rating recorded for the event. 
Table 10 displays the total number of authentication events each participant recorded 
during the reporting period, their total number of problem events, and the average level of 
frustration experienced by each. If a participant did not give any frustration ratings, the 
relevant cell in the “Average frustration” column contains a dash (-) rather than a 
number.  
Table 10: Individual participants’ problem events and average frustration ratings  
Participant Total # of events 
# Events 
with 
problems 
Average 
frustration 
(1-5 scale) 
1 16 0 - 
2 15 1 1.53 
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Participant Total # of events 
# Events 
with 
problems 
Average 
frustration 
(1-5 scale) 
3 34 0 0.6512 
4 22 2 1.00 
5 40 2 - 
6 28 0 1.64 
7 39 9 1.53 
9 13 2 1.00 
10 29 3 5.00 
11 4 0 1.00 
12 34 8 2.63 
13 24 1 4.67 
14 34 8 3.09 
15 22 1 1.05 
16 29 3 3.33 
17 11 0 1.60 
18 13 0 1.00 
19 25 2 1.00 
20 28 1 1.25 
21 16 0 - 
22 21 1 2.76 
23 17 5 3.00 
25 13 0 1.08 
                                                 
12 Participant 3 actually used a 0 in the frustration scale when his/her browser stored a password, 
which significantly lowered his/her average frustration: technically “1” should have been the lowest 
score recorded. 
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Eight participants (1, 3, 6, 11, 17, 18, 21, and 25) did not record any problems, while five 
participants (2, 13, 15, 20, and 22) recorded experiencing 1 authentication problem 
during the reporting period. Ten participants (4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, and 23) 
recorded experiencing multiple problems. Five participants (10, 13, 14, 16 and 23) had 
average frustration ratings of 3.0 or higher. Note that participants’ frustration level did 
not always correlate with the number of problems they encountered during the reporting 
period: for example, participant 13 reported one problem but recorded an average 
frustration level of 4.67, while participant 7 reported eight problems but had a much 
lower average level of 1.53. 
5 VISUALIZING THE EFFECTS OF AUTHENTICATION: THE 
USER EXPERIENCE 
One of the goals of this study was to understand better how authentication affected users 
over the course of a workday. To that end, the data captured from participants’ diaries 
and follow-up interviews were used to quantify and chart their individual experiences 
during the data collection period. 
As presented at the beginning of Sec. 4, the 23 participants reported a total of 528 
application events during the data collection period, meaning they each experienced an 
average of 23 authentication events. After observing the results presented in Sec. 4, the 
research team members posed additional questions of the data in an attempt to break 
down these numbers even further: Do the authentication events tend to happen at 
particular times of the day? Do authentication problems occur at certain times of the day 
more than other times of the day?  
In order to answer these questions, visualizations of the diary data were generated 
depicting how authentication impacted a user’s day. The next sections explain how these 
visualizations were constructed, and the visualization for Participant 23 is displayed in 
Fig. 12  in Sec. 5.3 to illustrate the method employed. Visualizations for each participant 
are shown in Appendix B.  
5.1 THE “JOURNEY MAP” AS A TEMPLATE FOR USER EXPERIENCE 
VISUALIZATION 
The concept of a “journey map” was the starting point for this visualization. The idea for 
this particular tool came from a lecture by the author Kurt Vonnegut, who used journey 
maps to lay out the various narrative arcs a hero might travel in the course of a story [25]. 
Vonnegut first started sharing this idea in the 1990s. Not much later, design firms 
adopted a similar approach – perhaps inspired by Vonnegut’s visualization of the 
storyline – to “map” the customer “journey” as customers encounter an organization, 
interact with it, and then end the relationship or start a new cycle. A discipline of design 
called service design [22][23] regularly uses a variant to depict customer experience 
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touch points with a particular service and factors involved in those customer interactions 
with the service that might be causing highs and lows. 
The journey maps used in design are typically generated heuristically – that is, 
researchers or designers review user stories that sometimes come from ethnographic data, 
make inferences about why users had the experiences they reported, and then place users 
in the map accordingly, much like tracking the epic journey of a protagonist in a story. 
The research team co-opted the concept of journey maps to model and visualize the 
impact of authentication. Because the factors that caused, fed, and weighted disruption 
could be quantified, a series of formulas to aid in the modeling of authentication events 
for the journey maps were generated. The visualizations helped the research team see, 
participant by participant, the times during the day when participants encountered and 
perhaps struggled with authentication.   
5.2 MEASURES USED IN THE USER EXPERIENCE CHART 
A chart was created for each participant, using their recorded events, with the time of day 
on the x-axis and a scale of what the research team called “User experience” on the y-
axis. While the x-axis component is a straightforward value representing time of day, the 
user experience component (y-axis) is based on quantifiable measures gathered from the 
participants.  
The user experience scale runs between +5 and -5, with +5 representing no impact on the 
experience (i.e., the primary task the user is performing) from authentication, 0 indicating 
moderate impact, and -5 representing extreme disruption. The user experience scale used 
here is consistent with the Service Design-based Journey Map concept, in that the 
positive end of the scale maps to more positive user experiences, while the negative end 
of the scale maps to less positive user experiences.  
Four measures are shown on each participant’s user experience chart. The first three 
measures, based on collected data, are the frustration rating the participant assigned to 
each event; an interviewer rating assigned by the researcher based on data from the 
interview with the participant; and a calculated value of effort and interruption for each 
event. The final measure is a composite informed by the previous three. 
Note that since the scales used in the underlying measures, e.g., user-supplied frustration 
rating, were not already on a +5 to -5 scale, the appropriate linear transformations were 
applied to convert each collected data set into appropriate values for the +5 to -5 user 
experience scale employed in these charts. The next sections provide the details on how 
each measure was informed. 
5.2.1 Frustration Rating 
The Frustration Rating (red line in the user experience graphs) was taken directly from 
diary data supplied by the participant and mapped to a +5 to -5 scale. On this scale, a +5 
means the participant reported a frustration rating of 1 (“Not Frustrated”), while a -5 
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means the participant reported a frustration rating of 5 (“Very Frustrated”). A zero (0) 
means the participant means the participant reported a frustration rating of 3. 
 
5.2.2 Interviewer Rating 
The Interviewer Rating (green line in the user experience graphs) was assigned by a 
researcher based on interview data for each event. This rating is intended to inform the 
impact on the primary task enabled by a given authentication event, in terms of both 
completion and ripple effects. The researcher assigned a score of 1-4 based on which of 
the following occurred during an event:  
1 The need to perform authentication slightly delayed the primary task 
2 Problems with authentication necessitated extra work, steps, and/or work-arounds to 
continue with the primary task 
3 Problems with authentication prevented full completion of the primary task, i.e., 
some progress on the primary enabled, but full completion restricted or blocked 
4 Problems with authentication caused primary task failure, i.e., the participant was 
unable to make any further progress on the primary task 
 
A linear transformation was then performed on these scores to assign an appropriate 
representation on the user experience graph. The mapping is shown in Table 11 below. 
Table 11: Interviewer rating mapping for assigned scores 
Interviewer assigned score Interviewer rating (mapped to user experience scale) 
1 4 
2 1 
3 -2 
4 -5 
 
5.2.3 Calculated Disruption 
The Calculated Disruption (blue line in the user experience graphs) is a composite 
measure representing impact from the authentication subtask, based on three factors:  
• Authentication Event Outcome: success or failure of the authentication event  
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• Impact on task switching: categorized assessment of how much attention the 
authentication enabling task might have taken, e.g., how much problem-solving 
was needed when a problem was encountered during the event 
• Authentication information entry effort: the effort required to supply necessary 
authentication elements.  
The research team expected that these three factors, taken together, would provide a 
useful view of the user experience. To the team’s knowledge, this application is the first 
of its kind to employ these measures in this way. The value assignments used for each 
factor are explained below. Overall, each assignment was chosen in an effort to 
appropriately inform the factor, with consideration for the impact on the visualization, 
i.e., providing separation of significant factor differences. Therefore, other values could 
be determined to be more useful or representative with additional research; however, the 
ones used in this study were considered adequate by the research team for the 
visualizations provided by the user experience charts and to illustrate the method.  
5.2.3.1 Authentication Event Outcomes 
The authentication event outcome served as the base value for the calculated disruption 
composite metric.  As shown in Table 12, the calculated disruption measure had a base 
value of 3 if an authentication event was successful. If the event ended in failure, 
however, the calculated disruption measure had a base value of -3.  
Table 12: Authentication outcome factor values for calculated disruption 
Authentication Event Outcome Impact Value 
“Success” Minor +3 
“Failure” Major -3 
 
5.2.3.2 Impact on task switching 
Any authentication problems encountered by a participant during an event were also 
factored into the Calculated Disruption measure. Each diary-reported problem (as listed 
in Sec. 4.4.4) impact was categorized as “Major” or “Minor”. For each minor-impact 
problem, a value of 1 was added to the Calculated Disruption measure, while 1 was 
subtracted for each major-impact problem.13 The categorizations and value adjustments 
for each problem are shown in Table 13. It should be noted that the participants in this 
                                                 
13 The exception to this rule is the problem “Needed to correct authentication element before submitting,” 
which is categorized as having a “Minor” impact but has a value of -1. This is because, when this problem 
occurred, the participant was eventually able to authenticate successfully but had to spend extra time and 
effort reviewing/re-entering their password in order to do so. 
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study reported a single problem when any problem was encountered therefore, only one 
value would be selected from this category per event. 
Table 13: Authentication problems and corresponding calculated disruption value adjustments 
Problem reported Impact Value 
Caps lock on Minor +1 
Needed to correct element before submitting Minor -1 
Mistyped password Minor +1 
Password change required re-authentication Minor +1 
Could not find where to enter password Major -1 
Forgot password Major -1 
Forgot user ID Major -1 
Lost PIV Major -1 
Misremembered password Major -1 
Trouble finding written memory aid Major -1 
Unknown problem Major -1 
Used wrong password Major -1 
Weak password – forced to strengthen Major -1 
 
5.2.3.3 Authentication Element Entry Effort 
The factor pertaining to the effort required to submit authentication information was 
informed by adding an assigned “effort value” for each element reported being used 
during an authentication event. The effort factor added to the overall calculated 
distribution measure is always a negative value, reflecting the negative effect on the 
participant’s primary task. As shown in Table 14, the value -0.5 is assigned if the user 
had the element memorized or had to look it up (e.g., on a handwritten note), and -0.1 if 
the element was contained in a mechanism such as a Web browser or PIV card. Note the 
relatively small value assigned to the Minor impact category reflects the relatively lower 
cognitive impact on the user. 
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Table 14: Effort values for different types of authentication elements 
Authentication element status Impact Value 
Memorized or remembered Major -0.5 
Look up by user (e.g., RSA token, file, paper) Major -0.5 
‘Something you have,’ ‘something you are’ or 
contained in mechanism (e.g., PIV card, 
fingerprint, browser-stored) 
Minor -0.1 
 
Most authentications required a combination of different types of elements or 
information, and some required multiple elements of the same type. The following 
examples show how effort values were calculated depending upon the elements used in a 
given authentication event: 
• Participant used a (one) password stored in browser (1 element contained in the 
mechanism): yields a calculated value of -0.1 
Calculation: (1)(element)*(-0.1)(assigned value)  = -0.1(calculated value) 
• Participant used a memorized password (1 element memorized): yields a calculated 
value of -0.5 
Calculation: (1) (element)*(-0.5)(assigned value)  = -0.5(calculated value)  
• Authenticated to VPN (2 elements memorized, 1 token element): yields a calculated 
value of -1.5 
Calculation: (2)(elements)*(-0.5)(assigned value)  + 1(token element)*(-0.5)(assigned value)  = -1.5(calculated value) 
5.2.4 Composite Rating 
The Composite Rating (purple line in the user experience graphs) was created by a 
simple weighting of each of the above three measures. Since participants did not always 
supply a frustration rating for each event, two sets of weights were created. 
• If the participant supplied a frustration rating for an event, the measures for that event 
were weighted as follows:  
o Frustration Rating = 20% 
o Interviewer Rating = 30% 
o Calculated Disruption = 50% 
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• If the participant did not supply a frustration rating for an event, the measures for that 
event were weighted as follows: 
o Interviewer rating = 40% 
o Calculated Disruption = 60% 
In the early stages of development of the user experience graphs for this study, it seemed 
logical to give more weight to the user-reported frustration ratings than the Interviewer 
Rating or Calculated Disruption rating, since the frustration rating was the most direct 
measure of impact on the participant. However, after carefully reviewing the frustration 
ratings provided by the participants, it was discovered that participants did not apply the 
frustration rating consistently (see Sec. 4.4.6). Additionally, in the retrospective review of 
events during follow-up interviews, participants sometimes expressed frustration or 
annoyance about events they had recorded, but for which they had not recorded any 
frustration rating. 
In contrast, the Calculated Disruption rating (as described in Sec. 5.2.3) could be 
computed consistently across all participants. Given the greater reliability of this data, the 
research team elected to weight it more heavily in each of the weight sets.  
Likewise, the interviewer rating provided some post-collection perspective. It gave the 
team a gauge of how authentication affected task completion and the ripple effects of 
authentication problems for the user. 
Note that no authentication events have a user experience rating of +5 (no impact), 
because all authentications have an impact – at the very least, they delay users in the 
performance of their primary tasks
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5.3 USER EXPERIENCE CHARTS 
The user experience graph shown in Fig. 12 displays the measures in relation to each other and the effect of the assigned weights in 
the composite measure for Participant 23 (P23), using the technique described in the previous section. User experience graphs for each 
participant were generated and are shown in Appendix B. 
Admittedly, the disruption assignments are a set of values assigned without benefit of empirical data or research-based findings on 
relative disruption for each disruption component used; however, one could argue that since the assignments are applied uniformly 
across all participants’ data, that as a visualization aid, fine-tuning the value assignments would be a matter of scale adjustment rather 
than negating the value of the visualization.  
 
Figure 12: User experience graph – P23 
This user experience graph tells the story of  Participant 23’s experience during the reporting period. Looking at the red frustration 
rating, we can see that at the beginning of the day, the participant did not experience frustration when authenticating (8:00, with a 
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frustration score of +5). But during the afternoon (~14:30), P23 experienced an event that caused extreme frustration (a score of -5). In 
a few unrelated cases, P23 experienced some authentication problems that prevented full completion of the primary task (the valleys 
on the green line at ~8:30, ~10:00 and ~5:30), however the participant never experienced complete primary task failure. The blue line, 
which indicates the amount of disruption caused by authentication events, tells us that while none of the authentication events were 
failures (e.g., the participant was unable to log in), P23 did have to take remedial action to recover from problems that were 
exacerbated by some circumstance that made providing the necessary authentication information difficult (e.g., the participant had to 
retrieve a memory aid). The composite (purple) line integrates the three measures together, showing us that though P23 experienced 
some problems and frustrations related to authentication, he/she experienced only light to moderate disruption during the day.  
Figure 13 shows a different view of  P23’s event data. In this user experience graph, the composite rating assessment has been 
graphed for each event at its associated time of day. Rather than a line graph, discrete points are displayed representing the disruption 
for each event over the course of the day. Note that the time scale was also expanded to show the entire collection period. 
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Figure 13: How users experience disruption caused by authentication - P23 (composite rating) 
With this view, it is somewhat easier to locate clusters of events and the relative impact they represent over the course of the day, 
while the view shown in Fig. 12 provides a good presentation of how the various ratings compare to each other. Using Fig. 13, it now 
becomes easier to discern that P23 experienced 5 mildly disruptive authentication events and 4 moderately disruptive authentication 
events before 10:30 AM. The authentication events that occurred after 1:30 PM were only mildly disruptive, with the exception of one 
event at approximately 5:30. 
The view shown in Fig. 13 was then used with the aggregated event data from all the participants using the composite rating method 
in order to provide an overview of the total disruption caused by authentication for all participants. The resulting graph can be seen in 
Fig. 14. 
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Figure 14: User experience with respect to disruption caused by authentication - all participants (composite rating) 
Two horizontal lines superimposed over the graph designate ranges of disruption. The top area contains 466 (88%) of the 
authentication events, showing that the vast majority of events reported during the study period caused mild disruption (recall that all 
authentication events are at least mildly disruptive in that they delay completion of a primary activity). The middle or moderate 
disruption range contained 42 (8%) of the events, and finally, 21 (4%) of the events were very disruptive. 
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Figure 15 displays the same data for all participants in the form of a heat map 
representation to convey the composite disruption measure for each event across the 
course of the study period. Again, with respect to relative disruption, most events are in 
the mildly disruptive top 3rd of the graph. The highest concentrations of events occurred 
at 9:00 AM, 10:00 AM, 12:00 PM and 2:30 PM. 
 
Figure 15: Heat map of authentication events and user disruption - all participants 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This section addresses the researchers’ interpretations of and insights gained from the 
research findings. The section presents qualitative data from the participants themselves, 
researcher observations regarding users’ authentication-related behavior, and finally 
insights about authentication gained from this study.  
6.1 HOW PARTICIPANTS PERCEIVED THEIR AUTHENTICATION 
WORKLOAD 
As presented in Sec. 4, participants reported an average of 23 authentication events each 
during the data collection period. However, they did not notice (and therefore did not 
report) any automatic authentications facilitated by NIST’s partial SSO solution. This 
means that the actual number of authentications was probably somewhat higher than the 
number reported. 
Participants themselves were actually surprised at the number of authentications they 
reported during the data collection period. In briefing meetings before the data collection 
period, when the researchers gave participants diary forms (see Appendix A for an 
example) with space to record 20 authentication events, many participants asserted that 
they would need more diary forms because they were going to authenticate much more 
than 20 times. In the follow-up interviews, when researchers asked participants what 
surprised them most about their experiences during the data collection period, the answer 
was often related to their estimated vs. actual number of times authenticating. Several 
said they had authenticated far less than anticipated. A few said they had authenticated 
considerably more than they thought they would, but over-estimation was more common 
by far than under-estimation. 
This is not because something unusual happened to participants during the data collection 
period. On the contrary, the day was fairly typical for most of them (except for the fact 
that they were recording authentication events). So where did this discrepancy between 
expectations and reality originate? The qualitative data suggest two principal reasons why 
many participants’ actual authentication workload did not align with their expectations.  
First, since participants taking part in the study were more aware of authenticating than 
was usually the case, they may have changed their behavior during the day. For example, 
some of them followed security policies more closely than usual: a few participants 
commented that during the study, they were more likely to purposely lock their 
computers when they left their desks than they normally did. The implications of the 
usual lack of awareness are significant. The qualitative data from this study suggest that 
authentication can become an automatic or automatized behavior: people do it habitually, 
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or by rote, until some significant disruption occurs (e.g., an authentication problem). 
Under most circumstances, participants reported they were not as mindful of 
authentication as they were when they recorded it for this study, reminiscent of the 
Hawthorne Effect. 
Second, from the data in this study, we propose the theory that this discrepancy between 
expectations and reality is that the act (or even the prospect) of authenticating carries a 
notable emotional and psychological load. This may have affected participants’ 
perceptions of the workload involved in specific authentication tasks and authentication 
in general: that is, participants’ feelings about authentication made it seem to take more 
time and effort than it actually did. This emotional load is created in part by previous 
“catastrophic” experiences with authentication, such as when authentication problems 
severely delay work on a critical primary task:  
“So a situation where authentication has been a real challenge and caused real 
problems, there's one example I can think of where I have a system that had 
completely failed, and I had to restore the system from a backup, a procedure that 
I've done a few times, works flawlessly without any problems. In this particular 
case there was some...just call it a bug that interfered with restoring the 
passwords to this device. These are root-level passwords, very low-level and 
basic passwords you log in to control a system, basically, the only account on this 
device, right? There's one account and it's super-user, super-privilege. That 
password had not been properly been reset, or it was...I think it was actually reset 
to a very, very, old password that...in hindsight it was a very, very old password, 
and it took me about three hours to figure out that that was the password that was 
in place and that something had happened in the configuration, and it restored a 
really old password or something like that. So that was very, very frustrating. The 
cost was actually high then. We had three hours, or two hours, of complete 
network failure of major component of our network, a major section of our 
network. So the cost was actually very high there, and it was all because the 
expected outcome of a restore didn't happen that way. […] The real cost is with 
all the people that are not able to use their systems and get their work done.” 
(P5) 
It is understandable that a few experiences like the one described above would make a 
user wary about authentication and the disruption that can cause, and make authentication 
tasks (or even the prospect of performing authentication tasks) seem more time-
consuming and effortful than they actually are. 
Tension created by specific adverse experiences is only part of the emotional load related 
to authentication. The other part is the everyday experience of friction and disruption 
caused by authentication. The literature on task switching indicates that going from one 
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type of task to another – for example, from a creative primary task to the memory-
intensive and physical task of recalling and typing in a password – has an impact on 
focus, concentration, and efficiency that can linger through subsequent tasks [7][16]. 
This issue may also be related to what is called the “Zeigarnik effect” (after the 
psychiatrist who first studied the phenomenon), which states that people remember 
uncompleted or interrupted tasks better than they remember tasks they finish [28]. 
Clifford Nass, a professor at Stanford University who studies multi-tasking and task 
switching, theorizes that users are painfully aware of disruption caused by authentication 
because authentication is imposed on them: 
“I suspect that unlike multitasking, in which the task switching is voluntary and 
hence people have an incentive to downplay the costs, authentication is not 
voluntary, thereby making people aware of the cognitive cost.  Also…negative 
experiences are much more memorable than positive experiences.” [17]  
Study participants’ own accounts give credence to the theory that they carried an 
emotional load related to authentication. They described, in detail and at length, the 
general and specific ways in which authentication makes their work (and their lives) 
more difficult than it would be otherwise. These friction points are the subject of the 
following section. 
6.2 SPECIFIC “FRICTION POINTS” DESCRIBED BY OUR PARTICIPANTS 
Participants’ diaries from the data collection period provided insights into the aspects of 
authentication that the participants found particularly frustrating or difficult, as well as 
the applications for which they were most likely to have problems when authenticating. 
During the follow-up interviews, researchers asked participants for more detail about 
these “friction points.” Many of them independently mentioned similar or identical 
issues, discussed in detail in Secs. 6.2.1 through 6.2.5. Many of these friction points were 
also identified as problematic issues for users of technology by an independent study at 
NIST regarding passwords [5]. 
6.2.1 Re-authenticating due to timed lockouts 
One of the friction points most frequently mentioned by participants was that of having to 
authenticate to the same application over and over again, particularly because of the 
timed lockouts described in Sec. 2.7. The purpose of this measure is to make it more 
difficult for an attacker to exploit a user’s computer (and access privileges) while the user 
is away from the computer.  
Of the 42 local computer authentication events participants recorded during the reporting 
period, only 4 (or 9.52%) had problems and the average frustration rating associated with 
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the application was only 1.69 (see Table 9). However, almost half of the study 
participants (10) cited the timed lockout as a source of non-problem-related friction and 
frustration during follow-up interviews. Some participants noted that the timeout often 
takes effect while they are actually sitting in front of – but not actively using – their 
computers, which often disrupts or diverts their thought processes. Several participants 
expressed sentiments along the lines of “the system should know it’s me.” One 
participant said of the timed lockouts: 
“Well, I think that if I just logged in, then it should be able to understand that I 
just logged in and not ask me for the password again. […] That's too much, 
because you shouldn't have to do extra work to authenticate. Because yeah, it can 
just pick up what you do.” (P18) 
Periodically pressing a key or jiggling the mouse did not really alleviate the interruption 
and subsequent irritation caused by timed lockouts, as another participant noted: 
“You end up having to almost set a timer in your head to go back to the computer 
and type something within every 10 minutes or so. And some minor studies of 
productivity I've been involved with indicate that it's better to be focused on a task 
as opposed to have lots of interruptions throughout the day.” (P21) 
6.2.2 Remembering a large number of passwords and when/where each one is 
supposed to be used 
Participants also said that having to remember all the passwords for all the different 
applications they used was very difficult: all but one participant in this study reported 
managing at least some passwords using some form of external record (e.g., handwritten 
note, password management software). Remembering which password corresponded to 
which application could be a problem as well, especially since some participants were 
unclear as to which passwords were synchronized and which were not: 
“So there's the confusion of is this our BizFlow password? Is it our general realm 
password? Is it our Entrust password? Then they enter the password wrong. Then 
they think they need the password reset, but they don't because it's not actually 
the Entrust password that they're entering. So it's a big mess that way. […] Most 
users will say, "This is my e-Approval password." But e-Approval is a 
combination of now two different passwords, the general realm password and the 
Entrust password. But people think, "My e-Approval password," which will easily 
get them confused.” (P3) 
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6.2.3 Managing a large number of authentication elements 
Authentication information management was also a major friction point. Again, the sheer 
number of passwords participants had to juggle was part of the problem (since they had 
to manage authentication information for many of the applications they used 
individually). When a password expired, participants would have to replace it with a new 
one, which they would have to commit to memory – and all the time and effort they put 
into this would cease to matter when the password expired and the cycle started again. In 
addition, the many applications they used could (and often did) have different password 
policies. A password that was acceptable for one application might not be allowed for 
another, which made it even more difficult to come up with compliant passwords. 
Passwords for different applications might also expire at different times. One participant 
expanded a specific example of this type of problem into a general complaint about it: 
“[W]hen I started getting into the WebTA thing, it just so happened that it was 
time to change my password and WebTA makes you change your password more 
frequently than the NIST general domain. And every time I have to do that, I get 
really frustrated because I am like why can't they always be in sync. You have to 
think if you are going to be the responsible person, then you have to think of 
different passwords for everything and it is very frustrating. So when it gets to 
those infrequently used passwords, then I get really irritated.“ (P11) 
This participant touched on a related and particularly sore point: that of resetting 
passwords for applications that participants did not use often.  
6.2.4 Management workload for infrequently used passwords 
Multiple participants described the difficulties of managing a password that needs to be 
renewed more than it is actually used: 
“[O]nce or twice a year I have to log into a foreign application we have here, 
and fill out a form, BizFlow, and I usually have to get my password reset because 
I don't remember what it was. I try a few times, and before I get to the right one 
I'm locked out.” (P14) 
“I don't travel very often, but when I do I have to log in to something called 
Travel Management. And that password expires just as fast as any other 
password. Every single time I go to log in to submit my expense reports, first of 
all, my account is locked because I haven't changed my password in a few 
months. So then I have to figure out how to unlock it. Then I've got to go change 
it.” (P19) 
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“And e-Approval is something that I use so infrequently that each of the past few 
times I've had to do something in there, I've had to get my password reset, and it 
is very embarrassing.” (P11) 
“Once again security has gotten in my way and it takes me extra time because 
now I got to look that one up because I don't use that one often enough.” (P17) 
6.2.5 Miscellaneous friction points 
Some other authentication-related friction points mentioned by participants included:  
• The “human factor” – mistakes and weaknesses in the interaction because humans are 
forgetful or neglectful  
• Being unable to re-use the same password multiple times on a single system, or 
across different systems 
• The time and effort it takes to change passwords 
• Being interrupted on the way to a task because of requirement to reset passwords 
• Embarrassment at having to request support from a help desk when encountering an 
authentication problem 
• The sheer number of authentication mechanisms and combination of requirements  
• Password policies and other security rules that are not revealed until the user fails to 
meet them  
• Drops and interruptions in connectivity to the VPN or wireless network because of 
some problem related to authentication 
And finally, participants simply find themselves spending a great deal of time and effort 
on authentication:  
“And it gets in the way. It definitely takes way more time out of my day, both just time 
having to deal with this and then the break in the flow of work.” (P19) 
“In my attention it's a tiny blip, but time wise, I think it does actually still take a lot of 
time. There's a substantial amount of time” (P5). 
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6.3 PARTICIPANTS’ FEELINGS ABOUT THE NECESSITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTHENTICATION 
Authentication clearly created problems for the study participants (as described in Sec. 
6.2). However, they did not think authentication should be scrapped entirely, nor did they 
think it was acceptable or appropriate to ignore, shortcut, or bypass NIST’s 
organizational security requirements. Participants valued organizational security (see Sec. 
2.7) and knew that authentication played a key role in maintaining it. They simply felt 
that authentication at NIST could be implemented in a more efficient and usable way.  
6.3.1 While all participants saw a need for organizational security at NIST, some 
questioned the effectiveness of current methods  
Several participants expressed the belief that following NIST security policy is an 
effective way to protect their own online assets and those of their co-workers. But more 
participants questioned whether the authentication requirements they must follow are 
actually effective. This is not to say that participants think the organization for which 
they work does not face real security risks. They had no expectation that the need to 
authenticate will ever go away, because there will always be “bad agents” who want to do 
damage for a variety of reasons. Rather, they felt that they had a part in protecting the 
organization from attackers – that they all shared some responsibility for organizational 
security. On that general point, they agreed with the organization and security specialists: 
however, they had specific disagreements about what security measures were actually 
appropriate. 
Generally, participants did not fear unknown, non-specific attacks on organizational 
security. They also expected that most attacks (or the most serious attacks) would target 
the organization’s servers or weaknesses in its infrastructure – not their own passwords. 
One participant said he had, “Never had anyone steal my account or break in by stealing 
my password – that I know of” (P7). Another echoed the sentiment, saying, “No one has 
hijacked my accounts. Problems – fraud – comes from insiders, not people hacking. The 
emphasis may be in the wrong place” (P20).  
This is related to another belief many participants held regarding security risks: even if 
they followed all security policies perfectly and did everything imaginable, they could 
not guarantee the safety of their organizational systems. An attacker could still find and 
exploit some previously unknown vulnerability. 
But another participant pointed out that it is unreasonable to expect security policies to be 
sufficiently proactive to counter unknown threats. On the contrary, security policies tend 
to be retroactive and implemented in response to specific security incidents: 
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“It’s hard for the system administrators and the security people to design 
authentication approaches that are more flexible. It's just hard. So more of a 
brute force approach is what people tend to favor. Does it really make the systems 
more secure? I don't know. It appears not in general. It helps protect against 
accounts being broken into, perhaps, by coworkers or insider attacks more, but 
people who are still doing sophisticated attacks still seem to be able to do those 
and be relatively successful at them. A lot of this stuff at least some of the security 
requirements on laptops especially, especially when traveling – resulted more 
from, I think, higher level screw ups, people in upper level management having 
their systems being broken into.” (P21) 
The implication of this statement is that security policies are difficult to make flexible 
(i.e., responsive to actual risk assessment) and effective, which leads to burdensome 
polices that attempt to cover more weaknesses, both human and information-technology 
related.  
6.3.2 Participants think organizational security measures are too demanding 
In general, study participants were cautious about criticizing the state and implementation 
of security where they work. This may have been an artifact of an internally conducted 
study. Even so, participants strongly suggested that they felt they were required to 
authenticate too much, too often – that security policies were far more demanding than 
they had to be to address security risks, and may in fact have created new vulnerabilities. 
“The things that move us beyond human memory, we have to use things less secure, like 
[password] sharing schemes. [IT] people are bound by their rules, not common sense” 
(P20), as one participant put it. Some participants also expressed the belief that security 
policies related to authentication were so demanding as to be counterproductive:  
“Going for longer and longer passwords, that just seems silly to me. I'm not sure 
that it actually gives you anything in terms of security, except it actually at a 
certain point decreases security.” (P2) 
“Authentication becomes a block if you don't use it frequently. It becomes an 
annoyance if you use it frequently.” (P1) 
“Human memory is limited. More security means more barriers, which makes it 
less usable. Close the door to attackers, but I have to put that password 
somewhere, which opens a window. Wish I could protect the whole house.” (P3) 
In addition, a number of participants worried that if the IT department found out 
about some of their strategies for coping with authentication (particularly schemas for 
password creation, as described in Sec. 6.4.1.3), they would prohibit these strategies 
through policy, technical enforcement, or both. Fortunately, this is not the case at 
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NIST, as its management supports this and related research in an effort to improve the 
usability of IT security at NIST and elsewhere. However, this is not an unreasonable 
concern within other organizations, given that IT departments  often tend to see 
imposing stricter and stricter security requirements as the most effective way to deal 
with “inherently insecure” users [1].  
Sentiments like these aside, many participants seemed resigned to dealing with the 
institution’s security policies. As the final participant quote in Sec. 6.3.1 implies, many 
considerations inevitably shape organizational security policy. Another participant 
summarized this situation by saying “[It’s a] cost of doing business in this environment. 
Just part of workday here” (P1). 
6.3.3 Overall, participants believe SSO is the best way to address both security and 
usability issues  
Several participants suggested organization-wide SSO as a compromise solution that 
would reduce tension between the organization’s need for security and their own need for 
usability (NIST already has partial SSO, as described in Sec. 2.7). A number of 
participants already employ authentication coping strategies that mimic SSO, such as 
synchronizing their passwords for multiple applications and trying to update all their 
passwords at the same time (see Sec. 6.4.1.6 and Sec. 6.4.1.7). 
Participants said they would accept having a long SSO password (longer than the ones 
they are currently required to use for any application) – provided that they could use it 
across all their work-related accounts, systems, and applications. As one participant 
explained it:  
“…the strength of the single sign-on is if I only have to remember one 
password for my work, I don't care that that is a 12-character password. 
But it's just one. Right? ... Then I probably would not put it in my personal 
password vault or whatever, because I could keep better separation.” 
(P23) 
However, they were aware that SSO contained the inherent risk of an attacker gaining 
access to the “master” password, and by extension all of a user’s access privileges on 
every application he/she used. One participant summarized the issue by saying, “If 
there’s a break-in, the attacker has everything. I don’t know how to balance that” (P7). 
Another participant suggested doing away with passwords entirely and using a 
biometrics-based SSO solution:  
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“We have to go to some sort of a single sign-on using biometrics. Enough of this 
business of trying to remember passwords and draw up rules for passwords that 
are designed to secure stuff when passwords themselves are not secure.” (P17) 
Unfortunately, some NIST users’ experiences with biometric authentication – 
specifically, using fingerprint readers – suggests that this is not yet feasible. One 
participant indicated that fingerprint authentication is not a reliable alternative to 
passwords: 
“This [authentication method] is worse, because it works by a biometric, and my 
finger doesn't read very well. I have to smear it with moisturizer, and then I forget 
what the actual password is. When it really just won't read my finger, I can't 
unlock it and I can't remember.” (P2) 
Whether it involved biometrics or not, implementing a true SSO solution at NIST would 
be extremely difficult (in part because of the way application ownership works within the 
organization – see Sec. 2.7).14 
6.4 COPING WITH AUTHENTICATION 
The study participants, like all users, are rational in the behavioral-economics sense: they 
have a high authentication workload, so they find or develop various ways to reduce the 
costs of individual authentication tasks. This allows them to use their authentication 
budget more efficiently and to greater effect than they would otherwise be able to do, all 
while complying with organizational security policies. In other words, they employ 
coping mechanisms to help them deal with the impact of authentication.  
In this section, we describe specific coping mechanisms used by our participants and 
what participants’ use of those coping mechanisms implies about how they view the 
relationship between authentication and security. 
6.4.1 Coping mechanisms used by participants 
Generally, participants’ coping mechanisms reflected the desire to make authentication as 
automatic and unconscious as possible and minimize the amount of effort they had to 
spend on entering and managing authentication elements [19]. These mechanisms could 
be tools, behavioral strategies, or a combination of both. 
                                                 
14 It may also not be feasible for Department of Commerce applications used within NIST, since NIST has 
no control over those applications. 
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Memory aids are perhaps the most obvious (and common) examples of coping 
mechanisms. As described in Sec. 4.4.3, all participants reported having at least some of 
their passwords memorized: however, all but one said that they used some kind of 
memory aid to help them remember their passwords. A number of them wrote their 
passwords down, either digitally (e.g., in an encrypted file on the computer) or by hand. 
These memory aids helped participants avoid the immense cognitive pressure of 
memorizing all their passwords or, alternatively, the impact of having to reset forgotten 
passwords. Some memory aids, such as password managers/vaults, not only made it 
easier to remember authentication information but made it easier to enter as well.  
The diary and interview data provided a rich picture of how participants used memory 
aids as well as other mechanisms and strategies to cope with authentication. These 
included: 
• Planning and time management 
• Removing the need to re-enter authentication elements 
• Employing a schema for generating passwords 
• Creating memorable passwords 
• Creating passwords that are easy to type 
• Synchronizing passwords across multiple applications 
• Proactively renewing passwords 
• Using written memory aids 
• Using cached or stored passwords 
• Employing non-password authentication mechanisms 
• Using password managers/vaults 
Each of these mechanisms is described in detail in the following subsections. 
6.4.1.1 Planning and time management 
One strategy many participants used to cope with authentication was planning ahead. For 
example, one participant said that if he/she expected to receive an urgent request while 
working at home, he/she would sign on remotely to the NIST network well in advance. 
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This way he/she could go through the complex, time-consuming process of authenticating 
to the NIST VPN and download and install any required security software updates (a 
process that could take up to half an hour) at his/her leisure, rather than when he/she was 
under pressure to perform an urgent primary task. 
On a similar note, a number of participants reported that they batched primary tasks so 
that they could keep to a minimum the number of times that they authenticated to a 
particular application. If a participant had more than one activity to perform using a given 
application during the day, he/she would block out time to perform all those activities at 
once. This batching of activities did not correspond to the natural flow of participants’ 
work, but it allowed them to authenticate to the application they needed only once instead 
of doing so multiple times during the day. 
This coping strategy is, essentially, changing one’s work habits because of authentication. 
One of the problems with doing so is that it overlaps with one of the symptoms of 
password fatigue: trading off productivity for security [13]. As one participant described, 
batching primary tasks can sometimes amount to postponing them: 
“Things get put off until when it's, ’OK, I have a block of time. It's worth it for me 
to get the token, to log in and to sit there and do like an hour's worth of work or 
half an hour or something like that.’ […] But if it's for like fleeting little, ’Oh, I 
have this great idea‘ or ’I want to send this e-mail‘ or something, then I'm more 
likely to put it off until I have that sort of block of time where a log-in is worth it. 
[…] especially if it's something that wasn't actually due. It's after hours. You've 
already put in your nine hours or however many hours you're doing and then you 
think of something of home, it definitely is less likely that you're going to get 
online to actually do that thing that you're thinking of. You're just going to wait 
until the next day.” (P11) 
6.4.1.2 Removing the need to re-enter authentication elements 
Study participants reported avoiding entering authentication elements in two key 
situations: time-outs on systems or networks, and when they perceived authenticating as 
more of a “hassle” than it was worth for the task they needed to do.  
One common reason for having to re-authenticate was because the desktop or laptop 
computer the person was using had locked after 15 minutes of inactivity (as described in 
Sec. 2.7). Participants addressed this inconvenience by doing something to prevent the 
computer from timing out, such as jiggling the mouse, or carrying their laptop with them 
– although as the participant quoted at the end of Sec. 6.2.1 pointed out, this solution was 
far from ideal and did little to reduce the friction and disruption caused by timed 
lockouts. One participant also mentioned (in jest) that software that makes the computer 
think the mouse is moving often enough to prevent the screen from locking or a  
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“drinking bird” could be employed to periodically tap a key on the computer and prevent 
timeouts. Another participant said that despite the appeal of “cheating” the lockout, 
he/she did not plan to do so: 
“Well you have two choices. Either you can beat the system – I mean there 
are little devices that you can buy that you plug into USB that imitates the 
mouse being moved every so often, right? […] And they're very cheap. 
They're like five dollars or something. But I prefer not to try and beat the 
system, although that's tempting.” (P23) 
In certain situations, participants elected to perform long tasks without the computer 
because doing so was more efficient than logging in, being locked out, having to log in 
again, and so on. In most cases, this involved working with pen and paper rather than 
digitally. For example, some participants reported printing documents rather than viewing 
digital copies on their laptop. Others said they would rather scribble things quickly on 
paper rather than open their machine, authenticate, and take notes digitally, or, if off 
campus, log into a computer, log into a virtual private network (VPN), log into the NIST 
network, and then log into e-mail to send a quick thought or idea.  
6.4.1.3 Employing a schema for generating passwords 
Because passwords must be remembered and entered, password construction often has an 
impact on subsequent use. For this reason, many participants used systems or schemas for 
generating passwords. Schemas are more of a general coping strategy than a specific one: 
they could be used to help facilitate password memorability, entry, management, or some 
combination of all three. Some specific examples of these schemas are described in Sec. 
6.4.1.4 and Sec. 6.4.1.5. 
6.4.1.4 Creating memorable passwords 
Many of the participants’ reported systems for creating memorable passwords involved 
“chunking” them into segments. Some participants used predetermined sets of segments 
in a modular fashion: when updating a password, they would simply take the segments 
within it and reorder them. Others would take a single set of three or four characters and 
repeat them until they reached the required password character length. 
In a number of cases, participants had a fixed segment or root that remained the same in 
all their passwords, ensuring that there would always be an element of the passwords that 
they could remember. When they needed to renew a password, participants would keep 
this fixed segment while changing a different part of the password, such as a prefix, 
suffix, and/or a single character they could increment (e.g., from “a” to “b” or from “1” to 
“2”). The fact that so many participants used these types of password creation strategies 
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is not surprising: some previous usability studies indicate that such techniques are very 
common [21]. 
Two participants described a somewhat less common strategy of using a cryptic password 
hint (when an application permitted it) that was effectively an “abbreviated” form of their 
segmented password. For example, one participant used the hint D! #, where “D” was 
his/her date of birth, while “!” and “#” each represented a specific password segment 
he/she had memorized. 
These kinds of strategies do not always protect users from forgetting their passwords, in 
large part because they simply have so many passwords to manage. One participant 
admitted to having this problem: 
“Yeah, I used to add an abbreviation to the end for each different system, but 
once in a while I'd forget how I'd abbreviated it.” (P14) 
6.4.1.5 Creating passwords that are easy to type 
Two participants reported that they used methods for creating passwords that were easy 
to type. Two others mentioned creating passwords based on keyboard typing patterns, 
moving one key in a specific direction whenever they had to renew their passwords (e.g., 
“a” to “s”). However, as one participant noted, this practice is often prevented by systems 
that perform assessments on password strength before they can be accepted and used. 
Also, this method only works on conventional PC and laptop computers. It is not easy to 
use on mobile devices with touchscreens or small keyboards. However, some participants 
take this into consideration as well: one said that he/she chose a password that did not 
require the Shift key so that it would be easier to enter on his/her iPad. 
6.4.1.6 Synchronizing passwords across multiple applications 
During new hire orientation, NIST staff are given best practices training that explicitly 
encourages using different passwords for every application. However, several 
participants mentioned reusing the same passwords across multiple applications. At least 
one participant specifically reported that he/she used one strong password for of all the 
applications on which it would work. Many participants actually used different classes of 
passwords based on the sensitivity of the data or application protected by the password. 
For example, two participants reported using the strongest passwords for their online 
banking, and weaker passwords for commenting on blogs. This is consistent with the 
findings of a large-scale study of password habits conducted by Microsoft researchers 
Dinei Florencio and Cormac Herley [9]. 
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Participants who used this strategy said that they often struggled with creating passwords 
that would comply with the different password policies (regarding length, composition, 
special characters, etc.) of multiple applications. Some found it very frustrating when 
they created what they considered a good, strong, memorable password, only to have it 
rejected when they tried to use it on certain applications.  
One participant circumvented this by creating a “universal” password that worked for the 
application with the strictest password policy, then using that password on other 
applications with less stringent requirements. This kind of “over-fulfilling” of password 
requirements is common [10][21]. While it may work well most of the time within 
enterprises or large organizations, it may not transfer to personal online accounts (e.g., 
because the password character minimum for an organization is greater than the password 
character maximum for one’s social networking account). 
Another obstacle to keeping one’s passwords synchronized is that the passwords for 
different applications may expire at different intervals – this was certainly the case for 
many NIST applications. To address this issue, many participants who synchronized 
passwords to some degree also used the complementary strategy of updating all their 
passwords on a schedule, as described in the next section. 
6.4.1.7 Proactively renewing passwords 
The applications used by the study participants had different password expiry intervals: 
some expired in less time or more time than others. For example, one application might 
have a “password lifetime” of 90 days, while another had a lifetime of only 30 days. To 
save time and effort in managing passwords, participants said they proactively updated as 
many passwords as possible when they received a notification that one was about to 
expire. In other words, many participants who had a 30-day password and a 90-day 
password would update both every 30 days. This was especially important for 
participants who tried to synchronize passwords across multiple applications. 
Based on comments from participants in follow-up interviews, it seemed that the practice 
of updating all of one’s passwords on the schedule of the one with the shortest lifetime 
was fairly widespread. One participant said that having to reset multiple passwords on 
different schedules was one reason that he/she badly wanted SSO (while acknowledging 
that others might not feel the same way): 
“If you forget that one password, you’re hosed, and maybe not everybody would 
like that, I mean because you would have to have such strict security requirements 
on that one password that maybe it wouldn't be worth it for everybody. But I 
guarantee for me I would sit down and practice that thing and practice that thing 
and practice that thing until it's automatized and I wouldn't forget it and I would 
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be totally happy to enter a 20-digit password if I could use the same one and not 
have to go through this hullabaloo of calling and resetting.” (P11) 
A disadvantage to this strategy is that a user might have so many passwords that resetting 
all of them at once could be a monumental task. One of our participants noted that 
synchronizing all her passwords could take him/her half an hour at best: at worst it could 
take him/her an entire day. 
6.4.1.8 Using written memory aids 
Participants reported using a variety of memory aids, most of which are listed in Sec. 
4.4.3. Many participants (16 in all, or 69.57%) reported writing passwords down or 
recording them in some other way: 11 (47.83%) of them said they used paper notes, and 6 
(26.06%) said they wrote their passwords down in digital files such as Word or Notepad 
documents, while one participant used both aids; the use of written memory aids was also 
documented by Choong, et al, in [5]. It should be noted that NIST’s security policy does 
not prohibit writing passwords down: simply that passwords in general be safeguarded, 
which means that writing down a password would not necessarily violate the policy. 
Those participants who wrote their passwords down had different ways of doing so, and 
some were more systematic than others. While some participants reported saving each 
password in a file and encrypting it, others said they wrote down only the difficult 
passwords on Post-Its and carried the notes with them while they were learning and 
memorizing new passwords. Others said they kept an up-to-date list of their passwords in 
a secure location.  
Though writing down passwords can reduce anxiety, it does create additional physical 
effort because the user has to have either the file or the piece of paper containing the 
passwords at hand and copy from it when entering his/her password. Digitally written 
passwords are somewhat less labor-intensive, since a user can simply copy and paste 
those passwords as needed – although as with handwritten passwords, the user may have 
to spend some time and effort locating the password they need first. Also, if something 
happens to the machine on which the digital password file is saved (e.g., hard drive 
failure) and the user does not have a backup or printout of that file, all the user’s 
passwords will be lost. This creates a serious authentication problem, as one of the study 
participants learned from his/her own experience: 
“I ended up having to change a password that day because I got locked out of an 
account. The reason that happened was because I had switched computers, where 
before, I was relying on the browser for my password. So I went to the new 
laptop, I didn't remember it, and I had no way of getting the password other than 
resetting it. The other computer was gone.” (P10) 
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6.4.1.9 Using cached or stored passwords 
Many Web browsers (e.g., Firefox, Internet Explorer) will offer to save a user’s login 
information for a Web site when the user creates an account or enters the password for 
the first time. Browsers that cache login information will not only store it, but when the 
user visits a Web site for which the browser has stored login information, they can enter 
it with one click, which takes much less time and effort than entering the information 
manually. Macs have a “Keychain” password management utility that works in much the 
same way, except not just in a single Web browser but also for all browsers and 
applications on a machine. Slightly more than half of the study participants (12, or 
52.17%) reported using cached passwords.15  
There is, however, a significant disadvantage to browser-cached passwords: like the 
digitally written passwords described in Sec. 6.4.1.9, they will be lost if the device on 
which they reside is lost and the user has made no backup. This is actually a more serious 
issue for browser-cached passwords, because while most users have the technical 
knowledge necessary to transfer an encrypted Word document containing their passwords 
off of a computer (e.g., by putting it on a thumb drive), the same is not true for passwords 
cached in a browser. 
6.4.1.10 Employing non-password authentication mechanisms 
Some participants also used authentication methods that  reduced the need to use 
passwords. Four participants  used a biometric fingerprint reader to authenticate in 16 
events (total). While one participant used his/her PIV card  two times to authenticate to a 
NIST computer during the study period.  
While not the participant who reported using a PIV card where a username-password 
could have been employed, one participant, P19, gave some insights into an appeal of 
PIV card use, but also why he/she was not using it to log into computer systems.  “I just 
put it in, put in the PIN, and that's it.” This participant went on to explain how the PIN 
composition requirements are easier than that of passwords, “A PIN number is four to six 
numbers, and that's pretty easy for me to remember. It's different than 20 characters, 15 
characters, of random stuff.” However, Participant 19 further explained why he/she does 
not use the PIV card to log into computer systems at NIST, “I actually don't use my PIV 
card here at work because I forget it in the computer a lot. If I leave the building, I can't 
get back in because that's also my access back into the building.” 
                                                 
15 Others may also have stored passwords in their browsers but did not report this technique because it 
automated the authentication process enough that they were not aware of when it was happening.  
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When using a fingerprint reader, in theory an individual could authenticate simply by 
placing his/her finger on the reader, without having to enter a password (at least for 
applications that supported this kind of authentication). In practice, fingerprint readers 
were not that reliable, as one participant pointed out: 
“This [authentication method] is worse, because it works by a biometric, and my 
finger doesn't read very well. I have to smear it with moisturizer, and then I forget 
what the actual password is. When it really just won't read my finger, I can't 
unlock it and I can't remember.” (P2) 
For this participant, one authentication failure – the fingerprint reader producing a false 
negative – led to another one: forgetting the password he/she could otherwise use as a 
backup, because he/she did not practice it enough to remember it. 
Another participant explained that in NIST’s implementation, the fingerprint reader and 
PIV card mechanisms are authentication system front-ends to an underlying password 
system. This means that while using the reader or the PIV card eliminates the daily 
exercise of recalling and entering complex passwords, it does not eliminate the need for 
password management. The participant said he/she still had to change his/her general 
NIST domain password every three months when it expired, which involved looking up 
the old domain password he/she never used just for the purpose of resetting it.  
6.4.1.11 Using password management tools 
A password manager or vault is a piece of software or hardware installed on a computing 
device, which can be a desktop computer, notebook computer, tablet, or smartphone. 
They store passwords16 – in encrypted form, protected by a single “master” password – 
and can fill them in as appropriate when the user opens an application or visits a Web 
page that requires authentication information. Password management tools have multiple 
advantages: they take pressure off users’ memory; remove the physical effort of entering 
authentication information (except for the master password); and prevent mistakes when 
recalling or entering a password. In certain circumstances, they can also automate some 
aspects of password management: if a user changes his/her password for a particular 
website, the management tool will offer to update the appropriate password in storage. 
Five (21.74%) study participants reported using some kind of password management 
tool. Although there are a variety of password management tools on the market, the 
participants reported that they used the following three products: 
                                                 
16 Some password management tools can also store other information, such as the answers to security 
questions, bank account and credit card numbers, identity information, and encrypted notes. 
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• IronKey is an encrypted USB stick with an option for a password vault. 
• KeePass is a free, open-source password management tool. It can be downloaded 
from the Internet. 
• LastPass is a free online application (a premium version is available with a paid 
subscription). It can be downloaded from the Internet. 
One participant described how his/her password manager worked, and mentioned some 
of its advantages: 
“It sits up here, as a browser extension for Mozilla or Chrome. I click this. 
Currently, I'm logged in. I had to log in for my master password this morning. It 
will automatically fill the form fields. But it stores things encrypted. I have it on 
my phone as well. It's very accessible.” (P3) 
No password management tool worked for all the accounts and devices users had, but 
participants reported that use of these tools made many of their authentication tasks easier 
and less time consuming. 
The research team developed two simulations to illustrate one of the anticipated 
advantages – time – of using a password manager to enter a user ID and password, rather 
than entering that authentication information manually. These simulations were informed 
by measuring the time required for a skilled user to log into a web application through a 
browser by entering authentication information manually and the time to perform the 
same task using the LastPass password manager, which automatically fills in the 
username and password on a Web page. The underlying modeling techniques used for the 
time measurements were: Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection rules (GOMS) and 
its daughter technique, Keystroke-Level Modeling (KLM), referred to as GOMS-KLM.  
The modeling technique GOMS-KLM reduces the interaction between a human and a 
computer to basic physical and cognitive actions such as pointing with the mouse, 
clicking, pressing keys, and mental preparation. GOMS-KLM provides numerical 
predictions for user performance of a set task and also estimates the amount of time a 
skilled user would require to accomplish that task. The task chosen was logging into a 
Web-based e-mail application with authentication requirements similar to that of logging 
into the NIST e-mail application through a Web browser. Two models, both employing 
GOMS-KLM, were developed to assess the time requirements for a skilled user to 
complete the selected task in two modes: 1) without using the LastPass and 2) to 
complete the task while using LastPass, which presumed that the preliminary task of 
logging into LastPass had already been completed (time estimate provided).  The first 
model was built by a member of the research team, who manually specified each step of 
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the task according to the GOMS-KLM technique. A lengthy example is provided in Table 
17, Appendix D The second model employed CogTool, which also uses GOMS-KLM, 
but may be more accurate than the manually generated GOMS-KLM estimates, as it 
removes the need for the researcher to be trained in the theory and use of KLM [11]. An 
example of a CogTool script used in this simulation is shown in Fig. 17, Appendix D. 
Table 15 shows the simulation results from the two models described above for the login 
task in both modes (with and without LastPass), as well as an estimate of the time needed 
to log into LastPass initially. The results of the GOMS-KLM analyses using both the 
manual method and CogTool, show that using a password management tool is likely to 
substantially reduce the time needed for a similar authentication task. These models 
predict that entering the authentication information manually will take approximately 14 
seconds (14.8 seconds using the researcher-developed model and 13.2 seconds using the 
CogTool-developed model), while using the password manager took roughly 5 seconds  
(5.7 seconds using the researcher-developed model and 4.6 seconds using the CogTool 
developed model) – meaning that the use of the password manager reduced the task time 
by approximately 9 seconds. 
Table 15: Task completion estimates for the login task using manual authentication information 
entry and a password manager 
Task 
Model type 
Researcher-developed 
model using GOMS-KLM: 
estimate (seconds) 
Model developed using 
CogTool: estimate (seconds) 
Logging into web e-mail by 
manually entering information 
(No LastPass) 
14.8 13.2 
Logging into web e-mail with 
LastPass password manager 5.7 4.6 
Logging into LastPass 
password manager (initial 
login) 
10.4 10.1 
  
Note that using the password manager requires an initial login. The predicted task 
completion times for the initial login to LastPass are also given, just over 10 seconds. 
However, a user can perform this initial login shortly after starting their system, after 
which the password manager will remain open until the user logs out – and the user will 
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more than make up their investment of time in the initial password manager 
authentication with two or more authentications similar to the one modeled. 
6.4.2 What participants’ coping mechanisms imply about their view of 
authentication and security 
As the preceding descriptions of coping mechanisms illustrate, participants clearly spent 
considerable time and effort trying to balance meeting security requirements with 
minimizing the impact of authentication on their primary tasks. Coping mechanisms were 
employed to make the secondary tasks of authentication as automatic and effortless as 
possible. But at least some of these coping mechanisms – such as using the same 
password across multiple applications, storing authentication information in Web 
browsers, and using schemas for creating passwords – suggest that participants were 
focused largely on following the rules to the letter without considering the security 
rationale behind them.  
This is not to say that participants did not value organizational security: on the contrary, 
they did. In principle, participants accepted that authentication was an important part of 
protecting the assets and reputation of NIST. But in practice, participants looked for ways 
to reduce the impact of compliance to more manageable levels.      
6.5 TRADING OFF PRODUCTIVITY FOR SECURITY  
Even security-conscious users with an array of coping mechanisms can find 
authentication tasks too effortful. They still have limited compliance budgets (see Sec. 
2.5), which can be exhausted by performing dozens of small authentication tasks over the 
course of a day. More subtly, prior bad experiences with authentication can condition 
users to approach future authentication tasks – particularly those that are time-consuming, 
complex, or otherwise difficult – with additional emotional loading. This emotional load 
increases the perceived time-and-effort costs of authentication (see Sec. 6.1). 
Either circumstance (or both) can cause users to trade security for productivity or vice-
versa. The study participants felt too invested in NIST’s organizational security (see Sec. 
2.7) to deliberately do anything that would compromise it, so they traded off productivity 
instead. In essence, if engaging in a certain activity required going through a difficult 
authentication process, the participants would either engage in that activity less or just 
give it up completely. 
For example, some participants stopped using certain devices because the effort of going 
through the authentication steps necessary to use them was not worth the trouble. Two 
participants reported giving up use of NIST laptops because of the authentication 
mechanism associated with the platform’s disk encryption. One participant gave up using 
a portable cellular device because of the authentication effort. Others have not given up 
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entirely on using such devices, but do not use them as much as they might otherwise (for 
example, in between meetings). 
The impact of authentication caused some participants to limit not only the devices they 
worked on, but from where they worked. One participant complained that “authentication 
policies work against telecommuting, off-site computing and connecting” (P21). This 
sentiment seems to have been shared by other participants. One stated that he/she worked 
from home less because of the three-step authentication process required to connect 
remotely to the NIST network – a process that involves entering a frequently-changing 
numeric code from an RSA token (see Sec. 2.7). Two other participants reported that they 
avoid traveling for the same reason. Others mentioned that when off-campus, they check 
their e-mails less frequently than they would otherwise because the effort and interruption 
of going through the necessary authentication is just not worthwhile. 
Finally, authentication requirements hinder collaboration between employees at NIST 
and members of other organizations. One participant stressed that he/she no longer seeks 
to do software development work with people from other institutions because security 
restrictions make transferring software across organizational boundaries prohibitively 
difficult.  
In each of the examples mentioned above, participants stated that their actions had ripple 
effects on their productivity, the productivity of their colleagues, and the organization 
overall. The participants were aware that by changing their habits to avoid dealing with 
authentication, they had lost out on potentially valuable opportunities. However, they felt 
that the time and effort required to pursue these opportunities – to overcome the friction 
of authentication – was not worth the potential rewards. 
6.6 INSIGHTS REGARDING AUTHENTICATION, FRICTION, AND 
DISRUPTION 
This study resulted in some valuable insights into why authentication causes friction and 
disruption and what factors intensify those effects. This study illustrated that 1) 
authentication friction and disruption are increased by authentication problems, 2) 
friction and disruption are increased during an authentication event as the impact 
increases with the addition of each  authentication “cost” associated with that event, and 
3) users experience friction even when there are no problems. Additionally, the study 
findings indicate that authentication may have more subtle, long-term effects on users 
than previously thought. 
6.6.1 Authentication problems create considerable friction 
Authentication creates friction when it delays or obstructs a user’s attempt to perform a 
primary task (as described in Sec. 2.4). The greater the time and effort required to 
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complete an authentication task, the greater the friction it creates. Predictably, when users 
experience problems that interfere with the completion of authentication tasks (e.g., 
having to recover lost authentication information elements) both the disruption of the 
primary task and the degree of friction are considerable.  
Many of the study participants said that they tend to experience authentication problems 
with applications they use infrequently. Since these applications tend to be “out of sight, 
out of mind” most of the time, users can easily forget to change their passwords. As a 
result, when they do use these applications, they often find that their passwords have 
expired, necessitating that they spend significant time and effort reinstating their 
accounts. Participants frequently cited these kinds of applications as a source of irritation 
and stress, in large part because of the need to change their passwords more frequently 
than they actually use them. As one participant said: 
“I've even thought about setting up a reminder on my calendar every two 
months to remind myself to just go in and change the passwords. I don't 
have to deal with the whole locking out thing. […] But even that's too 
much work, because if I don't travel for a year, I'll change my password 
six times. […] There's no purpose for it other than to avoid the five to 15 
minutes next year.” (P19) 
A complete list of applications and the number of authentication problems 
reported for each is shown in Table 9 in Sec. 4.4.6. 
6.6.2 Users experience friction from authentication even when there are no 
problems 
Authentication can create friction even if the user experiences no problems with it. The 
study participants’ self-reported levels of frustration certainly tend to indicate this: 
consider Table 9 (Sec. 4.4.6), in which participants reported frustration with 
authenticating to certain applications even if they did not experience problems doing so 
(online banking, for example). Similarly, Table 10 (also in Sec. 4.4.6) shows that some 
participants were frustrated by authentication even if they did not experience any 
authentication problems during the reporting period. 
Why would users be so frustrated even over authentication tasks that go smoothly? There 
are a few reasons, one being that authentication is a “non-productive” task that does not 
result in any direct benefits for the user [5]. Also, any authentication task that requires 
time and effort on the part of the user creates a “wall of disruption” that impedes the 
performance of primary tasks. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 16. 
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Figure 16: The wall of disruption created by the enabling task of authentication 
Even a successful, problem-free authentication task is fraught with friction caused by the 
effort of context switching between primary tasks and authentication tasks. As noted in 
Sec. 6.1, users are painfully aware of the task-switching costs imposed upon them by 
authentication [17].  
The higher the workload associated with a specific authentication task, the more friction 
and disruption it creates. Based on diary data and interview data from this study, the 
research team identified four essential factors that increase authentication workload (and 
therefore friction and disruption):  
• Difficulty accessing and/or retrieving authentication elements. Forgetting a 
password and having to consult a memory aid; having difficulty finding the 
memory aid; losing a smartcard; having trouble reading the code on an RSA 
token. 
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• Perceived lack of user control. Having to follow seemingly arbitrary rules; being 
blocked from access to an application, resource, or system due to problems with 
authentication; having no control over when one authenticates (or re-
authenticates), such as when the computer locks after a set period of time; being 
forced to create passwords that are difficult to remember and type. 
• Complexity. Dealing with different (and conflicting) sets of password creation 
requirements; having passwords with different expiration timing; keeping track of 
which passwords are synchronized and which ones are not; having to submit a 
large number of elements (3 or more) to authenticate. 
• Time. Waiting for a new password to be valid after it has been changed; spending 
15 or 20 minutes getting assistance from a help desk to resolve authentication 
problems; re-entering a password multiple times (either because it was entered 
incorrectly or because of repeated prompts for authentication); making multiple 
attempts to recover a password; delaying work to renew a password that is about 
to expire.  
Note that some of the example situations listed above involve more than one factor. For 
example, having to consult a memory aid (especially one that has been misplaced or is 
otherwise inconveniently located) not only involves the “Difficulty accessing and/or 
retrieving authentication elements” factor, but the “Time” factor as well. Time is actually 
a factor in all authentication tasks, because at a minimum, a user must spend some time to 
perform the task. All authentication tasks have some workload, and therefore a cost to the 
user: there is no “free” authentication. 
Generally speaking, the greater the impact of any one of these factors in an authentication 
task (e.g., the more difficult it is to retrieve elements, the less control the user feels, the 
more complex the task, and the longer it takes), the more friction and frustration the user 
experiences. This is supported by the data displayed in Table 9 (Sec. 4.4.6) and Table 3 
(Sec. 4.4.2): the former shows the frequency of problems and average frustration ratings 
for each application, and the latter shows the average number of authentication elements 
required to authenticate to each application. Upon comparing the two tables, the research 
team found that the more elements an application required for authentication, the more 
likely participants were to report some frustration with it, even if they experienced few or 
no problems. Table 16 consolidates this information. 
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Table 16: Frustration and problems associated with number of authentication elements used 
Authentication 
elements 
Average 
frustration 
Percentage of 
problems 
1 1.58 8.20% 
2 1.62 8.94% 
3 2.25 6.67% 
4 2.36 36.36% 
 
This data suggest that there is a connection between labor-intensive authentication and 
participant frustration. 
Accumulated frustration associated with a low-cost authentication task repeated many 
times was also high. The study participants said that performing the same small 
authentication task over and over was one of their major friction points (see Sec. 6.2.1). 
Both individual high-cost authentication tasks and large aggregations of low-cost tasks 
have the same effect in the end: friction and disruption that extends beyond the 
authentication task itself.  
6.6.3 Friction and disruption from authentication have long-term effects 
One of the most important insights that can be derived from the findings of this study is 
that authentication leads to an accumulation of disruption over time on any one account 
or application. The cost of authentication to the user goes well beyond those identified in 
some previous authentication diary studies [10]. The literature on task switching suggests 
that the negative impact of experiencing authentication as an obstacle to one primary task 
probably lingers through multiple subsequent primary tasks [7][16]. Consider the 
following example of a hypothetical NIST knowledge worker named Alice, derived from 
diary and interview data provided by our participants. 
At the end of a two-week pay period, Alice sits down to use the NIST Time and 
Attendance (TA) application, where she records how many hours she spent working on 
her projects, performing administrative duties, and/or on leave. However, Alice has not 
logged in since she last renewed her password two weeks ago. Because she has not had 
an opportunity to “exercise” the new TA password, she does not have it memorized. She 
has to look it up. But because she wants to keep the password secure, she has stored it in 
an encrypted file. She must find the file, unlock it, and then find the right password. Alice 
feels annoyed because this password is not synchronized with that of other key accounts 
she uses – she usually tries to renew all her passwords at the same time so she can focus 
her attention properly and not be interrupted at different times by different systems 
asking for new passwords. 
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Part of the reason Alice is having trouble is that she cannot remember the requirements 
for authenticating to TA. Does this password require a number? A special character? 
Both? Neither? She may feel that the password rules are more stringent than is 
appropriate for the value of the data being protected.  
Nevertheless, Alice keeps trying to authenticate to TA. She types her new password 
incorrectly, even though she has it right in front of her, because her fingers remember the 
old one or the combination of characters in the new one is difficult to type (or both). She 
tries to enter the password a second time, and logs on successfully.  
While it is true that this scenario typically plays out in under a minute, variations of the 
scenario repeat throughout the day. For example, Alice may have to log in to her TA 
account several times before she is done because she was interrupted while recording her 
hours each time and the application automatically logged her out after being idle for a 
few minutes. Multiply the time-and-effort cost of this kind of authentication task (i.e., 
remembering the new password, finding the memory aid, entering the password 
incorrectly) by the number of mission-critical applications Alice uses, and by the number 
of times per day she needs to authenticate to them, and the switching costs become more 
evident. Alice takes longer to complete the next several tasks because she is still 
processing the enabling task which caused a problem.  
In addition, because Alice has experienced many authentication-related problems like the 
one described above, she is conditioned to approach authentication anticipating possible 
difficulty (an issue touched on in Sec. 6.1). She also feels that the repeated cycle of 
renewing, using, and then retiring passwords never seems to end. Also, she feels guilty 
for being so frustrated with authentication: after all, authentication plays a key role in 
maintaining NIST’s security, and she takes that security very seriously [14]. 
The result of all this is that Alice’s accumulated experiences with authentication adds to 
the perceived costs of even the smallest authentication tasks, creating additional drains on 
the compliance budget and hastening the onset of physical, mental, and password fatigue 
[5][13]. Users’ experience of fatigue affects their future perceptions of and approaches to 
authentication, and so forth. In effect, authentication friction and disruption create a 
vicious cycle.  
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7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
As was illustrated in the preceding sections of this document, authentication entails 
significant costs for the study participants in terms of time and effort. Their 
authentication workload is high – because they have so many different authentication 
elements to use and manage – that they often resort to coping mechanisms to keep that 
workload at a manageable level. Even with these coping mechanisms, authentication 
creates disruption that has an impact on participants’ work – not just on the primary task 
immediately disrupted by authentication, but on future tasks as well. For some 
participants, the friction and disruption from authentication prompted them to avoid 
certain elective activities requiring authentication, which resulted in lost productivity. 
The study participants are hardly unique. Their situation is extremely common for 
countless other organizations and users, and has been for some time: Anne Adams and 
Martina Angela Sasse observed as early as 1999 that users were severely overburdened 
by their authentication workloads [1]. Over-authentication is already a crisis [9]. What 
can be done to address it? Where to start? 
This section presents recommendations on how to tackle the problem of over-
authentication, including changes in how specialists should think about and implement 
security; concrete steps that organizations, decision makers, security specialists, and even 
users can take to reduce the impact of authentication; and suggestions for future work in 
the field of usability. 
7.1 RETHINKING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT AUTHENTICATION 
The findings from this study illustrate how often knowledge workers authenticate during 
a typical day, that the impact from those events can linger beyond the enabling task of 
authentication, and that coping mechanisms are employed to reduce that impact. These 
findings suggest that it is necessary for security professions to acknowledge and respect 
the limits of users. When users’ cognitive limits are reached; they resort to variety of 
memory aids, some of which may have unintended security implications.  
7.1.1 Users struggle with authentication because they are only human 
Security specialists may be under the impression that users fail to practice good security 
behaviors because they are completely unaware of the consequences of their actions, or 
because they do not care about organizational security. This is not typically the case. 
Most users are aware, in principle, that they have a responsibility to help maintain 
organizational security. They also understand that part of that responsibility involves 
fulfilling authentication requirements. The authentication diary study participants were 
certainly aware of this, and took the importance of organizational security very seriously. 
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However, on a practical, day-to-day basis, users’ principal objective is to accomplish 
their primary tasks. Authentication makes that more difficult than it would otherwise be, 
because it disrupts users’ workflow (especially if it is complex, time-consuming, and/or 
prone to problems). The time-and-effort costs of authentication and the disruption it 
causes – which are both compounded by the number, type, and success or failure of 
authentication events – accumulate across tasks and applications over time.  
Therefore, users lose sight of the value of security measures as their attention naturally 
gravitates to the immediate task of meeting authentication requirements as quickly and 
efficiently as possible (which is the reason for coping mechanisms). When users 
encounter authentication, they tend to see it as a hassle first and a necessity second. This 
is not because users are stupid, malicious, or lazy; they are simply having an instinctive 
human reaction to being interrupted and detoured on the way to accomplishing their goals 
[17]. 
7.1.2 More authentication is not necessarily better 
Some of the study participants admitted that certain authentication coping mechanisms 
they used – such as writing passwords down, or using the same password for multiple 
accounts – had the potential to compromise organizational security. But without these 
coping mechanisms, it is difficult to use and manage many passwords. What choice did 
they have? 
In security design, making the user authenticate for everything is often the path of least 
resistance. But taking that path adds significantly, and possibly unnecessarily, to a user’s 
authentication burden.  
7.2 MAKING PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MORE USABLE 
Making authentication more usable is, ultimately, a long-term prospect. It will require not 
only a major shift in perspective, but extensive research and development efforts: we 
suggest some possible directions for both in Sec. 7.3. Fortunately there are steps that 
organizations can take in the relatively short term to reduce their users’ authentication 
burden.  
7.2.1 Listen to and work with users 
Making users more aware of and educated about the importance of organizational 
security and authentication’s role in it can help increase users’ compliance budgets [5]. 
Users will be more tolerant of authentication and other security policies and measures if 
they feel they understand the rationale behind them. The participants in this study were 
probably more accepting of authentication than they otherwise would have been because 
NIST makes it a point to foster a culture of security awareness, in no small part through 
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relevant education and training. However, such measures will not give users an 
inexhaustible compliance budget [5]. Even the most patient and security-positive users 
have limits.  
For users juggling many authentication elements, resorting to coping mechanisms – such 
as writing passwords down, reusing them, caching them in browsers, or employing 
management tools – is a rational way to reduce the impacts of authentication on their 
primary tasks. But from the point of view of organizational IT and security personnel, 
these coping strategies can shift user behavior into unintended territory. In this reactive 
posture, IT ends up lagging somewhat behind user workarounds that have not been 
assessed for risk or compliance, a situation that may create security vulnerabilities of 
which users are unaware.  
Organizational IT and security personnel need to support their users in this area. This 
means engaging users in discussions about authentication, encouraging them to share 
their friction points and coping mechanisms – and then following up with constructive 
action. Soliciting feedback from users and addressing their problems should be part of the 
organization’s iterative security process. Robust organizational security depends upon the 
willing and active cooperation of users. 
7.2.2 Implement SSO 
Many of the study participants expressed a desire for NIST to implement organization-
wide SSO. They said they would accept a password that is longer and more complex than 
any they are currently required to use, so long as it was the only one they had to use. 
Indeed, government employees in a much larger study regarding attitudes towards 
passwords expressed a preference for SSO [5]. 
SSO would solve many of the pressing usability problems described by our participants, 
such as having to manage multiple complex passwords with different composition rules 
and expiration schedules. While SSO may be difficult and expensive to implement for an 
organization,  it may be a worthwhile investment, since it would significantly cut down 
on authentication-related friction and disruption and their subsequent costs. 
7.2.3 Consolidate and standardize authentication as much as possible 
If it is not feasible for an organization to implement actual SSO, the best alternative is to 
meet users halfway and implement a uniform password policy. Even if the policy chosen 
for universal application is the one with the most stringent content rules and the shortest 
expiration time, it will still help users by reducing the confusion and inconsistency that 
makes it more difficult for them to cope with their authentication workloads. If an 
overhaul of existing password policies is considered to be too difficult and disruptive, the 
  Page 83  
 
 
organization should at least dictate that all future applications and systems that use 
password-based authentication should have the same policy. 
The lack of a uniform, consistent password policy made it that much harder for 
participants to create and manage the multiple passwords they used, especially if they 
employed the coping strategy of synchronizing passwords across multiple accounts. The 
fact that different passwords also expired at different times was also a source of 
confusion, and even those who tried to update all their passwords on the schedule of the 
one with the shortest expiry time found it difficult to keep up. NIST’s system owners may 
not have intended to cause this situation, but it is the natural consequence of an 
environment where password policies for many applications were created in isolation 
from each other and may have been inherited from legacy systems.  
7.2.4 Encourage and support the use of password managers or vaults 
Finally, it is recommended that organizations actively support a user coping mechanism 
that, when practiced correctly, significantly reduces authentication burden while 
maintaining security: password management tools. (Individual users are also 
recommended to look into password managers or vaults for their personal use.) As 
described earlier, participants described password management tools as considerably 
simplifying password entry, which is especially useful for users who need to authenticate 
multiple times during the course of a day.  
7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Although there are a number of different authentication mechanisms that employ a 
variety of different authentication elements (including PIV cards, RSA tokens, and 
biometrics), password-based mechanisms are by far the most common. They were the 
first authentication mechanism to be used on computers, starting with timesharing 
systems in the 1960s [15]. Users of these systems were required to enter a password once: 
to log on to the computer. This required a trivial amount of time and effort and did not 
overly disrupt any particular primary task. The relative few individuals who used 
computing resources needed only one simple password, which typically only had to be 
changed if there was good reason to believe it had been compromised.  
Computing technology and the way we use it has changed radically since then. But we 
are still using passwords as our default method of authentication in essentially the same 
way: one password per technological asset. This was effective and appropriate in the days 
when a user would interact with, at most, a handful of password-protected assets on a 
daily basis. But now that most users interact with dozens of such assets – devices, 
applications, Web pages, networks, etc. – protecting each one with a password is no 
longer practical. There are simply more than most users can remember, especially with 
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the added complication of policies that require passwords to be longer, more complex, 
and subject to frequent expiration. 
7.3.1 Take a broader perspective  
Mary Theofanos and Ellen Cram Kowalczyk observed at a recent NIST Information 
Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) meeting, that we have evolved from 
thinking “the user is the problem” to “technology is the solution”, to the realization that 
“the user must be part of the solution” [24]. However this holistic approach requires us to 
fully understand the user and embrace the considerable social science knowledge relevant 
to usability and computer systems. Taking a broader perspective, allows us to build 
usability into our security products and processes, that span the life of a system from 
conception through design, implementation, and evolution. Good usability, like good 
security takes into account the changing nature of the threat environment, changing 
business goals, and differences in user needs, skills, attitudes, and experience. In addition, 
usable security should be tailored to organizational priorities and needs.  
Authentication throughout an organization should be driven by an overall authentication 
strategy or approach that is driven by organizational security priorities and user needs and 
provides a vision for future growth.  It appears in many cases that as systems are 
deployed that there is no overall strategy that governs the authentication mechanism 
offered and how it complements or prepares for the future.  
7.3.2 Establish best practices for implementing usable authentication 
Essentially, usability best practices must give IT and security professionals a roadmap for 
understanding the context of use for whatever asset they are working with and assessing 
how they can implement authentication in a way that fits that context. For example, does 
securing a transaction require making the user authenticate, or would it be more effective 
to authenticate the transaction itself? Is it possible to secure a system through implicit 
authentication, where the system satisfies itself that this is the authorized user [2]?  
Sections 5 and 6 described some methodological tools (experience graphs and 
prototyping with CogTool) for measuring the effect of authentication on users, as well as 
recommendations for improving the usability of password-based authentication; these 
could be considered as a basis for best practices. But that is not nearly enough. Security 
and IT professionals need best practices that help them apply some basic principles of 
social science and design. Best practices should also guide the effective development and 
use of the modular authentication solutions we described in the previous section. 
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7.3.3 Conduct further research on habits and effects related to authentication 
Technologies, techniques, and best practices in any field need to have a basis in empirical 
data. Usability is no different. However, at this time there is only a small body of 
usability research from which to draw for this domain.  
This study makes strong methodological contributions in identifying and measuring the 
impact of explicit authentication on users. The experience journey maps discussed in Sec. 
5 (and shown for each participant in Appendix B) and their underlying measures can 
potentially be used by organizations to track and manage the effects of authentication on 
their customers or users. The experience journey maps, along with analyses that can be 
achieved through prototyping tools like CogTool, could be useful to IT and security 
professionals as they make security decisions that take user effort into account. 
The research team would like to see these techniques applied by other researchers in 
other settings, in order to confirm their utility and validity. In addition, we welcome 
suggestions for any refinements that may make these tools more effective. Finally, we are 
interested in seeing whether these findings and insights regarding users’ authentication-
related perceptions and behaviors hold true elsewhere. 
There is also a need for additional tools that reflect the factors involved in users’ 
compliance budgets and the properties of disruption from authentication. Research that 
employs these kinds of tools will help security designers to think beyond current models 
and take into account the downstream effects of security burden for users, teams, and 
organizations.   
Even without analytical tools such as the user experience journey maps and CogTool task 
analysis, the authors believe that usability researchers and organizations can gain 
valuable insights by conducting diary studies and follow-up interviews similar to those 
employed by this study. At a minimum, such studies are useful for collecting feedback 
and identifying the most widespread and persistent authentication issues within an 
organization. Studies with a larger number of participants than this one, would potentially 
reach a broader audience within an organization for an even broader perspective of the 
issues surrounding authentication.  
Longer-term diary studies, spanning the course of a week or more, may also be valuable. 
However, the data collection methods would have to be changed slightly in order to make 
this feasible for study participants. Expecting participants to record every single instance 
of authentication over a long-term period would add significantly to their authentication 
burden, which is the exact opposite of what we want to accomplish, and they would 
probably find journaling activities difficult to sustain for more than one day. One 
plausible variation would be to have participants record significant authentication related 
events (including problems) at the end of the day, while their actual authentications 
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would be counted through some automated means. The data from a series of periodic 
interviews would be invaluable, although the number of interviews should be related to 
the length of the study period. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
This study provided a very clear picture of the average government knowledge worker’s  
authentication workload at NIST during the course of a typical day. While participants 
were using technology, any kind of technology at all, the impact of authentication was 
present. The study participants spent a considerable amount of time and effort on 
authentication each day. Participants tried very hard to cope with this workload in ways 
that they thought would preserve organizational security. It is important to note that they 
dealt with authentication not only at work, but also in their personal lives, on their 
computers and devices outside of the work environment. Organizations may not consider 
it incumbent to count users’ personal authentication workload since they cannot control 
it. But it is an important factor that cannot be ignored, as people cannot divide their 
cognitive effort: they need to be able to accommodate some personal authentication 
events as well as work events.  
We found that: 
• Authentication problems create considerable friction 
• Users experience authentication friction even when there are no problems 
• Friction and disruption from authentication have long-term effects 
These findings lead us to a set of recommendations, described in Sec. 7. Most 
importantly, the underlying assumptions about authentication must be revisited, as the 
human limitations of users must be respected. For NIST in particular, further 
implementation of SSO and incorporation of an accepted password vault or manager 
would help reduce the friction of authentication for NIST knowledge workers. Moreover, 
we believe that the findings from this study generalize to the average government 
knowledge worker, as the password authentication workload found here is consistent with 
the findings from a much larger, Department of Commerce-wide study on password 
related behaviors [5]. 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY MATERIALS 
A.1 DIARY FORM 
Event Details    
Start Time:  
__________ 
End Time:  
___________ 
Reason for Authentication 
_____ First use since last logout 
_____ Re-try due to unsuccessful login 
(if re-try right after a failed login, 
you can skip the rest if info is the 
same) 
_____ Login after time-out 
Other reason: _________________ 
 
Location  
_____ NIST campus 
_____ Offsite 
 
Device 
_____ Desktop           _____ Laptop 
_____ Blackberry      _____ Cell phone  
_____ Desk phone    _____ iPad 
 
Other device: _________________ 
 
Type of Account/Application 
For example, NIST domain, Web TA, etc.  
_________________________________ 
Information required for authentication  
_____ User ID/Name           _____ Password 
_____ RSA Token                  _____ PIN  
_____ PIV card   
Other info: _________________ 
 
Memory Aids  
_____ Memorized          _____ Written on a 
paper  
_____ Stored in a file     _____ Remembered by 
the browser  
 
Other aids: _________________ 
 
Any Problems?  
For example, mistyped password, forgot user ID, lost 
PIV...  
_________________________________________ 
What are you going to do?   
_____ Try again immediately 
_____ Contact support (e.g. ITAC)   
 
Other : ____________________________________ 
Frustration Level 
Not 
frustrated 
  
Neutral 
 Very 
frustrated 
1 2 3 4 5 
          
 
Overall comment  
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A.2 FOCUS QUESTIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS 
We’re looking for high-level patterns here in terms of frustration, burden, or 
automatizing. 
Indented questions are suggestions for follow-up. The focus questions can happen in any 
order that makes sense in the interview. Go with the participant flow.  
A.1.1 Opening broad questions 
• What’s the biggest take-away for you from doing the day-in-the-life? Why?  
• What was the biggest surprise? Why?  
• What big questions do you have now?  
A.1.2 Focus questions 
A.1.2.1 Frequency 
If this hasn’t come up already:  
How do you feel about the number of authentication events you documented in your day?  
How close was that number to what you’d expected?  
A.1.2.2 Control and autonomy 
• In looking at the range of authentication devices, places, and methods you logged, 
tell me about how all that fits together. 
• Of what you can control about authentication, how did you decide on that 
combination?  
• What kinds of tricks do you use to make authentication easier or more efficient 
for yourself?  
A.1.2.3 Frequency 
Let’s look at a couple of episodes where you marked that you were very frustrated. [Walk 
through the data from the form, if you have it, up to the point of describing the problem. 
After you read their description, ask: ] What happened here?  
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• What was frustrating about it? [or, continue, if needed:] Why did you become 
frustrated?  
• What did that event cost you?  
A.1.2.4 Timing clusters 
When we skimmed through your data, we saw that most of your events happened 
[when?]. Tell us about that. How typical is that?  
A.1.2.5 Big picture: what’s the hassle factor? 
• Looking back at your day-in-the-life of authentication, what’s your take on 
authentication effectiveness?  
• What’s the biggest hassle about it? Why?  
• What do you see as the tradeoffs?  
A.3 DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
What is your profession?  
Gender ____ F   _____M  
Age range  
__< 20  
__ 21-29 
__ 30-39 
__ 40-49 
___ 50-59 
__ 60+   
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APPENDIX B: USER EXPERIENCE CHARTS FOR STUDY 
PARTICIPANTS 
This appendix contains user experience charts (as described in Section 5) for each of our 
study participants, in the form of a line graph and a scatterplot. 
Some participants provided frustration ratings for some of their recorded authentication 
events but not others: in these cases, the red Frustration line on their line graph may be 
broken. In a few cases participants provided no frustration ratings at all, so their graphs 
do not include frustration lines. 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 1 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 2 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 3 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 4 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 5
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 6 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 7
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 9 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 10 
 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
9.58 9.60 9.67 9.72 10.10 10.72 10.92 11.25 11.82 12.12 13.67 14.43 15.10 18.25
U
se
r E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
Time 
P10 
Calculated Disruption
Frustration Rating
Interviewer Rating
Composite Rating
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 18.00 20.00 22.00 24.00
U
se
r E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
Time 
P10 
  
 Page 104  
 
 
User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 11 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 12 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 13 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 14 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 15 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 16 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 17 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 18 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 19 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 20 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 21 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 22 
 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
U
se
r E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
Time 
P22 
Calculated Disruption
Frustration Rating
Interviewer Rating
Composite Rating
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 18.00 20.00 22.00 24.00
U
se
r E
xp
er
ic
nc
e 
Time 
P22 
  
 Page 116  
 
 
User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 23 
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User Experience Line Graph and Scatterplot – Participant 25 
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APPENDIX C: CATALOG OF PARTICIPANT QUOTES ON 
AUTHENTICATION-RELATED FRICTION POINTS, COPING 
STRATEGIES, AND HABITS 
The material in this appendix comes from follow-up interviews researchers conducted 
with participants following the data collection period. It consists of direct quotes (and, to 
a lesser extent, paraphrased statements written by researchers) regarding participants’ 
authentication-related experiences, perceptions, and behaviors. The quotes and 
paraphrased statements are organized by subject category in a hierarchical format. The 
“top-level” categories (indicated by Roman numerals) deal with five general areas related 
to authentication: the entry of authentication information; the management of that 
information; the impact of authentication on primary tasks; authentication coping 
strategies; and authentication’s unintended effects on work habits. Each section is further 
divided into parts that “drill down” into specific concepts, actions, or topics addressed by 
our participants. The quotes and paraphrased themselves are italicized, bulleted items 
appearing under the appropriate subject category (direct quotes have quotation marks, 
while the paraphrased statements do not). Each quote or paraphrased statement is 
attributed to the participant from whom it originated by means of the participant 
designations (e.g., P3, P17, P22) used in this study. 
Some quotes appear multiple times in different categories.  
I. Entering authentication elements 
A. Entering authentication elements > Passwords 
1. Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords 
a) Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords > 
Mistyping passwords is a common problem 
• P3, P12, P14, and P23 all mention the problem of mistyping 
passwords in general terms. 
b) Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords > 
The longer a password is, the easier it is to mistype 
• “I notice here, much more than other places where they only ask for 
an eight-character password. I tend to fat-finger it more. […] That's 
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when I went out and then had to come, so of course I had to lock it 
again. And then come back in again and I fat-fingered again.” (P2) 
• P23 says entering long (12-character) passwords can be difficult, fat-
fingering is likely to occur, and this causes frustration. 
c) Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords > 
Slowing down and putting in conscious effort when entering a password 
reduces the likelihood of typos and other mistakes 
• “I probably mistype it at least once every day. But again, I know what 
it is and I just need to either slow down. It's easy to fat finger, 
especially on a laptop keyboard. Maybe if I had an ergonomic one I'd 
type better.” (P9) 
• “It was really fascinating to have authentication fully in my 
consciousness as opposed to just kind of background and 
automatically happening. I think I typed – I made fewer typos. So there 
may be something about that too. I think I actually made fewer typos 
because it was getting 80 or 90% of my brain instead of, like, two or 
3%.” (P5) 
d) Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords > 
Being watched or thinking too hard when entering passwords makes 
mistyping more likely 
• “I usually don't misspell my passwords that – I don't know. When I 
was trying, when I was conscious of it, I was a little more [inaudible 
03:55].” (P12) 
• “I was thinking like when I mistype passwords, usually it's only if I'm 
trying to login when somebody is sitting next to me. I'm either trying to 
type fast, or checking to see if they're watching, and that's usually 
when I end up having to retype my password. But other than that, I 
think that in all other circumstances, I don't end up mistyping.” (P10) 
e) Entering a password into a system while it is loading may cause it to miss 
some characters being typed 
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• “Now if the endpoint, this came up one time, where the endpoint and 
checkpoint encryption thing or whatever, for whatever reason 
sometimes it just kind of lags behind and you are forced to 
conscientiously type that thing that you know really, really, really well, 
very slowly and explicitly and then I would mess it up. […] sometimes 
there is a lag with the initial log-in screen, whatever a full disk 
encryption thing they have is called checkpoint endpoint security, it's 
the thing that pops up. Occasionally, it just seems to be running slow 
where it doesn't keep up with you when you are typing. And so you get 
to that and you have typed it like you normally do, you hit enter and 
somehow it's missed a couple of letters and so you can't log in and 
then you have to go back and literally do it so slowly and wait for it to 
catch up, you know, the little stars to appear. And when that happens, 
I usually mess up two times and then like it's very painful to do it the 
third time because you really, really, really have to pay attention.“ 
(P11) 
f) Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Mistyping passwords > 
Touchscreens on mobile devices make it difficult to enter passwords 
correctly 
• “There's a few times [mistyping a password], with the Blackberry, 
because it's touchscreen. If my hand gets wet, or something, and if I'm 
in a hurry, and I can't get the password in, it gets a little frustrating. 
“In that 24-hour period I didn't actually experience that. I did want to 
say, that it does happen with the Blackberry. With the touchscreen, 
there's times, trying to enter it, that it's frustrating and you can't get it 
to enter correctly.” (P15) 
2. Entering authentication elements > Passwords > Forgetting passwords 
• “All I had to do was go in quickly, electronically sign a form and send it 
on. It took me half an hour because I forgot the password.” (P15) 
• “And e-Approval is something that I use so infrequently that each of the 
past few times I've had to do something in there, I've had to get my 
password reset, and it is very embarrassing.” (P11) 
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• “I don't remember exactly when it was, but I know I just had changed my 
password for a SafeBoot, and I just couldn't find where I'd written it down, 
and I couldn't get it right on the first ten tries.“ (P14) 
• “Once again security has gotten in my way and it takes me extra time 
because now I got to look that one up because I don't use that one often 
enough.” (P17) 
• “Yeah, I used to add an abbreviation to the end for each different system, 
but once in a while I'd forget how I'd abbreviated it.” (P14) 
B. Entering authentication elements – ID badge for physical entry 
1. Entering authentication elements > ID badge for physical entry > Having 
consistency in how one authenticates to particular applications can help make 
the action automatic 
• “[T]his that requires a hard key. When that door was shut, you have to 
open it with a hard key. I tried to badge into it. I held my badge up to the 
door, I wasn't even thinking and, again, just as an example of how when it 
becomes automated, you don't even think about it.” (P11) 
2. Entering authentication elements > ID badge for physical entry > It is difficult 
to “badge in” to a building while holding things 
• “I fold the wallet here, and coffee, and I'm trying to hold the badge up. 
And then it will beep, and then I'll pull it away. And if I don't open the 
door in the next two seconds, I have to do it all over again because I kind 
of re-position myself. There's limited light. So that's kind of weird, just the 
sort of mechanics of it. I mean, if I hold it up to the reader and then I put 
things back, or I don't go in right away, it will lock me out. I have to do it 
all over again.“ (P12) 
3. Entering authentication elements > ID badge for physical entry > Having to 
show ID to a guard to get onto the NIST campus delays the start of the 
working day 
• P17 says that having to show his/her ID to guards the NIST Campus gates 
to gain entry delays the start of his/her working day. 
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C. Entering authentication elements > Biometrics 
1. Entering authentication elements > Biometrics > Fingerprint readers are not 
reliable 
• “This one is worse, because it works by a biometric, and my finger doesn't 
read very well. I have to smear it with moisturizer, and then I forget what 
the actual password is. When it really just won't read my finger, I can't 
unlock it and I can't remember.” (P2) 
D. Entering authentication elements > RSA token code (to log into NIST VPN) 
1. Entering authentication elements > RSA token code (to log into NIST VPN) – 
Logging in with the RSA token is time-consuming and effortful 
• “And then the fact that I was realizing that you have to do it so many 
times. You have to log in. First I have to log in to decrypt. And then, I have 
to log in to actually start the computer. Then I have to log in to connect to 
the wireless network. […] You have to put in name and password three 
times before you're fully hooked up. If something goes screwy without 
luck, you have to do it four times because you have to do it once to 
decrypt, once to enter in, and then once to connect to the wireless.” (P2) 
• “For the e-mail, when I was at home, if I don't do anything on the Web 
page for five minutes or 10 minutes, it will log me out automatically. 
Which that can get frustrating because then I have to close the browser, 
open it up again, use the RSA key, hope I get it right the first time. And I 
can do that 15 or 20 times throughout the day. And a lot of times I'm just 
so tired of re-logging in, I'll just stop checking my e-mail. I might do it 
once every three or four hours instead of every 20 minutes.” (P19) 
• “If I was home and doing that, I would get a lot more irritation. Because 
in order to get into webmail, you have to put in your name, password and 
the PIN, and the secure ID, and your name and domain, and your domain 
name as well. It takes like probably about 20 seconds just to put the stupid 
information in. And then if you get something wrong, it blanks all the 
fields again […] That's just irritating.” (P2) 
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• “It's a bit stupid. Well, the token is a great idea I think, but the way the 
webmail account is done here is I have to give, of course, my user name. I 
have to give my password that I use at least, but also when I use a token 
there is... The token has two parts. One is the PIN number which doesn't 
change and all these numbers that changes every minute.” (P18) 
• “It's this extra, again, effortful stuff. I have to dig around in my bag and 
get the RSA ID token out and then set it on my laptop and then type out the 
number, make sure that you're not typing it right before changes or as it's 
changing or whatever. And it's not something that you just have 
memorized that you just can do automatically. Again, it's that sort of 
effortful, "I have to get the device. I have to look at it. I have to copy what 
it says into my computer, and then enter my password." If it was just me 
entering my password it wouldn't be as big of a deal. […] It's that 
deliberate effortful, conscientious...I really have to stop what I'm doing 
and think about it. Whereas if you're just doing something from muscle 
memory, you don't really even have to think about that.” (P11) 
2. Entering authentication elements > RSA token code (to log into NIST VPN) – 
Some physical aspects of the RSA token make it difficult to use 
• “I have to dig around in my bag and get the RSA ID token out and then set 
it on my laptop and then type out the number, make sure that you're not 
typing it right before changes or as it's changing or whatever.” (P11) 
• “These are very low-resolution. You have to have bright light. It's 
frequently misread. […] If you make a simple mistake, which it is easy to 
do. Sevens can easily be ones. Sometimes twos look like eights. If you 
make a mistake, then of course you've got to reenter... [...]There aren't 
clear signs on it to indicate which way it ought to be held and viewed. It 
looks like it's intended more to be held with you left hand than right.” 
(P21) 
3. Entering authentication elements > RSA token code (to log into NIST VPN) – 
The number on the RSA token changes every minute 
• “It changes every minute. So sometimes I'll be a little bit late, and it will 
be like, "OK, your pass code is invalid," because it had changed. And I 
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had to type in my user name twice, my password, and it's just a lot of stuff 
to do. And I often make typos, so... And even if this thing still has a minute 
left on it, I have to wait another minute because it kind of skips that step in 
the pass code chain or whatever, however it works.” (P19) 
• “It's a bit stupid. Well, the token is a great idea I think, but the way the 
webmail account is done here is I have to give, of course, my user name. I 
have to give my password that I use at least, but also when I use a token 
there is... The token has two parts. One is the PIN number which doesn't 
change and all these numbers that changes every minute.” (P18) 
II. Managing authentication elements 
A. Managing authentication elements > Passwords 
1. Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change 
a) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change > 
Password policies vary across applications, which can make it hard to 
keep up with all the elements one is supposed to manage 
• “Yeah, it can be a pain. And when I'm here, everything I log into, the 
password policy is completely different. So even if I wanted to, the 
password can't be the same. Some of them have to be eight characters, 
some of them have to be 12. So it can't be anything more than 12. So 
some passwords I have are 20 characters, some are 6. And it's just 
hard to remember everything, so I actually load a file on my computer 
that just has every password listed so I can just copy and paste it.” 
(P19) 
b) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change > 
Password change intervals are too short for infrequently used systems 
• “And e-Approval is something that I use so infrequently that each of 
the past few times I've had to do something in there, I've had to get my 
password reset, and it is very embarrassing.” (P11) 
• “I don't travel very often, but when I do I have to log in to something 
called Travel Management. And that password expires just as fast as 
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any other password. Every single time I go to log in to submit my 
expense reports, first of all, my account is locked because I haven't 
changed my password in a few months. So then I have to figure out 
how to unlock it. Then I've got to go change it.” (P19) 
• “[T]he first time I have logged in at the airport, I guess, then I got the 
message, "Oh, change your password, it will expire in two days." I am 
thinking I am out of town; I am not changing right now. I don't want to 
have to deal with that. Where am I going to write it down. And then the 
next day it's "Password is expiring in one day." Then I was trying to 
change it and I got interrupted by something or something, I don't 
remember, I'd have to look back at exactly what happened. But it's just 
that fact that you have to change it so much more frequently for Time 
and Attendance.” (P11) 
• “[W]hen I started getting into the WebTA thing, it just so happened 
that it was time to change my password and WebTA makes you change 
your password more frequently than the NIST general domain. And 
every time I have to do that, I get really frustrated because I am like 
why can't they always be in sync. You have to think if you are going to 
be the responsible person, then you have to think of different 
passwords for everything and it is very frustrating. So when it gets to 
those infrequently used passwords, then I get really irritated.“ (P11) 
c) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change > It 
can be difficult to remember a password one has recently changed/created 
• P18 says if he changes his password at the end of the week, he has a 
hard time remembering it on Monday. Otherwise after using the new 
password a couple of times, of entering, he is fine. 
• “[T]hat's when I had the most trouble. I remember my passwords 
pretty well, but after I change it I need to write it down on a cheat 
sheet for a little while. Especially with some things like the disk 
encryption on the laptop. If you type the wrong password more than 
three times it starts delaying authentication, it starts with one minute, 
goes to two minutes, then four, and pretty soon you are just shut out.” 
(P14) 
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d) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change > 
Creating a new password that complies with password policies is difficult  
• “Plus, they have to be punctuations and numbers. I use a password 
scheme with a slight variation, so that no one password is the same. 
The problem is that different secure sites have different requirements 
for passwords. Some of them require punctuation marks. Some of them 
forbid punctuation marks. So I can't even use one secure password 
base on all of my accounts. It's very frustrating. I manage most of my 
passwords by writing them down on paper.” (P7) 
• “Then I've got to deal with finding a new password that works 
according to that website's password policy.” (P19) 
e) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Password change > 
Reminders to change one’s password are annoying 
• “So it happens every 90 days. Actually, that's a misnomer too. They 
tell you it will last up to 90 days. But they start reminding you 20 days 
early. […] But they don't tell you, "Hey, we just thought if you are 
taking the next two weeks off, you might want to change it now." They 
don't say any of that. […] They just stick it in your face.” (P23) 
2. Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Resetting passwords 
a) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Resetting passwords > 
There is a confusing time lag between the creation of a new password and 
that new password becoming valid 
• “First I tried to login three times. Got locked out of my account. But 
then an administrator had to do something on there to clear that so 
that I could then try again and then were quite serious about my 
password. And once I requested to reset my password, the e-mail 
didn't get sent immediately. There was like a 20 minute lag. And I 
expected it to be sent right away. So I was like trying to login and 
request the request to reset it. Then I got locked out again. So I had to 
start over with requesting to the Admin that they clear that so that I 
could start again.” (P10) 
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b) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Resetting passwords > 
Getting a password reset is time-consuming and effortful 
• “[L]ast time I needed to sign something, I don't remember if it was a 
travel voucher, it was something I needed to sign. So the secretary e-
mails me, tells me it's ready for my signature and e-approval. I put it 
off because I know I don't have time to deal with the password reset, I 
don't have time to do that right now, I will do it at the end of the day 
and then it's too late because you can't call because they are not there 
to reset the password for you. And so this drags out over the course of 
maybe a week or longer and then she in the meantime has taken the 
time to send me another reminder e-mail, and then I feel bad because I 
am wasting her time. But I just couldn't get it done because I couldn't 
remember the thing and I didn't have the time allocated to do the 
whole reset thing. And I know that sounds silly, because you're like, 
"How long can a phone call be?" But it takes time and especially when 
you have to wait for them to do. […] Especially when you have to wait 
for them to generate the thing, and then you have to go downstairs and 
pick it up. I mean that's just a whole category on its own. […] Because 
it has rippling effects. You know, it wasn't just affecting me, it's 
affecting people that I am calling. […] It's affecting her trying to send 
me these reminder e-mails and whoever else is doing budgeting, I 
haven't signed for the thing yet. I mean it really has this kind of ripple 
in the pond effect.” (P11) 
• “The time cost to authenticate, if it's this automatic, non-effortful thing 
is minimal and I don't pay attention to it, it doesn't really frustrate me. 
If it is a large time cost, like me having to call and get my password 
reset and then you have to wait for them to generate this letter and 
then you have to go downstairs and pick it up, and it's like this really 
extended evolution. That is in a category all its own, it's very special.” 
(P11) 
c) Managing authentication elements > Passwords > Resetting passwords > 
Password synchronization does not always work the way one expects it to, 
which leads to authentication problems 
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• “I have with the Time and Attendance, and our training software, 
which for some reason doesn't sync. I don't know why the training 
software doesn't sync our training log. I've locked myself out of that, 
which turned out to be a massive problem, because we created them 
with a second username.” (P2) 
• “I've locked myself out on another thing. You go in. And to do the 
password you go to a website that supposedly syncs it. And it doesn't 
really sync it. The T and A system has a different password, and the 
travel system has a different password. […] Because apparently our 
computers can't pass credentials to the wireless system, although it is 
synced to the same password and username. You have to put it in 
again.” (P2) 
• “Once you get onto the NIST network through the secure client server, 
then if you change your password it can update it with the NIST 
servers. If I change my password before I connect to the NIST network, 
it changes on my laptop, but on the NIST servers, it doesn't change 
until I reconnect to the network and they can sync up.” (P15) 
• “So there's the confusion of is this our BizFlow password? Is it our 
general realm password? Is it our Entrust password? Then they enter 
the password wrong. Then they think they need the password reset, but 
they don't because it's not actually the Entrust password that they're 
entering. So it's a big mess that way. […] Most users will say, "This is 
my e-Approval password." But e-Approval is a combination of now 
two different passwords, the general realm password and the Entrust 
password. But people think, "My e-Approval password," which will 
easily get them confused.” (P3) 
B. Managing authentication elements > PIV card 
1. Managing authentication elements > PIV card > It’s bad to leave one’s PIV 
card in the card reader, but it’s hard to avoid doing so 
• “I actually don't use my PIV card here at work because I forget it in the 
computer a lot. If I leave the building, I can't get back in because that's 
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also my access back into the building.17 […] But this thing, it's just a tiny, 
nearly weightless piece of plastic that you often forget about. So I would 
forget this every single time. And I've been locked out of the building. I've 
been locked out of the floor. I've been reprimanded for leaving this in the 
computer. And there's nothing I could have done other than somehow 
setting reminders every two minutes to don't forget this.” (P19) 
• “When I stand up to leave, I would forget and leave my... Unless it's 
attached to me, I know exactly what's going to happen. My card's going to 
be in my system and I'm going to be locked out of the building. I'm going 
to run an errand or something, and get back, and realize, "Oops, I left my 
card in my laptop."” (P15) 
2. Managing authentication elements > PIV card > It’s easy to forget the PIV 
card somewhere – and then it will just be too much trouble to go get it, even if 
you need it to do something. 
• “Yeah, because not only do I have to have a computer and the password 
and PIN known, I have to have this thing physically with me. If I forget it 
downstairs or in my car or at work, I can't log in. I have to go downstairs 
or go to my car or go back to work to pick it up. […] I'll forget it in my car 
all the time. Sometimes I'll go get it, sometimes I'll just not check my e-
mail.” (P19) 
III. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks 
A. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication takes up a significant 
amount of time each day 
• “And it gets in the way. It definitely takes way more time out of my day, both 
just time having to deal with this and then the break in the flow of work.” 
(P19) 
                                                 
17 Most NIST users with a PIV card still have a separate ID/physical access badge, but this participant had 
only the PIV card.  
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• “But it's one of those things, if I spend eight hours logging into my e-mail, I'm 
not going to have any time to do any work. So I'd rather be doing the actual 
work than waste my time logging in every five minutes.” (P19) 
• “In my attention it's a tiny blip, but time wise, I think it does actually still take 
a lot of time. There's a substantial amount of time. Although, you know – and I 
guess this is why you have to do studies for more than just one day at a time 
or something like that, but there are a lot of systems that I thought I was going 
to use on that Wednesday that I didn't end up using. And – for instance, if we 
had had an actual operational emergency or some sort of situation where I'd 
actively have to solve a problem to restore our system, I'd probably have to go 
into my password safe, dig out a few old passwords and things like that which 
would have completely slowed down the process.” (P5)  
B. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication interrupts and distracts 
from the primary task 
1. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication interrupts and 
distracts from the primary task > Sometimes it takes so long to find one’s 
RSA token that one can forget what one was logging in to do in the first place 
• “The idea was that once I had to stop and look in a bag for something like 
that and I'm not on my computer. I don't have three windows open. I can't 
do something else while waiting to login. So actually taking the time away 
from the computer, I walk to get my bag. Someone else stops me in the 
hallway. I have a conversation with them. Then soon I go back and I 
remember to login, but I'm like, "Oh." The strong idea I had in my head of 
a message that I wanted to send might have become a little more fuzzy, the 
idea of what I was doing. "Why did I open that other new tab and not go to 
the..." So there's the little things. I feel like those little things really, when 
you have an idea of what you want to do next and then you have to deviate 
from that, I think at least for my brain it throws you off a little bit.” (P3) 
2. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication interrupts and 
distracts from the primary task > Authentication is a major distraction at 
conferences 
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• “It sounds stupid to me that everybody around me gets to watch me type 
my 12-character password in 15 times during the conference because it 
times out every 15 minutes. But evidently that's not important. [It’s] not 
just the embarrassment, but actually I mean, if I sit next to you... If he 
doesn't know by the end of the conference what your password is because 
you've retyped it umpteen times… So it is both. If I fat-finger, then it's a 
few more.” (P23) 
3. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication interrupts and 
distracts from the primary task > Having to re-authenticate multiple times 
breaks the flow of work 
• “And it gets in the way. It definitely takes way more time out of my day, 
both just time having to deal with this and then the break in the flow of 
work.” (P19) 
• P18 says re-authentication can break one’s thought process. 
• “So basically every time I go to use the computer, which means I have a 
thought or something that I'm trying to keep in my head, it's locked up, 
and now I have to remember this 12-character password so that I can then 
get to what I'm trying to do to write a quick note to remind me of 
something.” (P23) 
• “You end up having to almost set a timer in your head to go back to the 
computer and type something within every 10 minutes or so. And some 
minor studies of productivity I've been involved with indicate that it's 
better to be focused on a task as opposed to have lots of interruptions 
throughout the day.” (P21) 
C. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts 
1. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Timed lockouts 
interfere with work on multiple computers 
• “The most annoying thing is, because I have several computers, and I tend 
to work... Let's say, I write on one computer and I program on another 
one, and so I tend to switch between them. Every time I switch, I have to 
log in because I have this 15 minute...” (P18) 
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2. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Timed lockout 
disconnects remote users from VPN, necessitating re-authentication 
• “For the e-mail, when I was at home, if I don't do anything on the Web 
page for five minutes or 10 minutes, it will log me out automatically. 
Which that can get frustrating because then I have to close the browser, 
open it up again, use the RSA key, hope I get it right the first time. And I 
can do that 15 or 20 times throughout the day. And a lot of times I'm just 
so tired of re-logging in, I'll just stop checking my e-mail. I might do it 
once every three or four hours instead of every 20 minutes.” (P19) 
• “Wednesday, when I recorded things, I was working from home and I was 
using my Mac laptop, and recently we were all forced by the NIST security 
policy to have the Mac centrally managed. That meant some encryption 
software being put on the system. Then the system times out fairly 
frequently and it also reboots if you leave it unattended for roughly 45 
minutes or so. That added significantly to the amount of re-authentication 
I had to do. I have known for awhile that authentication issues have 
become excessively burdensome, I think. They are for everybody, I think, 
regardless of what you're doing, whether it's work or...“ (P21) 
3. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Logging out to 
avoid timed lockouts terminates all processes on a Mac 
• “Yeah, and logging out is bad. Logging is out is bad because it... There's 
such a thing as... If you walk away from here you aren't logged out. Your 
account is locked, in a sense, and you press "Control - Alt - Delete" and 
you can get back in. On a Mac, logging out is a different thing. It means 
all your processes and things you had up on the screen are now 
terminated.” (P21)18 
                                                 
18 This participant may be conflating “logging out” of a user account with “locking” it – the two functions 
do different things. “Logging out” on both Windows and OSX terminates any active processes started by 
the user. “Locking” a computer keeps user processes running, but they will not accept input until the 
computer has been unlocked. On a Mac, this option is called “sleep.” 
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4. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Timed lockouts 
make it more difficult to use laptops 
• “But the computer locks, screen locks more often if you are idle more than 
five minutes. So that's an annoying thing. So I only use this for not a lot of 
tasks, because my main computer's here and then whenever I need to go 
over there, it's always locked. So I have to authenticate. So I try not to use 
that too much.“ (P4) 
5. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Timed lockouts 
disrupt presentations 
• “I'd have 150 people waiting for a presentation. I'm waiting for 15 
minutes for that sucker to boot up, so I can actually use it. Then, because 
I'm not admin[istrator] and I can't change any setting on that box, when 
the screensaver kicks in, then I've got to log it all over again and 
reinitialize everything and start my presentation all over again and figure 
out where I was in the 120 slides that I use and make my way there. All the 
time the audience is - right? That's a combination of security and other 
miscellaneous things. But, like I said, it gets in the way. You're trying to do 
something, which should be straightforward, but you can't.” (P17) 
6. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Timed lockouts > Even 
preventing timed lockouts is distracting 
• “Yes, I'm trying not to log in that often. And also, if I am logged in, I'll 
keep going in. Hitting ‘check mail’ just to make sure it doesn't time me 
out. And then if I don't need to, you go and you hit ‘check mail.’ And it 
blanks you out. Then you have to close the browser. Go in to reopen it, 
and then sign back in.” (P2) 
• “You end up having to almost set a timer in your head to go back to the 
computer and type something within every 10 minutes or so. And some 
minor studies of productivity I've been involved with indicate that it's 
                                                                                                                                                 
The participant was probably unfamiliar with how to “lock” a Mac. Since NIST Macs were not configured 
with a timed lockout until shortly before this study, the participant never had a reason to try to preemptively 
lock his/her computer (or, rather, put it to sleep), and logged out by accident the first time he/she tried it. 
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better to be focused on a task as opposed to have lots of interruptions 
throughout the day.” (P21) 
D. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication problems can lead to 
primary task failure 
1. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication problems can lead 
to primary task failure > If something is wrong with the authentication for a 
particular application, it’s impossible to use that application 
• “Well, yeah, I was just trying to do a little work over the weekend. I 
reflected on something I was working on, and thought of how to solve the 
problem, and tried to log in and couldn't.” (P14) 
2. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication problems can lead 
to primary task failure > Even coping mechanisms may not prevent major 
authentication problems that cause primary task failure 
• “I don't remember exactly when it was, but I know I just had changed my 
password for a SafeBoot, and I just couldn't find where I'd written it down, 
and I couldn't get it right on the first ten tries.“ (P14) 
• “I ended up having to change a password that day because I got locked 
out of an account. The reason that happened was because I had switched 
computers, where before, I was relying on the browser for my password. 
So I went to the new laptop, I didn't remember it, and I had no way of 
getting the password other than resetting it. The other computer was 
gone.” (P10) 
E. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication creates delays and 
slows work down 
1. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication creates delays and 
slows work down > Sometimes authentication takes longer than the primary 
task it is supposed to enable 
• “All I had to do was go in quickly, electronically sign a form and send it 
on. It took me half an hour because I forgot the password.” (P15) 
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• “It might take me two hours to actually get back in. The actual time I'm 
spending dealing with the website, it can be anywhere from five minutes to 
15 minutes.” (P19) 
• “One of the aspects of security is here they have fixed IP addresses. I can't 
plug my laptop into our wired network, even though it's a NAIS registered 
computer. Can't do that, because it's on the fixed IP address. And none of 
the printers are connected to the wireless except for that one, are 
connected to the wireless printer. That one's physically connected, so you 
can print it. I can't print on our big printers, unless I log into this one 
again. I have to keep two computers running. Well, that's inane. I had 
been keeping notes of a meeting in someone else's office, and I'm on NAIS 
NET. And we were like, "OK, so we can print it off." What you had to go 
through to print the damn thing off! Because we couldn't hook my 
computer up to his printer, the wireless network doesn't access printers. 
And we couldn't just hook, what you would do anywhere else, which is 
unhook it from the back of his computer and hook it into yours. […] And it 
wouldn't do it. You can't do any of that, which just drives me crazy. 
Instead, we have to eventually e-mail it.” (P2) 
• “So basically every time I go to use the computer, which means I have a 
thought or something that I'm trying to keep in my head, it's locked up, 
and now I have to remember this 12-character password so that I can then 
get to what I'm trying to do to write a quick note to remind me of 
something.” (P23) 
2. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication creates delays and 
slows work down > Authentication delays critical, time-sensitive primary 
tasks 
• “In my attention it's a tiny blip, but time wise, I think it does actually still 
take a lot of time. There's a substantial amount of time. Although, you 
know – and I guess this is why you have to do studies for more than just 
one day at a time or something like that, but there are a lot of systems that 
I thought I was going to use on that Wednesday that I didn't end up using. 
And – for instance, if we had had an actual operational emergency or 
some sort of situation where I'd actively have to solve a problem to restore 
our system, I'd probably have to go into my password safe, dig out a few 
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old passwords and things like that which would have completely slowed 
down the process” (P5) 
• “So a situation where authentication has been a real challenge and 
caused real problems, there's one example I can think of where I have a 
system that had completely failed, and I had to restore the system from a 
backup, a procedure that I've done a few times, works flawlessly without 
any problems. In this particular case there was some...just call it a bug 
that interfered with restoring the passwords to this device. These are 
root-level passwords, very low-level and basic passwords you log in to 
control a system, basically, the only account on this device, right? There's 
one account and it's super-user, super-privilege. That password had not 
been properly been reset, or it was...I think it was actually reset to a very, 
very, old password that...in hindsight it was a very, very old password, 
and it took me about three hours to figure out that that was the password 
that was in place and that something had happened in the configuration, 
and it restored a really old password or something like that. So that was 
very, very frustrating. The cost was actually high then. We had three 
hours, or two hours, of complete network failure of major component of 
our network, a major section of our network. So the cost was actually very 
high there, and it was all because the expected outcome of a restore didn't 
happen that way. […] the real cost is with all the people that are not able 
to use their systems and get their work done.” (P5) 
F. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication can require an 
unreasonable amount of time and effort 
1. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication can require an 
unreasonable amount of time and effort > VPN login is complicated and takes 
a long time, especially if one fails to log in on the first attempt 
• “And then the fact that I was realizing that you have to do it so many 
times. You have to log in. First I have to log in to decrypt. And then, I have 
to log in to actually start the computer. Then I have to log in to connect to 
the wireless network. […] You have to put in name and password three 
times before you're fully hooked up. If something goes screwy without 
luck, you have to do it four times because you have to do it once to 
decrypt, once to enter in, and then once to connect to the wireless.” (P2) 
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• “For the e-mail, when I was at home, if I don't do anything on the Web 
page for five minutes or 10 minutes, it will log me out automatically. 
Which that can get frustrating because then I have to close the browser, 
open it up again, use the RSA key, hope I get it right the first time. And I 
can do that 15 or 20 times throughout the day. And a lot of times I'm just 
so tired of re-logging in, I'll just stop checking my e-mail. I might do it 
once every three or four hours instead of every 20 minutes.” (P19) 
• “If I was home and doing that, I would get a lot more irritation. Because 
in order to get into webmail, you have to put in your name, password and 
the PIN, and the secure ID, and your name and domain, and your domain 
name as well. It takes like probably about 20 seconds just to put the stupid 
information in. And then if you get something wrong, it blanks all the 
fields again […] That's just irritating.” (P2) 
2. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Authentication can require an 
unreasonable amount of time and effort > Logging in with the RSA token is 
particularly difficult because it always requires going out of one’s way to look 
something up 
• “It's a bit stupid. Well, the token is a great idea I think, but the way the 
webmail account is done here is I have to give, of course, my user name. I 
have to give my password that I use at least, but also when I use a token 
there is... The token has two parts. One is the PIN number which doesn't 
change and all these numbers that changes every minute.” (P18) 
• “It's this extra, again, effortful stuff. I have to dig around in my bag and 
get the RSA ID token out and then set it on my laptop and then type out the 
number, make sure that you're not typing it right before changes or as it's 
changing or whatever. And it's not something that you just have 
memorized that you just can do automatically. Again, it's that sort of 
effortful, "I have to get the device. I have to look at it. I have to copy what 
it says into my computer, and then enter my password." If it was just me 
entering my password it wouldn't be as big of a deal. […] It's that 
deliberate effortful, conscientious...I really have to stop what I'm doing 
and think about it. Whereas if you're just doing something from muscle 
memory, you don't really even have to think about that.” (P11) 
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G. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > The prospect of dealing with 
authentication discourages the use of course materials and other resources 
• “Once again security has gotten in my way and it takes me extra time because 
now I got to look that one up because I don't use that one often enough.” 
(P17) 
H. Authentication’s impact on primary tasks > Sometimes authentication encourages 
one to stay focused on a primary task for longer 
• “I mean, I might have continued longer than I normally would have so I 
wouldn't have to go back in and do it, possibly. But in a larger sense, it 
wouldn't, other than being an interruption. But I guess I would have stayed 
longer at a task rather than say going down the hall. Because I'd have to go 
back and do it.” (P12) 
• “I think in some ways this is actually a good thing for things like my 
Facebook account. So, on my NIST computer I wouldn't store my password, to 
add a little more friction to logging in so that I wouldn't do it. So I guess that's 
one. But that's kind of a benefit that it keeps me from getting distracted. […] 
And also, I noticed when I was going between the two laptops, so basically 
one of them was the only one I could use to access the Internet, and the other 
one was the one I was writing on. Since I locked the screen in-between times, 
it would keep me more focused on the writing because I wouldn't want to login 
and get going on the other machine, just to do a quick Google search, for 
example. I guess it's enough of a burden, but it made me change my work 
habits.” (P10) 
IV. Coping mechanisms 
A. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques 
1. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > Using a systematic 
method to create new passwords 
• “I used to write down the password for everything, and I recently 
switched, last year I switched, to the system where I have a system for the 
passwords. […] Well, basically, the ones that I use the most and the ones 
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that I have to change, I do under new system. But the ones that I don't use 
often and I didn't have to change them, they're still written down.” (P18) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > Employing a 
memorable sentence as a password mnemonic 
• “I created a sentence. And then I can remember the sentence and use that 
as a device to remember what the actual password is.” (P2) 
• “So instead, if I now have the ability to say, "Take a random phrase from 
a list of song lyrics," or a title of a song and they put some symbols on 
either side. Things that will be useful to the user and they have to 
remember less and can be more secure. I think that's an amazing 
direction.“ (P3) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > “Chunking” a 
password into segments to make it easier to remember and manage 
a) Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > “Chunking” a 
password into segments to make it easier to remember and manage > 
Using coded password hints as a “key” to remember password segments 
• “But if I had multiple phrases, then what I'll do is I'll switch them up, 
and then the password hint I will make a cryptic hint. I don't use these 
actual phrases, but to use an example, if it's D!#, or something like 
that, and then for D is my date of birth, ! Is some other phrase that I 
know, # is some other phrase that I know. And reusing those in 
combination allows me to have the password hint when that's 
available as an option, tell me what the cryptic phrase is.” (P3) 
b) Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > “Chunking” a 
password into segments to make it easier to remember and manage > 
Basing a new password on the previous one by varying some segments 
while keeping others the same 
• “Some of my passwords, when I change them, I'll just have one 
number that will change. So it's like "applesauce5," next time it will be 
"applesauce6."” (P19) 
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• “When I do have to change my passwords, I don't typically change 
them to something drastically different than what I had. If I can 
change a couple characters, I do, and get away with it, if you will. I try 
to relate them to a commonality. All of my passwords, regardless of 
what I'm logging into, have some reference to something that I always 
will remember. I don't want to tell you exactly...” (P9) 
• “You can append things on the end in an ordered fashion, or append 
things on the beginning or better yet, both the end and the beginning. 
But, if you do that while keeping the root, called the root word or root 
phrase, I mean I do use the fancy, "think of a phrase, and then you 
take the first number and then you switch out special symbols for the 
A's" and all that sort of stuff.” (P11) 
4. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > Creating passwords 
that are easy to type 
• “The other thing I try to do is I try to figure out what feels natural when 
I'm typing. I have come up with passwords that I am constantly not typing 
right. To me, I can recall that password, but I can't type it worth a darn, 
consistently well, so I just reset it to something else. Because you have to 
have a capital letter, so if you're hitting shift and the capital letter first 
and that's better for you than half-way through typing you have to hit shift 
and a capital letter, if that's messing you up then move it to the last letter 
or the beginning letter or whatever.” (P9) 
5. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > Using one’s birthday 
(or other memorable date) for PIN creation 
• “And then I type in my PIN, which is my six-digit PIN. […] Which I can 
remember because it's my birthday.” (P12) 
6. Coping mechanisms > Password creation techniques > Creating the password 
for the application with the strictest policy first, then using that password for 
all other applications 
• “Other than that, centralizing it and creating the strongest password for 
centrally possible has been my tactic. Try to get it all in one bucket.“ (P3) 
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• “We go to the password that has the most strict requirements, and if you 
can get a password to work there it'll work everywhere else. Assuming 
that you already know that you've got the right punctuation that will work 
and stuff. E-Approval is one of the ones that has the most strict 
requirements for EnTrust passwords, and that's great. I always start there 
when I have to reset. If that one takes it, I'm safe everywhere else.” (P9) 
B. Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions 
1. Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions > Employing non-password 
authentication mechanisms 
a) Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions > Employing non-
password authentication mechanisms > Biometric systems 
• “Biometrics, it would not be bad, except that it doesn't like my finger.” 
(P2) 
• P23 uses a biometric fingerprint reader. 
• “We have to go to some sort of a single sign-on using biometrics. 
Enough of this business of trying to remember passwords and draw up 
rules for passwords that are designed to secure stuff when passwords 
themselves are not secure.” (P17) 
b) Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions > Employing non-
password authentication mechanisms > PIV card reader 
• “Because I'm in the computer security division, I do understand the 
need for the security. But the places where I've used card readers, I 
find those are just easier. Because all you need to remember are four 
digits. And it's physical.” (P2) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions > Using a password manager 
or vault 
• “Firefox has a password storage scheme where it will remember many 
passwords for you. You can lock them all with one key. When I start up the 
Firefox, it immediately asks me for the key. Then for all of that session it 
will fill in passwords for me with any website that I visit.” (P6) 
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• “It sits up here, as a browser extension for Mozilla or Chrome. I click this. 
Currently, I'm logged in. I had to log in for my master password this 
morning. It will automatically fill the form fields. But it stores things 
encrypted. I have it on my phone as well. It's very accessible.” (P3) 
• P19 uses a password manager: KeePass Password Safe. 
• P23 uses an IronKey (a secure USB drive) to cope with authentication. 
• “The other thing I found out is, I didn't realize how many passwords I had 
memorized. I keep them in an encrypted vault, because it got so difficult to 
memorize those, then I only have to remember one really good password, 
and I can go get...” (P15) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Technological solutions > Keeping passwords cached 
in a Web browser (e.g., Firefox, Internet Explorer) 
• “I guess it was a surprise how much I really leverage cached credentials 
and how much I couldn't live without them, where everything, all of my 
passwords are stored somewhere already. And I completely depend on – I 
really depend on one or two passwords to protect most of them. That was 
a – I've known that for years, and I try to protect my passwords really 
well, but that was a surprise, realizing that almost every authentication I 
made was actually stored somewhere for me. And I couldn't live without 
that. If I had to truly authenticate every single time I went in to check my 
e-mail or every single time I wanted to log into – well, mainly e-mail. E-
mail's a big one, or instant messenger or something like that. I wouldn't do 
it as much. I wouldn't use three different instant messenger clients, you 
know – Yahoo and AOL and G Talk. I wouldn't use them all. I would 
really limit myself.” (P5) 
• P12 keeps some of his/her passwords in the browser cache. 
• P17 has some passwords stored in his/her browser cache and others 
written down. 
C. Coping mechanisms > Keeping a list of passwords for reference 
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1. Coping mechanisms > Keeping a list of passwords for reference > Writing 
digitally (e.g., in an encrypted Notepad file or Word document) 
• “I have a one-password file that I just store passwords in plain text, but 
then that gets encrypted with a really long key that I have to remember. 
That one file I use to store all the passwords of my whole life and I keep 
that backed up in a couple of different places.” (P6) 
• P9 stores passwords on her phone just in case. 
• “Yeah, it can be a pain. And when I'm here, everything I log into, the 
password policy is completely different. So even if I wanted to, the 
password can't be the same. Some of them have to be eight characters, 
some of them have to be 12. So it can't be anything more than 12. So some 
passwords I have are 20 characters, some are 6. And it's just hard to 
remember everything, so I actually load a file on my computer that just 
has every password listed so I can just copy and paste it.” (P19) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Keeping a list of passwords for reference > Writing 
passwords on paper 
• “And everything has to get written down because you can't remember. 
Once you get above five or six then you start writing things down.” (P17) 
• “I do keep a hard copy printout of all my passwords in my fire safe at 
home. So, if things get really desperate, I could go there. But, I feel like I 
shouldn't keep it in the desk drawer here, which I know some people do, 
because these cabinets actually don't really lock. I have the keys that you 
can just pop it right open. So, this one does.” (P11) 
• “It [voice-mail] requires a PIN, and the paper is taped onto the phone.“ 
(P6) 
• P12 keeps some passwords written down in his/her wallet. 
• P17 has some passwords stored in his/her browser cache and others 
written down. 
• “Plus, they have to be punctuations and numbers. I use a password 
scheme with a slight variation, so that no one password is the same. The 
  
 Page 144  
 
 
problem is that different secure sites have different requirements for 
passwords. Some of them require punctuation marks. Some of them forbid 
punctuation marks. So I can't even use one secure password base on all of 
my accounts. It's very frustrating. I manage most of my passwords by 
writing them down on paper.” (P7) 
• “Respondent: Yeah, usually I write down my password when I change it, 
until I get used to the new one. […] Well, I have scraps of paper laying 
around with the password written down. Interviewer: The question is, do 
you destroy it, or do you still keep it? Respondent: I keep it.” (P14) 
• “[T]hat's when I had the most trouble. I remember my passwords pretty 
well, but after I change it I need to write it down on a cheat sheet for a 
little while. Especially with some things like the disk encryption on the 
laptop. If you type the wrong password more than three times it starts 
delaying authentication, it starts with one minute, goes to two minutes, 
then four, and pretty soon you are just shut out.” (P14) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Keeping a list of passwords for reference > Looking up 
passwords in a system for which one has administrative privileges 
• P14 has administrator rights for some systems, so he/she can look up 
forgotten passwords on those systems instead of having to reset them. 
D. Coping mechanisms > Organizing, centralizing, and/or consolidating passwords 
1. Coping mechanisms > Organizing, centralizing, and/or consolidating 
passwords > Using a password manager or vault 
• “Firefox has a password storage scheme where it will remember many 
passwords for you. You can lock them all with one key. When I start up the 
Firefox, it immediately asks me for the key. Then for all of that session it 
will fill in passwords for me with any website that I visit.” (P6) 
• “It sits up here, as a browser extension for Mozilla or Chrome. I click this. 
Currently, I'm logged in. I had to log in for my master password this 
morning. It will automatically fill the form fields. But it stores things 
encrypted. I have it on my phone as well. It's very accessible.” (P3) 
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• P19 uses a password manager: KeePass Password Safe. 
• P23 uses an IronKey (a secure USB drive) to cope with authentication. 
• “The other thing I found out is, I didn't realize how many passwords I had 
memorized. I keep them in an encrypted vault, because it got so difficult to 
memorize those, then I only have to remember one really good password, 
and I can go get...” (P15) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Organizing, centralizing, and/or consolidating 
passwords > Synchronizing one password across multiple applications 
• “Interviewer: Right. So which one do you change first? Do you change 
the main NIST password first and then you change the other ones to keep 
them on the same...? Respondent: Yeah, I change the ones first that I have 
to, and then when I log into something and notice that it's behind, I update 
it. Interviewer: Right, OK. Do you do all of them in one go or do you 
basically next time when you need that one, bring it in line with the 
others? Respondent: Yeah, usually next time I need it, I bring it in line.“ 
(P14) 
• “Other than that, centralizing it and creating the strongest password for 
centrally possible has been my tactic. Try to get it all in one bucket.“ (P3) 
• P14 tries to keep the passwords for several different applications the 
same. 
• “[W]hen they sent an e-mail to say, "Hey, you have several, you know, 
how many days to change your password," and so I change it. And then I 
would go and change everything else so that I would have one password. 
[…] But if one system sent it, I changed it for everything, for everything so 
that I had to remember only one password. “ (P4) 
• “We go to the password that has the most strict requirements, and if you 
can get a password to work there it'll work everywhere else. Assuming 
that you already know that you've got the right punctuation that will work 
and stuff. E-Approval is one of the ones that has the most strict 
requirements for EnTrust passwords, and that's great. I always start there 
when I have to reset. If that one takes it, I'm safe everywhere else.” (P9) 
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3. Coping mechanisms > Organizing, centralizing, and/or consolidating 
passwords > Having categories of passwords for different kinds of 
applications 
• “From even the experts that I have talked to, it's very rare that anybody 
does more than three classes of passwords. Usually those are the three, 
the different variants strengths, often related - not always - but usually 
longer. Then if one doesn't fit, then they'll either bump it up to the 
stronger, if it's a requirement, which is really infuriating. Sometimes the 
system you don't feel calls for that strength.“ (P23) 
• “Well, for a lot of my personal stuff, all my banking passwords are the 
same. I'll have categories, so anything that deals with money is this 
password.” (P19) 
E. Coping mechanisms > Using alternative channels to reduce or avoid the need for 
authentication 
1. Coping mechanisms > Using alternative channels to reduce or avoid the need 
for authentication > E-mailing instead of directly accessing a system 
• “One of the aspects of security is here they have fixed IP addresses. I can't 
plug my laptop into our wired network, even though it's a NAIS registered 
computer. Can't do that, because it's on the fixed IP address. And none of 
the printers are connected to the wireless except for that one, are 
connected to the wireless printer. That one's physically connected, so you 
can print it. I can't print on our big printers, unless I log into this one 
again. I have to keep two computers running. Well, that's inane. I had 
been keeping notes of a meeting in someone else's office, and I'm on NAIS 
NET. And we were like, "OK, so we can print it off." What you had to go 
through to print the damn thing off! Because we couldn't hook my 
computer up to his printer, the wireless network doesn't access printers. 
And we couldn't just hook, what you would do anywhere else, which is 
unhook it from the back of his computer and hook it into yours. […] And it 
wouldn't do it. You can't do any of that, which just drives me crazy. 
Instead, we have to eventually e-mail it.” (P2) 
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• “Our administrative assistants no longer allow us to go to the travel 
website, because we apparently muck it up. This is the reason we say, 
"They create our names and passwords in those, and then they just log in 
as us. […] When I was at [another agency], we had this struggle. Our 
administrative assistant just never let us put our own time in, because she 
said we screwed it up too much. And she had to spend too much time 
fixing it. We would just send it to her in an e-mail, and then she would log 
in as us and put in our time.” (P2) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Using alternative channels to reduce or avoid the need 
for authentication > Going non-digital whenever possible 
• “I mean at some point I just got so infuriated that I just started printing 
out the documents I wanted and carrying them in because I got tired of the 
stupid 15-minute timeout.“ (P23) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Using alternative channels to reduce or avoid the need 
for authentication > Checking e-mail on a BlackBerry rather than a computer 
• “Some people like to get e-mail on their BlackBerry, for example, because 
they don't have to boot up the computer...“ (P9)19 
• “It's funny, because I'll sit here and I can do my e-mail on my desktop, but 
most of the time, if I'm working on a document or something, I just have 
the Blackberry in front of me. It typically gets e-mail before I get it on my 
desktop. I'll just look at the e-mail on my Blackberry and keep working on 
whatever document I'm doing on my desktop. I'm not sure why I do it. I 
guess it's a convenience thing because I don't have to close the document 
and open up... Bring up Outlook. I find it less interruption on the work 
flow. [...] I don't have to interrupt the work I'm working on [...] the 
Blackberry is like a prescreening. I don't need to see that now. I don't need 
to see that. Ooh, that one I need to see it now. A lot of times I'll pop up 
Outlook and say, "OK, I need to see what this was," and deal with it. It is 
                                                 
19 The hard drives on NIST laptops are encrypted with SafeBoot, which prompts the user for a user ID and 
password during the boot process. Checking NIST e-mail on a BlackBerry is a way to avoid the SafeBoot 
authentication prompt.  
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easier to respond on a big keyboard than the Blackberry. The more I'm 
talking about it, it's a prescreening of the e-mail to decide I don't really 
need to interrupt what I'm doing.” (P15) 
4. Coping mechanisms > Using alternative channels to reduce or avoid the need 
for authentication > Using Linux instead of Windows on one’s work PC20 
• P14 Uses Linux rather than Windows because the virus threat to Linux is 
lower. 
F. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management 
1. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management > Doing other things 
while waiting for a slow authentication process 
• “If you count from the first time it asks you for it to the second time it asks 
you for it, I have no idea how long that takes. Because it takes so long, I 
generally go and get a bite to eat.” (P2) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management > Carrying things in a 
bag to have one hand free to use the door card reader comfortably 
• “Like if I'm carrying my lunch or coffee or books or whatever, and trying 
to do it, it's frustrating. So I've just adapted. I just know in advance not to 
carry all this stuff in. […] Local trips, yeah. Or I'll take a big bag. Like 
this morning, I had a bunch of papers, I just put them like with my coffee. 
And just kept one hand free.” (P12) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management > Authenticating ahead 
of time to avoid work delays/interruptions 
• “So it's something where if it's important, if I were expecting an e-mail 
that I had to respond to right away, I might log in, in advance, to get all 
that taken care of. But just to read my e-mail, I'll be here again tomorrow 
morning.” (P14) 
                                                 
20 NIST computers running Linux are configured with the same security and authentication measures as 
computers running Windows or OSX – for example, they lock after 15 minutes of inactivity. 
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• “I'll take it home Thursday night and I'll telework Friday. A lot of times 
I'll just... I like to boot it up Thursday, because they do security scans, too. 
I'll boot it up, log back into the network, and then that way it can do its 
scan or anything before Friday so it's not doing it while I'm trying to 
work. I've turned it on and come in Friday morning and it's still at the 
SafeBoot because I forgot... I got busy doing something else. It will sit 
overnight.” (P15) 
4. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management > Batching primary 
tasks to keep the number of authentication tasks to a minimum 
• “I mean, I might have continued longer than I normally would have so I 
wouldn't have to go back in and do it, possibly. But in a larger sense, it 
wouldn't, other than being an interruption. But I guess I would have 
stayed longer at a task rather than say going down the hall. Because I'd 
have to go back and do it.” (P12) 
• “If I am at home, I try to... Well, I try not to do it multiple times, basically, 
because I know that it's going to take me, to frustrate me to some degree 
so I would check it if necessary but try to batch together.” (P18) 
• P21 sees some advantages of batching. 
5. Coping mechanisms > Planning and time management > Leaving the Outlook 
calendar open for quick access the next day 
• “But every morning, to see that; they force us to use that for our corporate 
time keeping. Every morning when I come in to see what I've got 
scheduled for that day, I have to authenticate myself to Outlook. I have to 
log into this machine and then tell Outlook because it's always logged out. 
[…] Now, if I'm really smart, I will leave it at the end of the day with the 
calendar showing the next day's schedule. So I can look over there and see 
it without having to log in.” (P7) 
G. Coping mechanisms > Miscellaneous coping strategies 
1. Coping mechanisms > Miscellaneous coping strategies > Carrying laptop 
around (and periodically pressing a key or moving the mouse) to avoid re-
authentication due to timed lockout 
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• “[T]he benefit I have is I had a lot of meetings that day and I take my 
laptop with me, and I just close it and take it. It doesn't really require me 
to – I don't lock the screen because I'm not leaving it anywhere. I just go 
from one room to another and take it with me, versus people who leave to 
go to meetings. They need to lock their computer. And then when they 
come back from the meeting, log back in.” (P9) 
2. Coping mechanisms > Miscellaneous coping strategies > Ignoring 
unnecessary requests for credentials rather than following up 
• “Windows pops up this box that says it needs my current credentials and 
that I should lock the screen and log back in. Well, this started happening 
a while ago, maybe a couple of months, once in a while, and I see no 
reason why I need to log out and back in, because I had access to 
everything I need. So, I tried it once I think, and I didn't notice anything 
different, so I just ignored it and dismissed the little popup. […] Yeah, 
there's a little circle with an X and I just click on it. […] some days it pops 
up more than others. This day it happened quite a bit.“ (P14) 
3. Coping mechanisms > Miscellaneous coping strategies > Deducing the 
password for a particular application by looking at the policy 
• “[B]ecause one way I remember my passwords, especially for things 
where the password policies are a little bit more complicated, is I'll look 
at the password policy itself. And then from that I can kind of deduce what 
my password is. […] if I see what the password policy is, I might be able 
to narrow it down to a few that I can try.” (P19) 
4. Coping mechanisms > Miscellaneous coping strategies > Periodically clicking 
the mouse or pressing a key to prevent timed lockout 
• “You end up having to almost set a timer in your head to go back to the 
computer and type something within every 10 minutes or so. And some 
minor studies of productivity I've been involved with indicate that it's 
better to be focused on a task as opposed to have lots of interruptions 
throughout the day.” (P21) 
V. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits 
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A. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Postponing tasks to put off 
or avoid difficult authentication 
• “[L]ast time I needed to sign something, I don't remember if it was a travel 
voucher, it was something I needed to sign. So the secretary e-mails me, tells 
me it's ready for my signature and e-approval. I put it off because I know I 
don't have time to deal with the password reset, I don't have time to do that 
right now, I will do it at the end of the day and then it's too late because you 
can't call because they are not there to reset the password for you. And so this 
drags out over the course of maybe a week or longer and then she in the 
meantime has taken the time to send me another reminder e-mail, and then I 
feel bad because I am wasting her time. But I just couldn't get it done because 
I couldn't remember the thing and I didn't have the time allocated to do the 
whole reset thing. And I know that sounds silly, because you're like, "How 
long can a phone call be?" But it takes time and especially when you have to 
wait for them to do. […] Especially when you have to wait for them to 
generate the thing, and then you have to go downstairs and pick it up. I mean 
that's just a whole category on its own. […] Because it has rippling effects. 
You know, it wasn't just affecting me, it's affecting people that I am calling. 
[…] It's affecting her trying to send me these reminder e-mails and whoever 
else is doing budgeting, I haven't signed for the thing yet. I mean it really has 
this kind of ripple in the pond effect.” (P11) 
• “So it's something where if it's important, if I were expecting an e-mail that I 
had to respond to right away, I might log in, in advance, to get all that taken 
care of. But just to read my e-mail, I'll be here again tomorrow morning.” 
(P14) 
• “Things get put off until when it's, "OK, I have a block of time. It's worth it for 
me to get the token, to log in and to sit there and do like an hour's worth of 
work or half an hour or something like that." […] But if it's for like fleeting 
little, "Oh, I have this great idea" or "I want to send this e-mail" or 
something, then I'm more likely to put it off until I have that sort of block of 
time where a log-in is worth it. […] especially if it's something that wasn't 
actually due. It's after hours. You've already put in your nine hours or 
however many hours you're doing and then you think of something of home, it 
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definitely is less likely that you're going to get online to actually do that thing 
that you're thinking of. You're just going to wait until the next day.” (P11) 
• “[W]hen I'm at home, if I'm downstairs, and even if I have my work laptop 
there which I do. I have a property password, if I have my work laptop there 
and I think, "Oh, I need to send this e-mail," if I have to go upstairs into my 
office and get my RSA token, I am likely to just scribble a note on a piece of 
paper and remember it the next day, hopefully. So, it definitely changes my 
behavior. That's a good question. I had not thought of that. Same thing, like it 
makes me less likely to, if I'm at the airport and I close my laptop to go to the 
restroom or whatever, and I have 15 minutes before the plane's going to 
board or 10 minutes or something like that, if I have to re-authenticate and 
dig out that RSA token, again, then it'll make me less likely to take advantage 
of just a few minutes because it's that, again that kind of level of effort. […] I 
mean if there's something I have to get done, then of course, I will do it. But, 
as far as, "Oh, let me just taking advantage of every last second," you're less 
likely to do that because there's a cost associated with taking advantage of 
that time. […] We know people are sensitive to small, local costs and when I 
hear myself describing the fact that, oh, well me going upstairs to get the thing 
is going to prevent me from doing one e-mail, it sounds kind of silly, but that's 
what happens.” (P11) 
• “Well, let's say I'm working on a Word document and I have to refer to 
somebody's e-mail just to see one of their comments or an attachment of 
something I sent myself or somebody sent me. I'd have to really stop my work 
for five minutes. And if I'm on a roll with something, it's… […] Yeah. It just 
breaks everything. So instead of having to stop, go do this and then come 
back, and then try and get back in the flow of things, I'll just keep going. I'll 
just skip it and maybe come back later. [...] Every time I do that and wait for 
incentives here to check my e-mail, I'll get like five or six e-mails that 
probably people would have preferred a more immediate response.“ (P19) 
B. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less frequently 
1. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less 
frequently > Checking e-mail less frequently, especially when working 
remotely 
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• “But it's one of those things, if I spend eight hours logging into my e-mail, 
I'm not going to have any time to do any work. So I'd rather be doing the 
actual work than waste my time logging in every five minutes.” (P19) 
• “For the e-mail, when I was at home, if I don't do anything on the Web 
page for five minutes or 10 minutes, it will log me out automatically. 
Which that can get frustrating because then I have to close the browser, 
open it up again, use the RSA key, hope I get it right the first time. And I 
can do that 15 or 20 times throughout the day. And a lot of times I'm just 
so tired of re-logging in, I'll just stop checking my e-mail. I might do it 
once every three or four hours instead of every 20 minutes.” (P19) 
• “Respondent: And I just work away, and I have to consciously remember 
to check e-mail. And then whenever I do that, it's already locked, because 
it's usually locked in five minutes or something. It's just some ridiculous 
amount of time like that, so... Interviewer: Do you think...I mean is 
that...so you probably...overall you check your e-mail less frequently 
because of that. Respondent: Yeah.” (P4) 
• “Yeah, because not only do I have to have a computer and the password 
and PIN known, I have to have this thing physically with me. If I forget it 
downstairs or in my car or at work, I can't log in. I have to go downstairs 
or go to my car or go back to work to pick it up. […] I'll forget it in my car 
all the time. Sometimes I'll go get it, sometimes I'll just not check my e-
mail.” (P19) 
• “Well, let's say I'm working on a Word document and I have to refer to 
somebody's e-mail just to see one of their comments or an attachment of 
something I sent myself or somebody sent me. I'd have to really stop my 
work for five minutes. And if I'm on a roll with something, it's… […] Yeah. 
It just breaks everything. So instead of having to stop, go do this and then 
come back, and then try and get back in the flow of things, I'll just keep 
going. I'll just skip it and maybe come back later. [...] Every time I do that 
and wait for incentives here to check my e-mail, I'll get like five or six e-
mails that probably people would have preferred a more immediate 
response.“ (P19) 
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2. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less 
frequently > Checking bank account balance less frequently 
• “You know, like my bank – when I log into online banking or something – 
that's never stored anywhere. That's always out of my memory. Real time 
dynamically all the time, and of course, as a result, I don't log into my 
bank. Well, you know, you don't need to log into your bank 15 times a day 
to check your balances or whatever.” (P5) 
3. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less 
frequently > Working from home less often 
• “[T]here are lots of things that harm productivity, such as the 
inconvenience associated with working from home. I would probably do 
more work from home if there weren't so many security issues associated 
with that.” (P6) 
4. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less 
frequently > Using a laptop less (because of timed lockouts) 
• “But the computer locks, screen locks more often if you are idle more than 
five minutes. So that's an annoying thing. So I only use this for not a lot of 
tasks, because my main computer's here and then whenever I need to go 
over there, it's always locked. So I have to authenticate. So I try not to use 
that too much.“ (P4) 
5. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Doing things less 
frequently > Doing “a little extra work” less often 
• “Things get put off until when it's, "OK, I have a block of time. It's worth it 
for me to get the token, to log in and to sit there and do like an hour's 
worth of work or half an hour or something like that." […] But if it's for 
like fleeting little, "Oh, I have this great idea" or "I want to send this e-
mail" or something, then I'm more likely to put it off until I have that sort 
of block of time where a log-in is worth it. […] especially if it's something 
that wasn't actually due. It's after hours. You've already put in your nine 
hours or however many hours you're doing and then you think of 
something of home, it definitely is less likely that you're going to get online 
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to actually do that thing that you're thinking of. You're just going to wait 
until the next day.” (P11) 
• “[W]hen I'm at home, if I'm downstairs, and even if I have my work laptop 
there which I do. I have a property password, if I have my work laptop 
there and I think, "Oh, I need to send this e-mail," if I have to go upstairs 
into my office and get my RSA token, I am likely to just scribble a note on 
a piece of paper and remember it the next day, hopefully. So, it definitely 
changes my behavior. That's a good question. I had not thought of that. 
Same thing, like it makes me less likely to, if I'm at the airport and I close 
my laptop to go to the restroom or whatever, and I have 15 minutes before 
the plane's going to board or 10 minutes or something like that, if I have 
to re-authenticate and dig out that RSA token, again, then it'll make me 
less likely to take advantage of just a few minutes because it's that, again 
that kind of level of effort. […] I mean if there's something I have to get 
done, then of course, I will do it. But, as far as, "Oh, let me just taking 
advantage of every last second," you're less likely to do that because 
there's a cost associated with taking advantage of that time. […] We know 
people are sensitive to small, local costs and when I hear myself 
describing the fact that, oh, well me going upstairs to get the thing is 
going to prevent me from doing one e-mail, it sounds kind of silly, but 
that's what happens.” (P11) 
C. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Collaborating with people 
from other institutions less (or not at all) 
• “[I]t's very difficult to do real collaborative work with anyone who is not a 
NIST employee. I have research collaborations with people in other 
institutions, but it is just extremely difficult to share files with them, to transfer 
software you're writing, and that sort of thing. To me, the way that security 
impacts work is not that I waste a few seconds typing in a password, but it is 
these things that you just can't do because of the limitations of security policy. 
[…] I can think of cases when I have thought it would be really nice to include 
some person at another university on a software development project, but then 
I realize it is going to be such a tremendous pain to organize that.” (P6) 
D. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Being discouraged from 
traveling 
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• “Also, another really annoying thing is when you go on foreign travel, you 
can't take your own laptop. You must take a laptop that you borrow from the 
IT support group, which is not configured with your software. That's a real 
problem if the purpose of your travel is that you want to share software with 
people that you're working with.” (P6) 
• “Well, I may not travel as much because you have to take a laptop for the 
meetings and so forth and I just didn't want to deal with it.” (P12) 
E. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Giving up on devices 
1. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Giving up on devices > 
PIV card 
• “I actually don't use my PIV card here at work because I forget it in the 
computer a lot. If I leave the building, I can't get back in because that's 
also my access back into the building. […] But this thing, it's just a tiny, 
nearly weightless piece of plastic that you often forget about. So I would 
forget this every single time. And I've been locked out of the building. I've 
been locked out of the floor. I've been reprimanded for leaving this in the 
computer. And there's nothing I could have done other than somehow 
setting reminders every two minutes to don't forget this.” (P19) 
2. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Giving up on devices > 
Laptop 
• “I don't have a laptop. I don't have a laptop, which that was another – 
which one of the reasons why I gave up the laptop was the password thing 
for the SafeBoot. I had all kinds of trouble with that, but that's another 
story. […] Yeah. Yeah, that was one of the reasons why I didn't want to 
deal with the laptop anymore because I could not remember my SafeBoot 
code. I could not remember it. I could not remember it.” (P12) 
• “If I had a NIST laptop I would have to log in twice, once when you turn it 
on because the hard drive's encrypted, and then again to actually get into 
Windows or the operating system. […] So I never wanted a NIST laptop 
for that reason. I don't want to have to log in more times than I need to. 
That goes to the whole password security policy that we have here, is 
everything that leaves NIST has to be encrypted.“ (P19) 
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3. Authentication’s unintended effects on work habits > Giving up on devices > 
Mobile devices 
• “I don't have a mobile device for work. I don't bother. I don't have one for 
my personal either. I mean I have a phone and text. I guess mainly my 
thing is, again, I just try to keep my environment simple. I don't need a lot 
of gadgets that I have to then deal with and manage and all that.” (P9) 
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APPENDIX D: MODELING METHOD EXAMPLES 
Two models based on the GOMS-KLM technique were developed to model a login task 
similar to one NIST employees execute. The first model was developed by a member of 
the research team by manually modeling the task using the prescribed GOMS-KLM 
technique. For this model, the researchers broke the task of logging in to an e-mail app 
down to its most basic elements as prescribed by GOMS-KLM. GOMS-KLM includes 
standard durations (in seconds) for each of these actions, which were used in the task 
breakdown for this model. Table 17 shows an example of a GOMS-KLM sequence for 
the manual login, with each action and its associated time.  
Table 17: Example Keystroke Level Modeling sequence of steps for manually logging into an 
application, with time for each step 
Step Activity GOMS-KLM Task Symbol 
Time 
(in seconds) 
1 Mentally prepare M 1.35 
2 Home hand on mouse H 0.4 
3 Position the cursor over the bookmark P 1.1 
4 Click mouse P1 0.2 
5 Position the cursor over the userid field P 1.1 
6 Click mouse P1 0.2 
7 Home hands on the keyboard H 0.4 
8 Recall userid M 1.35 
9 Enter userid (8 characters) 8 (K) 1.76 
10 Home hand on the mouse H 0.4 
11 Position the cursor over the password field P 1.1 
12 Click mouse P1 0.2 
13 Home hands on the keyboard H 0.4 
14 Recall password M 1.35 
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Step Activity GOMS-KLM Task Symbol 
Time 
(in seconds) 
15 Enter password (8 characters) 8 (K) 1.76 
16 Home hand on the mouse H 0.4 
17 Position the cursor over the submit button P 1.1 
18 Click mouse P1 0.2 
 Total Time  14.77 
 
For the second model, the research team used CogTool, a prototyping tool that predicts 
the amount of time required for a skilled user of an interface to perform a particular task 
based on data provided to the tool. The team performed the actions necessary to log into 
the selected e-mail app (manually and with LastPass) and took a screenshot at each step. 
This sequence of screenshots was then entered into CogTool, along with specifications 
for the buttons and fields used for interactions at each stage (e.g., the number of 
characters to be typed into a certain field). CogTool then assigned cognitive and physical 
components of the task based on the screenshots and information provided. While it used 
standardized GOMS-KLM durations for each task as a baseline, it also calculated its own 
times where possible. These calculations, which were based on Fitts’ Law [8], took into 
account the distance to and size of the target object users needed to click to complete an 
activity. Figure 17 below shows CogTool’s script for the login task. CogTool developers 
assert that CogTool is at least as accurate as GOMS-KLM-only models, and perhaps 
more so [11]. 
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Figure 17: A sample CogTool script for the Keystroke Level Modeling sequence of steps for manually 
logging into an application 
 
